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Introduction
These tragedies marked the first time public health was 
considered central to the nation’s emergency prepared-
ness — marking the beginning of a significant transfor-
mation.  However, the system had been underfunded 
for years, and while officials responded to the attacks as 
best as they could, they often did not have the technol-
ogy, resources, workforce or training needed.  A series 
of expert assessments after September 11 and the an-
thrax events concluded that the public health system 
was “structurally weak in almost every area.”1,2,3
Since then, the field of public health has faced the 
challenge of rebuilding basic capabilities in all 50 
states and territories while also determining how 
to prioritize and plan for the greatest risks — with 
limited resources.  
There are two key aspects of preparedness.  One is to 
support the basic functions of a public health system 
— such as trained epidemiologists, laboratories and 
surveillance systems.  The second is to have the spe-
cialized training, procedures, leadership and coordi-
nated plans in place so first responders and experts have 
clear roles and responsibilities and know what capa-
bilities exist and how to use them during a crisis.  This 
requires ongoing planning and coordination, exercises 
and drills, systems for providing care to large numbers 
of patients when needed, including the ability to rapidly 
distribute vaccines and medications, and a system to 
detect, manage the response and communicate emer-
gencies as soon as they arise.  Preparedness requires 
programs and funds dedicated specifically to building 
core capabilities and understanding what is necessary 
to respond to any hazard or crisis the country faces.
For nine years, the Trust for America’s Health 
(TFAH) has issued the Ready or Not? report to 
provide an independent analysis of progress and 
vulnerabilities in public health preparedness.  The 
reports have found that while a significant invest-
ment has led to a major upgrade in the nation’s 
ability to prevent, diagnose and respond to health 
emergencies, the resources have not been sufficient 
for filling many major gaps.  
Despite these serious ongoing gaps, the Ready or Not? 
reports documented how preparedness had been on an 
upward trajectory until the economic crisis hit.  Since 
then, local, state and federal cuts to public health bud-
gets and staff are starting to erode a decade’s worth of 
progress.  Health departments are increasingly spread 
thin and programs and core capabilities are being cut. 
n  In the past year, 40 states and Washington, D.C. 
have cut funds to public health, 30 states cut their 
budgets for the second year in a row and 15 of 
those have cut their budget three years in a row;
n  Since 2008, 49,310 state and local public health 
department jobs have been lost to layoff and at-
trition — 14,910 in state health agency central 
offices and 34,400 in local health departments;4 
n  Sixty percent of state health agencies have cut en-
tire programs since 2008, while half of all local 
public health departments reported cutting at least 
one program altogether in the last year alone;5 and
n  Federal funds for state and local preparedness de-
clined by 38 percent from fiscal year (FY) 2005 to 
2012 (adjusted for inflation) — and additional cuts 
are expected under budget sequestration.6
This year’s Ready or Not? report examines:
n  Section 1: Examples of specific programs and 
capabilities at-risk for major cuts or elimination; 
n  Section 2: State and local public health 
budget cuts;
s  Commentary: Select Agents and Toxins — Impact 
of Proposed Regulatory Changes on Public Health 
Laboratories — By Chris N. Mangal, MPH, 
Director of Public Health Preparedness and Re-
sponse, Association of Public Health Laboratories
s  Commentary:  Components of a System Put to the 
Test: A Look at North Dakota’s Public Health 
Preparedness System — By Tim Wiedrich, Sec-
tion Chief Emergency Preparedness and Response 
Section, North Dakota Department of Health
n  Section 3: A review of 10 years of progress 
and gaps in preparedness, a timeline of major 
public health preparedness events, and a re-
view of special topics;
s  Commentary: Meta-Leadership Empowers Com-
munity Leaders to Act Together in Times of 
Crisis — By Charles Stokes, president and chief 
executive officer of the CDC Foundation
s  Commentary:  Preparedness and Public Health Sys-
tems and Services Research — By F. Douglas Scutch-
field, MD, principal investigator of the Center for 
Public Health Systems and Services Research at the 
University of Kentucky College of Public Health
3
For the past decade, since the September 11, 2001 and anthrax events, the United States has grappled with how to best prepare for public health emergencies.
4s  Commentary:  Public Health Legal Prepared-
ness in the United States — Q&A with James G. 
Hodge, Jr., JD, LLM, Lincoln Professor of Health 
Law and Ethics and director of the Public Health 
Law and Policy Program and director of the Net-
work for Public Health Law-Western Division at 
the ASU Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law
s  Commentary:  Disaster Preparedness for Mass Casual-
ties from Explosive Devices — the Role of Injury Pre-
vention and Control — By Richard W. Sattin, MD, 
FACP, president-elect of the Society for the Advance-
ment of Violence and Injury Research and professor 
and research director at the Department of Emergency 
Medicine at the Georgia Health Sciences University 
n  Section 4: An examination of areas with major 
gaps in federal policies and recommendations 
for improving all-hazards preparedness — 
particularly in the context of a reauthorized 
Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act 
(PAHPA), including:
l  Dedicated funding for preparedness and for 
strengthening public health infrastructure;
s  Commentary: A Decade of Public Health Pre-
paredness:  A Focus on Oregon — By Melvin 
Kohn, M.D., MPH, State Health Officer and 
Public Health Director, Oregon Health Authority
s  Commentary: Improving Collaboration between 
Federal, State and Local agencies in Planning 
for a Worst Case Scenario: A Broad Aerosolized 
Dispersal of Weaponized Anthrax in a Major 
Metropolitan Area, By Alonzo Plough, PhD, 
MPH, Director of Emergency Preparedness and 
Response  of the Los Angeles County Department 
of Public Health and Member of the Board of 
Directors, Trust for America’s Health
l  Modernizing biosurveillance to rapidly and 
accurately detect outbreaks and threats;
s  Commentary: Surveillance: Essential for Public 
Health Preparedness and Response, By, Jeffrey 
Engel, M.D., State Health Director, Division of 
Public Health, North Carolina Department of 
Health and Human Services
l  Improving research, development and 
availability of vaccines and medications; 
l  Increasing the ability of the public health 
and health care systems to provide mass 
care during emergencies;
l  Working with communities to cope with 
and recover from emergencies;
s  Commentary:  Vulnerability, Resilience and 
Mental Health Considerations in Disaster Plan-
ning and Response: Do Resources Match the 
Rhetoric?  By David Abramson, PhD, MD and 
Irwin Redlener, MD, Columbia University Mail-
man School of Public Health
l  Coordinating public health preparedness 
with strategic implementation of the U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
Food Safety Modernization Act of 2011
s  Commentary: Food Safety: New Law Takes a Big 
Bite Out of the Problem, but Leaves Much on 
the Plate, By By Erik D. Olson, Director of Food 
Programs at The Pew Charitable Trusts
Overall, the report concludes that while it is 
impossible to be prepared for every potential 
threat, it is possible and essential to maintain a 
basic, core level of preparedness and response 
capabilities.  Being prepared means the coun-
try must have enough resources and vigilance to 
prevent what we can and respond when we have 
to.  In an era of scarce resources, it is more im-
portant than ever to think strategically to ensure 
Americans are not left unnecessarily vulnerable.
n  Fifty-one cities — located in 40 states — are at risk for elimi-
nation of cities Readiness Initiative funds, which support the 
ability to rapidly distribute and administer vaccinations and 
medications during emergencies.
n  all 10 state labs with “level 1” chemical threat testing 
status are at risk for losing top level capabilities, which 
could leave the u.s. centers for Disease control (cDc) 
with the only public health lab in the country with full 
chemical testing capabilities.
n  twenty-four states are at risk of losing expert epidemiology sup-
port, which has supplemented state and local gaps in the past.
n  academic preparedness research and training centers are at 
risk due to budget cuts.
n  potential cuts to the national center for environmental health 
(nceh) mean the ability for the u.s. centers for Disease con-
trol and prevention (cDc) to mount a comprehensive response 
to nuclear detonation, radiological attacks, chemical attacks and 
natural disasters is at risk.
n  Forty states and Washington, D.c. cut their state public 
health budgets — 29 states cut their budgets for a second 
year in a row, 15 for three years in a row.
n  Forty-one states had cuts in state and local preparedness 
support through the public health emergency and pre-
paredness (phep) grants from FY 2010 to FY 2011.
n  all 50 states and Washington, D.c. had cuts in the hospital 
preparedness program (hpp) from FY 2010 to FY 2011.
KeY FInDIngs
5Examples of Key Programs 
at Risk For Major Federal 
Funding Cuts
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, CDC has provided more than $7 billion in preparedness funding to states and some major cities.
Federal funds for state and local preparedness 
declined by 38 percent from fiscal year (FY) 2005 
to 2012 (adjusted for inflation) — and additional 
cuts are expected under budget sequestration.
From FY2010 to FY2012, there will be a $72 mil-
lion reduction to PHEP grants from state, local, 
territorial, and tribal funds, a $22 million cut 
to the Academic Centers for Public Health Pre-
paredness and $5 million from the Advanced 
Practice Centers.  
These programs are also at risk based on FY 2012 
and FY 2013 sequestration budget scenarios.  
This section highlights a number of programs 
that are at risk due to the continued funding cuts 
to preparedness and response activities at CDC. 
A number of these programs receive support as 
part of the PHEP cooperative agreement (Cities 
Readiness Initiative, the chemical laboratory pro-
gram, and the Career Epidemiology Field Offi-
cer Program (CEFO)) and others are part of the 
CDC’s operational budget for providing expertise 
and support during national or local crises (sup-
port for environmental health emergencies at the 
National Center on Environmental Health).
TFAH has identified the following CDC pro-
grams as under particular threat as a result of 
proposed additional cuts to preparedness fund-
ing.  This analysis is based in part on a review 
of Administration and Congressional budget 
documents as well as expert assessments of the 
potential impact of cuts.  
1S e c T i o n
the federal role: Includes setting national policies, 
funding programs, overseeing national disease pre-
vention efforts, collecting and disseminating health 
information, building capacity, and directly managing 
some services, and supporting biomedical research 
and production capability.7  some public health 
capabilities, such as the strategic national stockpile 
(sns), are federal assets managed by federal agen-
cies that are available to supplement a state’s and 
community’s response to a public health emergency 
that overwhelms or may overwhelm their capabili-
ties.  public health functions are widely diffused 
across eight federal agencies and two offices.
state and local roles: under u.s. law, state 
governments have primary responsibility for the 
health of their citizens. constitutional “police 
powers” give states the ability to set local 
policies and enact laws and issue regulations 
to protect, preserve and promote the health, 
safety and welfare of their residents. In most 
states, state laws charge local governments with 
responsibility for the health of their citizens.  
state and local health departments and first 
responders are the front line in any public 
health emergency.  
FeDeRal, state anD local publIc health JuRIsDIctIons
6KeY ProGrAmS AT riSK For mAJor FUnDinG cUTS              AnD cUrrenT FUnDinG cUTS 
Level One Chemical 
Labs At Risk for 
Elimination
Cities Readiness Initiative 
Cities At Risk for 
Elimination
At Risk for Losing Career 
Epidemiology Field 
Officer Program Support
At Risk for Losing Preparedness and Emergency Response Learning 
Center Support
At Risk of Losing Prevention and Emergency 
Response Research Center Support
At Risk for Losing 
Environmental 
Threat Support
Cuts to PHEP 
Funding
Cuts to State 
Public Health 
Budget*
Cuts 
to HPP 
Funding
STATE City
Alabama Birmingham 3 University of Alabama School of Public Health Alabama 3 3 3 3
Alaska Anchorage Alaska 3 3
Arizona 3 University of Arizona College of Public Health Arizona 3 3 3 3
Arkansas Little Rock Arkansas 3 3 3
California 3 Riverside, Sacramento Fresno, San Jose 3 California University of California at Berkeley and Los Angeles 3 3 3 3
Colorado Colorado 3 3 3 3
Connecticut New Haven, Hartford Connecticut 3 3 3 3
Delaware Dover Delaware 3 3 3
D.C. D.C. 3 3 3
Florida 3 Orlando, Tampa 3 University of South Florida College of Public Health Florida 3 3 3
Georgia Georgia Emory University 3 3 3 3
Hawaii Honolulu Hawaii 3 3 3
Idaho Boise 3 Idaho 3 3 3 3
Illinois Peoria University of Illinois Illinois 3 3 3 3
Indiana Indianapolis Indiana 3 3 3
Iowa Des Moines University of Iowa College of Public Health Iowa 3 3 3 3
Kansas Wtchita Kansas 3 3 3 3
Kentucky Louisville 3 Kentucky 3 3 3 3
Louisiana Baton Rouge, New Orleans Louisiana 3 3 3
Maine Portland 3 Maine 3 3 3 3
Maryland Baltimore Johns Hopkins University Bloomberg School of Public Health Maryland Johns Hopkins University Bloomberg School of Public Health 3 3 3 3
Massachusetts 3 Harvard University School of Public Health Massachusetts Harvard School of Public Health 3 3 3 3
Michigan 3 3 Michigan 3 3 3
Minnesota 3 3 University of Minnesota School of Public Health Minnesota University of Minnesota 3 3 3 3
Mississippi Jackson 3 Mississippi 3 3 3 3
Missouri Kansas City Missouri 3 3 3 3
Montana Billings 3 Montana 3 3 3
Nebraska Omaha 3 Nebraska 3 3 3 3
Nevada 3 Nevada 3 3 3 3
New Hampshire Manchester New Hampshire 3 3 3
New Jersey Trenton New Jersey 3 3 3 3
New Mexico 3 Albuquerque New Mexico 3 3 3 3
New York 3 Albany, Buffalo 3 Columbia Universtiy Mailman School of Public Health; University of Albany SUNY School of Public Health New York 3 3 3 3
North Carolina Charlotte 3 University of North Carolina Gillings School of Global Public Health North Carolina University of North Carolina 3 3 3 3
North Dakota Fargo 3 North Dakota 3 3
Ohio Cincinnati, Columbus Ohio 3 3 3
Oklahoma Oklahoma City University of Oklahoma College of Public Health Oklahoma 3 3 3 3
Oregon Portland Oregon 3 3 3 3
Pennsylvania 3 Pennsylvania University of Pittsburgh 3 3 3 3
Rhode Island Providence Rhode Island 3 3 3
South Carolina 3 Columbia South Carolina 3 3 3 3
South Dakota Sioux Falls 3 South Dakota 3 3 3
Tennessee Memphis, Nashville 3 Tennessee 3 3 3
Texas San Antonio 3 Texas A&M School of Rural Public Health Texas 3 3 3 3
Utah Salt Lake City Utah 3 3 3 3
Vermont Burlington 3 Vermont 3 3 3 3
Virginia 3 Richmond, Virginia Beach 3 Virginia 3 3 3 3
Washington University of Washington School of Public Health Washington University of Washington 3 3 3 3
West Virginia Charleston 3 West Virginia 3 3 3 3
Wisconsin 3 Milwaukee Wisconsin 3 3 3
Wyoming Cheyenne 3 Wyoming 3 3 3
Total 10 40 24 13 8 50 + D.C. 41 40 + D.C. 50 + D.C.
*2011 budget totals adjusted for inflation
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More than half of the country’s population lives 
in urban areas.  Many experts believe that be-
cause of their density, cities are more likely to 
be the target of a bioterror attack.  
In 2004, CDC created the Cities Readiness Ini-
tiative (CRI), a program that helps cities and 
large metropolitan areas prepare to dispense 
medicine quickly, on a large scale. CRI is funded 
through PHEP.
From 2004 to 2010, CRI expanded from 21 ini-
tial cities and metropolitan areas to include 72 
cities and metropolitan areas — at least one in 
every state.8  
The program focuses primarily on helping these 
cities improve their ability to deliver antibiotics 
to the entire population in that area within 48 
hours of an attack, which is the time window for 
possible effective treatment.  In each metropol-
itan area, health departments have developed 
their own plans.  The primary dispensing model 
for each plan is through Points of Dispensing 
(PODs).  PODs are large public clinics, set up 
to deliver medicine to thousands of people, up 
to 500 per hour.9  In some places, officials have 
developed plans for “closed PODs,” which act 
as public sector clinics at places such as large 
companies, which can distribute medicines to 
employees and their families, to help relieve the 
strain on the public PODs.  Some of distribu-
tion plans depend on school buses, public em-
ployees or postal workers to get medicine to the 
population.10 
In addition to creating plans for the delivery of 
medicine, CRI helps participating areas inte-
grate emergency plans, so that fire, police and 
public health departments, as well as hospitals 
and local governments, are all working together. 
Every year, CDC tests participating cities to 
gauge their readiness.  In a report released 
in September 2011, Public Health Preparedness: 
2011 State-by-State Update on Laboratory Capabili-
ties and Response Readiness Planning, the agency 
found that the national average for the cities’ 
readiness scores increased from 68 out of 100 
in 2007-08 to 88 in 2009-10.  According to the 
report, cities improved most on training, exer-
cise and evaluation, as well as on communicat-
ing information to the public.11
The program received $54 million in FY 2011, 
down from $62 million in FY 2010.12  Further 
proposed cuts to PHEP cooperative agreement 
in FY 2012, could result in 51 cities being cut 
from the program — reducing the number of 
CRI cities from 72 back to the initial 21 cities.13 
8
a.  cItIes ReaDIness InItIatIVe:  51 cItIes at RIsK to be cut 
FRom the pRogRam
9initial 21 cri Areas as of 
2004 — expected to be 
Funded in FY 2012
atlanta, ga
boston, ma
chicago, Il
cleveland, oh
Dallas, tX
Denver, co
Detroit, mI
District of columbia
houston, tX
las Vegas, nV
los angeles, ca
miami, Fl
minneapolis, mn
new York city, nY
philadelphia, pa
phoenix, aZ
pittsburgh, pa
san Diego, ca
san Francisco, ca
seattle, Wa
st. louis, mo
15 cri Areas (Added in 
2005) At risk for elimination 
in FY 2012
baltimore, mD
cincinnati, oH
columbus, oH
indianapolis, in
Kansas city, mo
milwaukee, Wi
orlando, FL
Portland, or
Providence, ri
riverside, cA
Sacramento, cA
San Antonio, TX
San Jose, cA
Tampa, FL
Virginia beach, VA
36 cri Areas (Added 
in 2006) At risk for 
elimination in FY 2012
Albany, nY
Albuquerque, nm
Anchorage, AK
baton rouge, LA
billings, mT
birmingham, AL
boise, iD
buffalo, nY
burlington, VT
charleston, WV
charlotte, nc
cheyenne, WY
columbia, Sc
Des moines, iA
Dover, De
Fargo, nD
Fresno, cA
Hartford, cT
Honolulu, Hi
Jackson, mS
Little rock, Ar
Louisville, KY
manchester, nH
memphis, Tn
nashville, Tn
new Haven, cT
new orleans, LA
oklahoma city, oK
omaha, ne
Peoria, iL
Portland, me
richmond, VA
Salt Lake city, UT
Sioux Falls, SD
Trenton, nJ
Wichita, KS
source: http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2009/RanD_tR640.pdf, p. 55-56
Public health labs have shown dramatic progress 
in the past decade.  In 2010, every lab except 
one increased or maintained their capability to 
respond to chemical threats.
In addition, the laboratories created an effective 
and efficient network, the Laboratory Response 
Network (LRN-c) to respond chemical threats.14 
The LRN-c includes: 
n  Nine Level 3 laboratories, which  perform the 
basic functions that all of the LRN labs have 
— working with hospitals and other first re-
sponders within their jurisdiction to maintain 
competency in clinical specimen collection, 
storage, and shipment; and 
n  Thirty-four Level 2 laboratories have chemists 
who are trained to detect exposure to a num-
ber of toxic chemical agents (analysis of cya-
nide, nerve agents, and toxic metals in human 
samples are examples of Level 2 activities); and
n  Ten Level 1 laboratories provide surge ca-
pacity to CDC and can detect exposure to 
an expanded number of chemical agents, 
including mustard agents, nerve agents and 
other toxic industrial chemicals.  These labs 
expand CDC’s ability to analyze large num-
bers of patient samples when responding to 
large-scale exposure incidents.  
Above the Level 1 labs are those at CDC and the 
Department of Defense (DOD), which test the 
most complex and dangerous samples.  
A report released in September 2011 by CDC, 
Public Health Preparedness:  2011 State-by-State Up-
date on Laboratory Capabilities and Response Readi-
ness Planning, found the most advanced, “Level 
1” LRN-c labs increased their capabilities by 
increasing the number of methods they use to 
rapidly detect chemical agents, from an average 
of 6.7 in 2009 to an average of 8.9 in 2010.15
Over the last two years, funding for Level 1 
chemical labs has been decreased significantly. 
It is unlikely that states will continue to operate 
their Level 1 chemical labs without sustained 
funding from CDC and cuts to the PHEP coop-
erative agreement threaten that funding.
The 10 chemical labs currently at Level 1 status, 
which are at risk if further funding cuts are en-
acted include:  
n  California
n  Florida
n  Massachusetts
n  Michigan
n  Minnesota
n  New Mexico
n  New York
n  South Carolina
n  Virginia
n  Wisconsin
If the chemical testing capabilities are cut from 
these 10 labs, CDC would be the only remaining 
public health lab in the country with this ability.
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b.  publIc health laboRatoRY Response netWoRK:   
chemIcal thReat testIng at RIsK In all 10 state labs WIth 
aDequate chemIcal capabIlItIes anD capacItIes
In addition to responding to chemical threat, the 
laboratories created an effective and efficient 
network, the laboratory Response network 
(lRn-bio) to respond biological threats.16  the 
lRn-bio includes labs with a hierarchy of different 
capabilities, wherein labs with increased capabili-
ties provide support for other labs, consisting of:
n  national laboratories - including those oper-
ated by cDc, u.s. army medical Research 
Institute for Infectious Diseases (usamRIID), 
and the naval medical Research center 
(nmRc) — are responsible for specialized 
strain characterizations, bioforensics, select 
agent activity and handling highly infectious 
biological agents; 
n  Reference laboratories are responsible for inves-
tigation and/or referral of specimens. they are 
made up of more than 100 state and local public 
health, military, international, veterinary, agricul-
ture, food and water testing laboratories; and 
n  sentinel laboratories, which provide routine 
diagnostic services, rule-out and referral steps 
in the identification process. While these 
laboratories may not be equipped to perform 
the same tests as lRn reference laboratories, 
they can test samples.
laboRatoRY Response netWoRK FoR bIologIcal thReats
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according to a survey conducted by the american 
public health laboratory association (aphl) in 
the fall of 2011 about capabilities from august 10, 
2010 to august 9, 2011, funding cuts are nega-
tively impacting the capabilities of many state pub-
lic health laboratories.
cuts to biological Terrorism  
Preparedness Activities
Forty-four percent of state public health labs 
report being unable to renew service or mainte-
nance contracts for instrumentation, 40 percent 
report losing a full-time staff position and 40 
percent report being unable to attend trainings.
cuts to chemical Threat Activities 
thirty percent of state public health reported 
that budget cuts meant they would be unable 
to renew service or maintenance contracts for 
some instruments, 29 percent report being un-
able to expand capabilities for new assays or 
tests, 27 percent report being unable to hire 
staff due to lack of funds, 25 percent report 
being unable to purchase critical equipment and 
23 percent report being unable to attend train-
ings and conferences.
*48 out of 50 states responded to the survey.
2011 suRVeY bY the assocIatIon oF publIc health laboRatoRIes
one of the key components of public health pre-
paredness and response is the ability for labora-
tories to quickly and accurately detect and report 
public health threats. to ensure that a robust sys-
tem is in place, state and local public health labora-
tories that receive cDc public phep cooperative 
agreement funding must build strong partnerships 
with clinical laboratories. these relationships as-
sure that specimens are quickly referred into the 
public health system. the aphl supports strong 
and effective communication and collaboration 
between the public health reference laboratories 
and the sentinel clinical laboratories of the national 
laboratory Response network (lRn). these 
public-private partnerships are the foundation for a 
successful system poised to detect the next threat. 
In fall 2011, aphl conducted a survey of the 
50 state and Washington, D.c. public health 
laboratories.  Forty-eight (94 percent) of labo-
ratories responded to this survey and provided 
the following information on sentinel laboratory 
preparedness and outreach:
n  Forty-eight state public health laboratories 
maintained a list of more than 4,000 active 
sentinel clinical laboratories in their jurisdiction. 
Forty-one of these laboratories utilized a rapid 
method, such as the health alert network 
(han), blast-email or fax, to send messages to 
sentinel clinical laboratories. public health labo-
ratories also utilized the same tools to send rou-
tine updates and information on training events 
and drills to these clinical laboratories. 
In addition to routine communications with 
their sentinel clinical partners, public health 
laboratories provide training on rule-out testing, 
biosafety, packaging and shipping to thousands 
of laboratorians across the us. however, this 
outreach and training is in jeopardy as declining 
funds threaten to reduce personnel, supply and 
travel budgets.  
aphl has established a sentinel laboratory 
partnerships and outreach group, comprised 
of representatives from state and local public 
health laboratories, clinical partners such as the 
american society for microbiology (asm) and 
the american society for clinical pathology, and 
the cDc, to address the status of sentinel and 
public health laboratory relationships to enhance 
overall preparedness and response to emerg-
ing threats. In the coming year, the group will 
review and make recommendations to adopt 
a definition of sentinel clinical laboratories, de-
velop a list of common database elements that 
phep funded state and local public health lRn 
reference laboratories could use to contact 
sentinel laboratories in their jurisdiction and 
further articulate the broad role of public health 
laboratories in support of the sentinel clinical 
laboratories. the more standardized definition 
and contact databases will help public health 
laboratories to perform more targeted outreach 
to sentinel clinical partners. 
sentInel laboRatoRY paRtneRshIps anD outReach 
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Select Agents and Toxins — Impact of 
Proposed Regulatory Changes on Public 
Health Laboratories
By Chris N. Mangal, MPH, Director of Public Health Preparedness and Response, APHL
The events of september 11, 2001 reinforced the need to enhance public health prepared-
ness and response across the united states. Recog-
nizing this gap, congress passed the public health 
security and bioterrorism preparedness and Re-
sponse act of 2002 (“the bioterrorism Response 
act” or “the act”) (pl107-188)17, which president 
george W. bush signed into law on June 12, 2002. 
In  addition to bolstering laboratory preparedness 
and response capability at cDc and in public health 
laboratories across the united states, the act also 
addressed the need to enhance controls on danger-
ous biological select agents and toxins (bsat) agents 
by establishing a bsat list; regulating the possession, 
transfer and use of bsat; maintaining databases of 
and inspecting facilities that possessed the agents; and 
screening personnel with access to such agents.  the 
act culminated with the implementation of the final 
select agents Regulations (saR) (42 cFR part 73, 7 
cFR part 331 and 9 cFR part 121) in april 2005. 
since the implementation of the saR, cDc and the 
us Department of agriculture (usDa) have main-
tained the national select agent Registry (nsaR) 
and have routinely inspected facilities which possess 
bsat. public health laboratories which possess lim-
ited quantities of biological select agents and toxins 
for quality assurance and control purposes are typi-
cally regulated by the cDc select agent program 
(sap). Further, these laboratories are also regulated 
under occupational safety and hazard administra-
tion (osha), national environmental laboratory 
accreditation commission (nelac), clinical labo-
ratory Improvement amendments (clIa), and the 
college of american pathologists (cap).  
In July 2010, president barack obama signed execu-
tive order 13546, Optimizing the Security of Biological 
Select Agents and Toxins in the United States, noting 
that the “absence of clearly defined, risk-based se-
curity measures in the saR/sap has raised concern 
about the need for optimized security and for risk 
management.”18 the executive order directed the 
secretaries the Department of health and human 
services (hhs) and the usDa to designate a sub-
set of the select agents and toxins list (tier 1) that 
presents the greatest risk of deliberate misuse with 
the most significant potential for mass casualties or 
devastating effects to the economy, critical infra-
structure; or public confidence; explore options for 
graded protection for these tier 1 agents and toxins 
to permit tailored risk management practices based 
upon relevant contextual factors; and consider reduc-
ing the overall number of agents and toxins on the 
select agents and toxins list. Further, the order es-
tablished the Federal experts security advisory panel 
(Fesap) to provide advice to the secretaries on the 
select agent program security including:
n  the composition and potential reduction of the 
biological select agents and toxins (bsat) list, 
including the development of “tier 1 agents,” 
which pose the greatest risk for intentional misuse 
n  measures to enhance reliability of personnel 
with access to tier 1 bsat 
n  standards for physical and cyber security for 
facilities possessing tier 1 bsat 
n  emerging policy issues relevant to the security 
of bsat
the concept of a tiered approach to regulating se-
lect agents and toxins assumes that more optimized 
security measures can be implemented for agents 
that pose a higher risk to public health and safety. 
however, the proposed changes articulated in the 
october 2011 Federal Register notice, Possession, 
Use and Transfer of Select Agents and Toxins; Bien-
nial Review; Proposed Rule, per the Federal Register 
volume 76, no. 191, october 3, 2011,19 does not 
take into account the unique role public health labo-
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ratories play in the laboratory Response network 
(lRn), a national asset in place to ensure a rapid re-
sponse to public health and emerging threats. the 
lRn, formed in 1999 through a partnership between 
cDc, the Federal bureau of Investigation (FbI) and 
aphl, is the nation’s premier laboratory network 
serving as a model for all other networks, respond-
ing to actual events on a daily basis and continually 
proving its utility during events such as amerithrax, 
the h1n1 pandemic, disease outbreaks and natural 
disasters. the true value of the lRn is demonstrated 
through the communications and relationships built 
with clinicians, hospitals, law enforcement, first re-
sponder and epidemiology communities.  these well 
established partnerships are the cornerstone that al-
lows the lRn to effectively respond to all threats.  
the proposed changes would adversely impact 
the public health laboratories, which comprise 70 
percent of the lRn, by jeopardizing the ability of 
these laboratories to respond to biological threats. 
In september 201020 and again in July 201121, aphl 
participated in meetings of the Fesap to provide 
input on the final recommendations issued in their 
report, Recommendations concerning the select 
agent program released on June 12, 2011.22 aphl 
informed the panel of existing biosecurity practices 
within state and local public health laboratories that 
comprise the lRn and the impact of changes to the 
select agent regulations on these laboratories.  
aphl has publicly commented on the proposed 
rule, calling for: 
n  exemption of all lRn reference laboratories from 
the proposed tier 1 requirements. aphl encour-
aged the select agent program to consider the 
recommendation from the Fesap, where they 
noted: The FESAP recognizes that there are unique 
facilities such as diagnostic, public health, animal 
health, and environmental laboratories, such as the 
laboratories of the Laboratory Response Network, 
which perform a vital national security function and 
may require different methods of implementation of 
the recommended standards. In these instances, the 
FESAP encourages the Select Agent Program, through 
their authority in Section 4 of E.O. 13546, to “ex-
plore options for graded protection of Tier 1 agents 
and toxins… to permit tailored risk management 
practices based upon relevant contextual factors.” 
n  Representation of local and state public health 
laboratories during the development of codifying 
changes and guidance documents; and 
n  Removal of Bacillus anthracis pasteur strain, bot-
ulinum neurotoxin, and toxin-producing strains 
of Clostridium botulinum from tier 1 designation.
Further, aphl also noted:
n  additional costs to comply with the proposed 
changes to the rule would adversely impact 
other critical public health programs that are 
supported by state and local public health labora-
tories, many of which have had to take significant 
budget reductions during the past three years.
n  public health laboratories already foster an 
environment of biosafety and biosecurity to 
protect against physical and cyber attacks and 
insider threats.
n  promoting continued exemplary practices of en-
gaging leadership, encouraging teamwork, build-
ing relationships with employees and providing 
ethics training has greater value than the use of a 
“spot in time” personnel reliability program. 
n  additional requirements for select agents may 
result in some laboratories abandoning the 
lRn, resulting in a weakened capability for 
national response. 
n  modifying occupational health programs or add-
ing personnel reliability program requirements 
will put further strain, including legal ramifica-
tions for request for health information, on 
laboratories already facing worker shortages.   
n  Increased biosecurity requirements will be 
damaging to public health laboratories storing 
limited quantities of bsat used during response 
to public health emergencies and would com-
promise lab preparedness and the ability of the 
us to detect and respond to threats.
aphl continues to monitor changes to the select 
agent Regulations, providing feedback to federal 
officials to ensure that public health laboratories are 
not adversely affected and that robust biosecurity 
and biosafety practices implemented within pub-
lic health laboratories remain in place to protect 
against public health threats.  
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c.  caReeR epIDemIologY FIelD oFFIceR pRogRam:  24 states 
at RIsK to lose epIDemIologY suppoRt
In 2002, CDC developed a program to help 
state, territorial, and local health departments 
strengthen their epidemiologic capability for 
public health preparedness and response.  The 
Career Epidemiology Field Officer (CEFO) Pro-
gram assigns CDC epidemiologists at the request 
of state, territorial  or local health departments. 
The program has filled a critical gap by establish-
ing a system to assign well-trained, highly capa-
ble epidemiology staff to provide direct support 
and assistance to health departments.23 
All CEFOs have completed CDC’s Epidemic In-
telligence Service (EIS) training or comparable 
training.  Once assigned to a location, CEFOs 
take on a range of roles:  
n  Developing and strengthening state and local 
surveillance systems;
n  Investigating major health problems; 
n  Training local staff; 
n  Helping develop local public health emer-
gency plans and disaster-response exercises;
n  Coordinating local response to disasters and out-
breaks with CDC and other federal agencies; and
n  Fostering cooperation between emergency 
responders, health care providers and other 
agencies involved in disaster response. 
Over the past decade, CEFOs have played es-
sential roles in a wide range of incidents.  For 
example, a CEFO assigned in New York City 
helped the city respond in the early stages of the 
H1N1 flu epidemic, tracking cases among high 
school students who had returned from spring 
break in Mexico.24  A CEFO in Kentucky orga-
nized and led the emergency needs assessments 
for over 7,000 persons in temporary shelters fol-
lowing the 2009 ice storm.  The CEFO in North 
Dakota served as Planning Chief for the state’s 
public health emergency response to the 2010 
Red River flooding.  The CEFO in Mississippi es-
tablished surveillance to monitor health effects 
in coastal residents following the Gulf oil spill.
As of November 2011, the program had 32 
epidemiologists working in 24 states.25  The 
program is supported as part of the PHEP co-
operative agreement.  Under the FY2012 cuts to 
state and local preparedness programs at CDC, 
states that currently have CEFOs could lose the 
support, including:
n  Alabama
n  Arizona
n  California
n  Florida
n  Idaho
n  Kentucky
n  Maine
n  Michigan
n  Minnesota
n  Mississippi
n  Montana
n  North Carolina
n  North Dakota
n  Nebraska
n  Nevada
n  New York
n  Pennsylvania
n  South Dakota
n  Tennessee
n  Texas
n  Virginia
n  Vermont
n  West Virginia
n  Wyoming  
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D.  pRepaReDness anD emeRgencY Response leaRnIng 
centeRs: 14 unIVeRsItIes at RIsK to lose FunDs FRom 
cuts to the tRaInIng pRogRam
In 2010, 14 universities around the country 
received funding to create Preparedness 
and Emergency Response Learning Centers 
(PERLCs) to help train and educate public 
health workers on disaster preparedness 
and response.  PERLCs are designed to help 
integrate federal and local disaster response 
by educating workers and officials on federal 
standards and strategies.26  
A number of local public health officials have 
said these programs help fill a crucial gap. 
“Many people in critical public health roles 
don’t come through with formal training,” said 
then New York State Health Commissioner Dr. 
Richard F. Daines.  “They… desperately need 
the support of academic training.”27  
Some PERLCs are expanding on schools’ exist-
ing work.  For instance, at Harvard, the PERLC 
replaces the Harvard Center for Public Health 
Preparedness, which began in 2002.  Over the 
last nine years, the center has trained nearly 
33,000 students and organized drills and exer-
cises involving more than 6,000 public health 
officials.28  Over the past decade, Columbia Uni-
versity’s PERLC, the Columbia Regional Learn-
ing Center (CRLC), has trained 100,000 public 
health workers across the country.  Because 
the center uses online training for many of its 
classes, a significant number of these workers 
are outside the school’s immediate area.29
CDC originally announced that the centers would 
be funded for five years.  But in the FY 2011 fed-
eral budget, the PERLC budget was reduced by 
30 percent.  The Academic Centers for Public 
Health Preparedness, which include the PERLCs 
and Preparedness and Emergency Reseponse Re-
search Centers (PERRCs), are scheduled for $10 
million in additional cuts in FY 2012.30, 31  
In FY 2011, $13 million in grants were awarded 
to the 14 institutions listed below, with the 
grants totaling approximately $940,000 each.32 
The federal funds for these programs will be 
significantly cut in 2012:
n  Columbia University Mailman School of Pub-
lic Health, New York, NY
n  Harvard University School of Public Health, 
Boston, MA
n  Johns Hopkins University Bloomberg School 
of Public Health, Baltimore, MD
n  Texas A&M School of Rural Public Health, 
College Station, TX
n  University at Albany SUNY School of Public 
Health, Albany, NY
n  University of Alabama School of Public 
Health, Birmingham, AL
n  University of Arizona College of Public 
Health, Tuscan, AZ
n  University of Illinois, Chicago, Illinois
n  University of Iowa College of Public Health, 
Iowa City, IA
n  University of Minnesota School of Public 
Health, Minneapolis, MN
n  University of North Carolina Gillings School 
of Global Public Health, Chapel Hill, NC
n  University of Oklahoma College of Public 
Health, Oklahoma City, OK
n  University of South Florida College of Public 
Health, Tampa, FL
n  University of Washington School of Public 
Health, Seattle, WA
e.  pRepaReDness anD emeRgencY Response ReseaRch 
centeRs: nIne unIVeRsItIes at RIsK to lose FunDs FRom 
cuts to the pRogRam
One of the major ongoing gaps in preparedness 
is understanding ways to measure standards and 
create performance metrics.
In 2008 and 2009, CDC awarded $13.6 million 
to nine schools of public health around the 
country to help them form Preparedness and 
Emergency Response Research Centers (PER-
RCs).33  The goal of these centers is to study key 
questions about how best to respond to disas-
ters and emergencies, and then to translate that 
knowledge into practical guidelines that can be 
adopted by public health departments across 
the country.  
Each center is undertaking three or four re-
search projects, focusing on a different area of 
study.  The research topics, which have been 
recommended by the Institute of Medicine 
(IOM), include: 
So far, the research has resulted in the 
publication of 64 peer-reviewed articles.34
For FY 2011, CDC cut the overall PERRC budget 
by approximately 40 percent.35  The FY 2012 
budget significantly cuts funding for PERRCs.36 
Depending on how CDC allocates cuts to the 
PERRCs and PERLCS, any of the nine research 
centers could be eliminated in 2012.
School research Priority Award
emory university (atlanta, ga) create and maintain sustainable preparedness and  
response systems
$1,562,676
harvard university (boston, ma) generate criteria and metrics to measure effectiveness  
and efficiency
$1,717,286
Johns hopkins university   
(baltimore, mD)
preparedness to address the risks of vulnerable populations $1,495,398
university of california (berkeley, ca)* achieve public health and community readiness for today’s 
challenges and future threats
$1,506,306
university of california*  
(los angeles, ca)
preparedness and emergency Response centers: a public 
health systems approach
$1,193,365
university of minnesota (minneapolis, 
mn)
enhance the usefulness of training $1,470,307
university of north carolina  
(chapel hill, nc)
create and maintain sustainable preparedness and response 
systems
$1,695,189
university of pittsburgh (pittsburgh, pa) create and maintain sustainable preparedness and response 
systems and generate criteria and metrics to measure 
effectiveness and efficiency
$1,701,845
university of Washington  (seattle, Wa) Improve communications in preparedness and response $1,270,632
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*Funded FY 2003-2013 
source: http://www.cdc.gov/phpr/documents/science/peRRc_Fact_sheet.pdf
F.  natIonal centeR on enVIRonmental health (nceh) 
anD agencY FoR toXIc substances anD DIsease RegIstRY 
(atsDR) pRogRam:  compRehensIVe Response capabIlItIes 
FoR nucleaR DetonatIon, RaDIologIcal attacKs, 
chemIcal attacKs anD natuRal DIsasteRs at RIsK
The National Center for Environmental Health 
and the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease 
Registry (NCEH/ATSDR) lead CDC in developing 
national, coordinated, science-based responses to 
deal with the health concerns resulting from envi-
ronmental threats. Environmental health threats 
comprised eight out of 15 “all-hazard” planning 
scenarios that were released in 2005 for use in na-
tional, federal, state and local homeland security 
preparedness activities including:
n  Nuclear detonation;
n  Radiological attacks or accidents;
n  Chemical attacks or accidents, including blis-
ter agents, toxic industrial chemicals, nerve 
agents and chlorine explosions; and 
n  Natural disasters, including major earth-
quakes and hurricanes.37
These scenarios were “designed to be the foun-
dational structure for the development of na-
tional preparedness standards from which 
homeland security capabilities can be measured 
because they represent threats or hazards of na-
tional significance with high consequence.”38 
Additionally, natural disasters to date have 
caused more fatalities and destruction in the 
United States than any others.
In FY 2011, NCEH received around $2.7 mil-
lion to support emergency preparedness and re-
sponse activities.  In addition, in FY 2011, NCEH 
received $3.5 million in support from CDC’s Of-
fice of Public Health Preparedness and Response 
(OPHPR) for activities related to radiological 
emergency preparedness and response and $2.3 
million from OPHPR for maintaining and en-
hancing CDC radiological laboratory capacity to 
respond to a radiological or nuclear emergency. 
NCEH/ATSDR has led CDC’s response to the 
public health challenges of diverse environmen-
tal emergencies. These include the Deepwater 
Horizon oil spill, the Fukushima nuclear power 
plant disaster, and every hurricane response in-
cluding major disasters such as Katrina (2005) 
and Gustav and Ike (2008).  With cuts proposed 
to CDC’s preparedness activities in the FY 2012 
budget, the agency would need to prioritize 
where internal resources should be targeted. 
CDC officials have indicated that support for 
preparedness activities at NCEH/ATSDR, like 
support for other CDC preparedness programs 
addressing infectious diseases, mass trauma, and 
other threats, could be eliminated in order to 
provide sufficient resources to other priorities. 
Without these funds, CDC would have limited 
capability to assist all 50 states and Washington, 
D.C. in the response to natural disasters or with 
incidents involving toxic substance releases or ra-
diological exposures through contamination as-
sessments, field investigations and issuing expert 
guidance on protective actions.
In addition, if the approximately $1.7 million in 
preparedness funding for poison center (PC) 
surveillance was cut, it would mean: 
n  All national surveillance efforts for chemical 
and radiological exposures and illness would 
stop (there is currently no alternative system 
available which could replace this);
n  NCEH-CDC would no longer be able to 
honor requests for assistance from  other 
Departments, including DHS, and Agencies, 
FDA, EPA in particular, with regard to poison 
center data in a public health emergency; 
n  Maintenance and support would cease for 
the web-based National Poison Control Data 
System (NPDS) services used by state public 
health departments and BioSense agencies;
n  Maintenance and support of PC upload of 
data to NPDS would cease;
n  NCEH-CDC would lose their unrestricted access 
to the national poison center database; and
n  NCEH-CDC would no longer be able to per-
form customized, incident-specific surveil-
lance for exposures and illness from a public 
health threats where this has been utilized in 
the past such as carbon monoxide poison-
ing from hurricanes, oil exposures from the 
Deepwater Horizon incident, adverse effects 
from medical countermeasures used during 
the 2011 Japan nuclear incident.
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In a september 2011 commentary in the british 
medical journal The Lancet, ali s. Khan, m.D., 
m.p.h, director of cDc’s ophpR, noted that 
state and local health departments had lost more 
than 44,000 jobs between 2008 and 2010.  since 
then, the number as risen to nearly 50,000.  
Khan wrote that “(s)tates cannot adequately 
meet everyday needs, let alone increased efforts 
for emergency incidents that have potential na-
tional implications, without reliable, dedicated, or 
sustained federal funding.  because all responses 
are initially local, this limitation is the primary vul-
nerability to national preparedness.”39
Khan argued that in the aftermath of the sept. 
11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the anthrax at-
tacks later that year, the country realized that it 
wasn’t properly prepared for such events.  since 
then, federal, state and local governments have 
taken important steps to improve their capacity 
to respond to attacks and disasters:40
n  In 2006, congress passed the pandemic and 
all-hazards preparedness act (papha), 
which created a comprehensive framework 
for dealing with threats; 
n  Increased federal funding helped improve epi-
demiological capacity, as well as the stockpile 
of medicines to respond to specific threats, 
including anthrax, smallpox, tularemia, and 
some chemical and nerve agents;
n  cDc funding expanded the network of 
laboratories that analyze and diagnose 
bioterrorism agents as well as naturally 
occurring hazardous microbes; and
n  cDc now has a cutting-edge emergency 
operations center; 10 years ago, it had only a 
makeshift center.  
Khan said that these improvements in prepared-
ness have helped public health departments’ 
ability to respond to a range of emergencies.  
he noted that in 2009, cDc and other groups 
responded effectively to the discovery of the 
h1n1 flu strain, quickly developing a vaccine.
he also pointed out that the increased capacity 
helps in public health departments’ routine opera-
tion.  “the us government is increasingly recog-
nising [sic] that preparedness and core (routine) 
investments in public health are synergistic,” he 
wrote.  “large-scale and unpredictable natural, ac-
cidental, or intentionally caused disease outbreaks 
and environmental disasters need many of the 
same routine surveillance, laboratory, risk commu-
nication, and other core public health systems.”
at the same time, he said, recent funding cuts, 
driven by the economic crisis as well as political 
considerations, have threatened these develop-
ments.  he noted that a 2009 survey found that 
35 percent of state epidemiologists reported 
that they did not have substantial-to-full capacity 
for an emergency response to a bioterror attack 
— a 10 percent increase since federal prepared-
ness funding hit a peak seven years ago.41
In the same issue of The Lancet, two new York 
city health Department officials authored a 
commentary on how their agency has improved 
its disaster response abilities.42  thomas a. Far-
ley and Isaac Weisfuse, both of the new York 
city Department of health and mental health 
(Dhmh), write that over the past decade, the 
agency has taken several key steps.  It has:  
n  created a volunteer medical Reserve corps, 
made up of 9,000 medical professionals, who 
can help the city during emergencies;
n  established a formal incident command system, 
which gives all of the agency’s 6,000 workers 
specific responsibilities during an emergency; 
n  set up two emergency operations centers at differ-
ent sites, in case one is unusable in a disaster; and
n  Developed an electronic medical surveillance 
system that includes almost all city hospital 
emergency departments.43
the authors single out two areas in which the 
disaster community must improve: strategies for 
cleaning up anthrax from the environment, and 
how to most efficiently distribute medicine to 
large populations during a disaster or epidemic.
In another september commentary in the Journal 
of the American Medical Association, thomas V. 
Inglesby of the center for biosecurity of the uni-
versity of pittsburgh medical center agreed that 
disaster preparedness had improved significantly 
over the past decade, largely because the federal 
government increased funding.44  he also noted 
that social media, including Facebook and twitter, 
have played a key role in helping both the public 
and responders share information quickly.
at the same time, he wrote, the disaster re-
sponse community must continue to hone its 
strategies and provide adequate funding.45
“commitment to a stable level of investment in 
disaster preparedness at the federal, state, and 
local levels is needed,” he wrote.  “the gains of 
the last 10 years are now at risk with this de-
creased funding and will be further threatened if 
resources continue to decline.”46
oFFIcIals VoIce conceRn oVeR pRepaReDness spenDIng cuts
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Components of a System Put to the Test: A Look at 
North Dakota’s Public Health Preparedness System
By Tim Wiedrich, Section Chief Emergency Preparedness and Response Section, North Dakota Department of Health
To safeguard the public’s health and ensure public safety, north Dakota has built an integrated preparedness system 
that features six main components. these components are the 
result of a strategic approach to preparedness focusing on an 
all-hazards approach.
the investments in public health and preparedness over the 
last decade have helped us develop our preparedness systems 
and these components. these investments have been critical 
for building capabilities and capacity. as the economic situation 
continues to worsen, the potential for further funding cuts could 
put these advancements at significant risk. 
component 1: Statewide Tactical communications 
north Dakota has a secure and redundant wide-area network 
that includes a variety of technologies (video conference, data, 
Voice over Ip, teleconference, web streaming and others) to 
connect public health, hospitals, long-term care facilities and 
emergency medical services (ems). 
We also have wireless routers in every hospital and trailer-based 
(which includes satellites, VhF public safety, VhF repeaters and 
cell phone repeaters) and kit-based (which includes satellite-bgan 
with data and voice, public safety radios with VhF and commer-
cial wireless with data and voice) communication systems.
to truly be prepared, responders must be able to communicate 
with each other during public health emergencies. north Dakota 
strategically created flexible communications channels that can 
be utilized during any kind of emergency. through our statewide 
tactical communications component, everyone involved in public 
health preparedness shares a common operating picture and can 
stay in contact no matter the emergency.
component 2: command and control
the north Dakota Department of health, like most other state 
health departments, has an emergency operations center. our 
operations center houses a trained staff of 50 personnel who 
undergo quarterly training programs. In addition, the depart-
ment is committed to the national Incident management sys-
tem (nIms), which ensures public health proactively works with 
other parts of government, nongovernment organizations and 
the private sector to respond to emergencies. 
through our statewide situational awareness, each aspect of an 
emergency response is integrated and connected; for example, 
from the vehicle (such as ambulances) and staff staging areas to 
the sending facility to the receiving facility. every part of the staff, 
patient, transportation and destination is tracked step by step 
through command and control. 
north Dakota has also built a statewide health alert network 
notification system that ensures public health departments and 
the medical community share information rapidly.
our command and control systems allow responders to take 
action on a common operating picture, which is shared through 
the statewide tactical communications, to coordinate operations 
among a variety of different responders in different locations.
component 3: State medical cache
much like the strategic national stockpile, north Dakota has a 
state medical cache that includes: 
n  Warehouse and delivery;
n  pre-hospital stabilization and staging, which include trailer-
based kits that feature ten beds that can surge to 20; 
n  state medical shelters for low acuity patients;
n  ancillary medical equipment;
n  bus conversion kits, which ensure transport for wheelchairs 
and stretchers; and 
n  tent sheltering. 
our state’s warehouse and delivery system is a 23,000 square foot 
facility that houses medical supplies, pharmaceuticals, wrap-around 
supplies and equipment and other public health emergency essen-
tials. the entire cache is standardized, palletized and deliverable by 
cargo.  supplies and equipment are ordered by medical and public 
health providers through an online ordering process.
We can quickly transport medicines, materials and people across 
the state during an emergency through our state medical cache.
component 4: Just-in-Time Training
north Dakota has the ability to reach out to the medical com-
munity and distribute educational information and rapidly teach 
them techniques and information they need using our just-in-
time training component. For example, in 2002, the federal gov-
ernment initiated a smallpox vaccination program to inoculate 
key medical and public health responders. because smallpox 
vaccination had not been done for several decades, medical 
professionals were no longer familiar with the technique. Just-
in-time training delivered through a distance learning system 
provided an effective mechanism to rapidly build this capability. 
the just-in-time distance learning system includes live and ar-
chived web/video conference capabilities that can be broadcast 
through dedicated wide area networks, the public internet and 
public access television.
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component 5: Planning and response contracts
north Dakota has created and entered into planning and re-
sponse contracts that determine, in advance, important aspects 
of emergency response. this includes things like medical shel-
ters, pharmaceutical and transportation access, services and 
many other aspects. 
the planning contracts have been made with local public health 
departments, the long term care association and the hospital 
association. Response contracts also exist with ems, universi-
ties, bus companies, pharmaceutical distributors and medical 
supply and equipment distributors. 
During emergencies, the contracts are activated to obtain the 
resources required to respond.
component 6: medical reserve corps, emergency 
System for Advanced registration of Volunteer Health 
Professionals (eSAr-VHP)
In north Dakota, the medical Reserve corps and esaR-Vhp are 
a single statewide system. the system has credentialed more 
than 800 medical professionals and has the capability of notify-
ing all 17,000 licensed medical providers in the state to rapidly 
credential and deploy personnel.   north Dakota state law estab-
lished a single esaR-Vhp registry operated by the state health 
department and provides tort protection when medical provid-
ers are activated under the auspices of the state response system.
our Preparedness System, Tested
beginning in 2009, these systems were put to substantial test. 
In 2009, north Dakota experienced extensive flooding along the 
Red River, which impacted Fargo, Valley city and other com-
munities in the eastern part of the state. the flooding required 
public health to create a major evacuation process for thousands 
of hospital patients, long-term care residents and other vulner-
able populations. the evacuation included movement of these 
groups across a three-state area. 
the difficulty of the response was exacerbated by an incredible 
spring blizzard that hit the interstate roads and closed down 
traffic during the evacuation. We relied on our systems to go 
beyond what our initial plan had contemplated to press other 
types of evacuation processes. We worked with the private sec-
tor to secure commercial airplanes to transfer people. Delta/
northwest provided two large commercial aircrafts to do mul-
tiple round trips. 
Immediately after the flooding subsided, Influenza a (h1n1) was 
spreading across north america. obviously, this presented a far 
different public health emergency. however, at the end of the 
day, the same six components were utilized to manage and miti-
gate the issues. For example, vaccine distribution relied on our 
state tactical communication systems and command and control 
to distribute the state medical cache. 
the flooding in 2009 was labeled as the “500-year flood.”  how-
ever, our weather patterns in 2010 aligned in the same way 
as the previous year creating another substantial spring flood 
threat.  the entire state received heavy snowfall, but an almost 
perfect spring thaw allowed us to escape serious spring flood-
ing.  In 2011, we were not as lucky.  Flooding and flood threats 
occurred on three major river systems.  on the east side of the 
state, substantial flooding and flood threats were occurring on 
the Red River. at the same time, there was another flood threat 
hundreds of miles away on the missouri River in the central part 
of the state near bismarck. 
then a third river system, the souris, was overwhelmed. the 
river, which begins in canada and goes through minot and other 
communities, experienced devastating flooding.  the hospital 
systems were hardened so that evacuation of the hospital was 
not necessary, but a large long-term care facility and over 11,000 
people in minot needed to evacuate.  the flooding river cut the 
city in half and isolated many citizens from medical facilities.  the 
local hospital stood up a temporary emergency department and 
clinic on the north side of the city using the state medical cache. 
During the flood responses for all three river systems, we leaned 
on transportation agreements to get supplies, people and materi-
als to those who in the impacted areas. In total, about 7,000 homes 
flooded. the health and medical response to these devastating 
floods was successful in large part because of the planning, pro-
cesses and systems that have been developed and implemented 
through the public health and medical preparedness programs.
moving Forward
the last three years have validated our preparedness system. It 
has proven to be robust, flexible and effective.  however, it is in 
significant danger of eroding. as we learned in 2011, emergen-
cies can occur simultaneously hundreds of miles apart. 
If preparedness funding continues to deteriorate, it is clear that 
major portions of our system will be threatened and lost.  If I 
look at our six components, there is not one component that 
can be sacrificed and still maintain an effective system. 
as most states have done over the last decade, north Dakota 
has built strong and effective preparedness systems that have 
been put to the test many times and will continue to be tested 
by mother nature, pandemics and humans. preparedness is not 
something you can buy once and put on the shelf, it needs to be 
updated, supported and maintained.  
State and Local Public 
Health Funding Cuts
Forty states decreased their public health budgets from FY 2009-10 to FY 2010-11, 29 states decreased budgets for a second year in a row, and 15 for 
three years in a row.
In FY 2010-11, the median state funding for 
public health was $30.09 per capita, ranging 
from a high of $154.80 in Hawaii to a low of 
$3.45 in Nevada.
From FY 2008 to FY 2011, the median per capita 
state spending decreased from $33.71 to $30.09.
While most preparedness specific funding 
comes from the federal level, the federal invest-
ment assumes and builds on a core capacity at 
the state and local level.  State budget cuts are 
undermining core public health capacities.
Every state allocates and reports its budget in dif-
ferent ways.  States also vary widely in the budget 
details they provide.  This makes comparisons 
across states difficult.  TFAH conducts an annual 
analysis that examines state budgets and appro-
priations bills for the agency, department, or di-
vision in charge of public health services, using 
a definition as consistent as possible across the 
two years, based on how each state reports data. 
TFAH defined “public health services” broadly, 
including most state-level health funding.
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10 states increased or maintained level funding for 
public health services from FY 2009-10 to FY 2010-11
State and percent increase (adjusted for inflation)
alaska (11.2%)2 north Dakota (17.9%)3
arkansas (1.8%) ohio (7.2%)
Florida (3.9%)2 tennessee (0.2%)
Indiana (1.4%) Wisconsin (2.9%)
louisiana (1.9%) 
michigan (0.4%)3 
40 states and D.c. DecreASeD funding for public 
health services from FY 2009-10 to FY 2010-11
State and percent decrease (adjusted for inflation)
alabama (-0.4%) nebraska (-3.4%)
arizona (-0.1%)^ nevada (-4.6%)*
california (-5.1%)^ new hampshire (-9.4%)4
colorado (-1.3%)* new Jersey (-15.8%)^
connecticut (-8.4%)2, * new mexico (-11.7%)4, *
Delaware (-28.0%)2, * new York (-2.4%)*
D.c. (-19.5%)4, * north carolina (-3.2%)2, ^
georgia (-15.7%)* oklahoma (-10.6%)1, *
hawaii (-17.2%)2 oregon (-18.1%)*
Idaho (-1.2%)* pennsylvania (-6.1%)2, ^
Illinois (-8.9%)* Rhode Island (-2.3%)4, ^
Iowa (-16.2%)4, * south carolina (-19.2%)^
Kansas (-3.0%)^ south Dakota (-4.9%)4
Kentucky (-7.0%) texas (-1.6%)
maine (-14.2%)2 utah (-1.6%)4, ^
maryland (-5.7%)2, 4, ^ Vermont (-10.1%)4, *
massachusetts (-6.2%)^ Virginia (-5.1%)3, ^
minnesota (-6.5%)2, ^ Washington (-2.1%)3
mississippi (-13.2%)2, ^  West Virginia (-2.4%)
missouri (-28.5%)* Wyoming (-0.6%)^
montana (-7.5%)
notes: 
biennium budgets are bolded.
1  may contain some social service programs, but not medicaid or chIp. 
2 general funds only.
3 budget data taken from appropriations legislation.
4  state did not respond to the data check tFah coordinated 
with astho that was sent out october 26, 2011.  states 
were given until november 18, 2011 to confirm or correct the 
information.  the states that did not reply by that date were 
assumed to be in accordance with the findings.
* budget decreased for second year in a row
^  budget decreased for third year in a row
source: Research by tFah of publicly available state budget documents 
and communications with health and budget officials in the states.
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The following states’ budgets went down for the 
second year in a row: Colorado, Connecticut, 
Delaware, D.C., Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, 
Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, Okla-
homa, Oregon and Vermont.
The following states’ budget went down for the 
third year in a row: Arizona, California, Kansas, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missis-
sippi, New Jersey, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Utah, Virginia 
and Wyoming.
Public health funding is discretionary spending 
in most states and, therefore, is at high risk for 
significant cuts during economic downturns. 
While few states allocate funds directly for public 
health preparedness, state and local funding is 
essential for supporting public health infrastruc-
ture and core capacities of health departments. 
Several states in this analysis that are identified 
as increasing or maintaining spending may not 
have actually increased their spending on pub-
lic health programs; this can just be a reflection 
of how that state reports their budget.  For in-
stance, some states include federal funding in 
the totals or public health dollars within health 
care spending totals, such as the state share of 
Medicaid or mental health expenditures, which 
makes it very difficult to determine “public 
health” as a separate item.
For additional information on the methodology of the 
budget analysis, please see Appendix B: Data and 
Methodology for State Public Health Budgets.
In september 2011, the public health accreditation 
board (phab) launched the first national accredita-
tion program for all public health departments.47  
the goal of accreditation is to set standards and 
measures for public health departments, includ-
ing in key areas related to preparedness.
according to Kaye bender, Rn, phD, Faan, 
president and ceo of the board,  “phab’s vi-
sion for accreditation is to create a reliable na-
tional standard for public health.  phab supports 
health departments in achieving this standard by 
recognizing the important work they do and by 
providing support to improve their services.”
In a time of budget cuts, accreditation can help 
determine when cuts are having an impact on 
the core standards and capabilities of public 
health departments.  “With shrinking budgets 
and a growing number of health challenges to 
address, there has never been a more important 
time for public health departments to focus on 
the best and most efficient ways to keep people 
healthy,” according to James marks, m.D., mph, 
senior Vice president and Director of the Rob-
ert Wood Johnson Foundation’s health group.
publIc health accReDItatIon
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a recent study conducted by the national association of 
county and city health officials (naccho) found significant 
cuts to programs, workforce and budgets at local health de-
partments (lhDs) around the country.
since 2008, lhDs have lost a total of 34,400 jobs due to lay-
offs and attrition.48  combined state and local public health job 
losses total 49,310 since 2008.49     
lhDs continue to struggle with budget cuts.  In July, 2011 
nearly half of lhDs reported reduced budgets, which is in ad-
dition to 44 percent that reported lower budgets in november 
2010.50  In addition, more than 50 percent of lhDs expect cuts 
to their budgets in the upcoming fiscal year.
In september 2011, city and county managers, who oversee 
and coordinate jurisdiction-wide responses that encompass a 
range of aspects beyond public health,  outlined key aspects of 
preparedness from their perspective at the annual conference 
of the International city/management association (Icma).51
Five panelists who represent different types of communities 
— Ron carlee, coo of the Icma, who, managed arlington 
county, Virginia, during the september 11 attacks; William 
Fraser, city manager of montpelier, Vermont; aden hogan, 
city manager of evans, colorado,  and former assistant 
city manager of oklahoma city, oklahoma during the 
1995 bombing; elizabeth Kellar, president and ceo of the 
center for state and local government excellence; and Ken 
pulskamp, city manager of santa clarita, california — identified 
the following key components to effective disaster response:
General Planning and Preparation:
n  every disaster is local, and local governments should be 
prepared to respond in partnership with states.
n  many communities, especially smaller ones, have difficulty 
planning for emergencies.  but preparedness is essential.
n  the first few hours after a disaster are crucial.
n  Reduce disaster responsibilities to checklists.  on the day 
of an emergency no one has time to read pages of text.
n  have a plan, but be flexible.  the disaster rarely plays out ex-
actly according to the plan.  be prepared to adjust on the fly.
n  It is impossible to plan for every contingency.  plan for 
what is probable. a careful plan that activates resources 
can be effective in many contexts.
n  have a plan to make use of residents who want to volunteer 
during and after the disaster.  this can be a key resource.
n  collaboration between departments, and between neigh-
boring jurisdictions, and with state and federal partners, 
is critical.  It is very important to practice joint response 
strategies with these partners.
communication:
n  During a disaster, frequent communication with the public 
is essential.
n  It is especially crucial to communicate frequently with 
the disabled community, as well as with the elderly and 
people with children.
n  During emergencies, twitter and other social media tools 
can help keep the public informed.
n  especially in smaller communities, disaster response of-
ficials should be prepared to act as direct communicators 
with the public.
n  It is important to manage not only those affected directly 
by the disaster but also the “worried well” who can ei-
ther help or hinder a response depending on how they 
are supported. 
What residents Should Know:
n  authorities may not be able to offer help for 72 hours.  
Residents should know that they may have to rely on 
their own resources for that time; they should know their 
neighbors, be able to turn off water and gas lines, and have 
stockpiles of essential supplies such as food, water and bat-
teries.  they should also consider buying a generator.
n  the public should know to pay close attention to official 
warnings.  often people don’t take these alerts as seri-
ously as they should.
n  Residents should plan for road closings and major traffic, 
and should prepare alternate routes to and from home, 
work and school.
challenges:
n  Recent federal, state and local budget cuts have put a 
strain on local preparedness efforts to communicate with 
the public in a timely manner to mount the most effective 
response as well as to engage partners in a coordinated, 
strategic and as immediate response as possible.
local health DepaRtments cuts
cItY anD countY manageRs outlIne KeYs to DIsasteR pRepaReDness
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a new report, released october 2011, by the 
bipartisan Weapons of mass Destruction (WmD) 
terrorism Research center, headed by former 
u.s. senators Jim talent (R-mo) and bob graham 
(D-Fl), found the united states is not prepared for 
a bioterror attack, particularly a large-scale event.52 
eleven of the nation’s top biodefense experts 
participated in the bio-Response Report card 
and gave different aspects of the response 
grades ranging from bs to Fs.  
the higher grades were awarded to the ability 
to respond to small-scale non-contagious and 
contagious events, but dropped for larger-scale, 
drug-resistant and global health crises.   
the lowest grade for capability across all of the 
response scenarios was for “attribution,” which 
is the ability to identify the source of the attack 
which is important for determining who is re-
sponsible for the attack and how to halt follow-
up attacks if need be.   communication among 
first responders and stakeholders received the 
highest marks across the types of attacks.
the ability to detect and diagnose biological events, 
the availability and ability to distribute vaccines or 
other medicines, and medical management grades 
were higher for the smaller-scale events and sig-
nificantly lower for larger-scale events.  the overall 
ability of the country to develop and approve vac-
cines and drugs received a D.
some of the report’s top findings and conclusions 
include:
n   “a scientifically and legally validated attribution 
capability [the ability to identify the source of 
an attack] does not yet exist for anthrax or vir-
tually any other pathogen or toxin.” 
n   the biomedical advanced Research and 
Development authority (baRDa), which en-
courages the private sector to develop coun-
termeasures, is significantly underfunded and 
is not spurring necessary innovation.
n   the country has adequate doses of smallpox 
vaccine and antibiotics for anthrax, but it doesn’t 
have adequate countermeasures for the viral dis-
eases known collectively as hemorrhagic fevers.  
n   the Department of health and human ser-
vices (hhs) has not yet developed a set of 
goals for research, product requirements and 
dispensing countermeasures to civilian popu-
lations and is not coordinating these priorities 
with the Department of Defense.
n   While the government has built up the stra-
tegic national stockpile (sns), it has not paid 
enough attention to how it will deliver the 
medicines during an attack.  
n   the usefulness of bioWatch, which is de-
signed to provide early warning of a bioterror 
attack, remains unclear.  
n   the country’s health system is not equipped 
to handle the surge of patients that would 
follow a large-scale attack.  current surge 
capacity may be as much as 50 times below 
what might be needed.
n   Very few of the recommendations developed 
by the federally appointed national 
commission on children and Disasters have 
been implemented or funded.  children 
represent one of the largest vulnerable and 
special needs populations in the u.s.; failure 
to understand and accommodate special 
needs becomes a crisis in any major disaster.
n   most individual citizens are not prepared 
for a bioterror attack and don’t understand 
basic medical facts about the most likely 
bioterror agents.  
n   the government has no plan for cleaning 
up a large area after an attack with a non-
contagious agent such as anthrax.  While 
small-scale cleanup plans do exist, they are 
not likely to be applicable to a larger area.
n   the federal government has no plan, and 
provides little guidance, on local or regional 
evacuation following an anthrax attack or 
the detonation of an improvised nuclear 
device (InD), among other potential large-
scale disasters.
WmD commIssIon RepoRt FInDs unIteD states VulneRable  
to bIoteRRoR
25
A Decade of Public Health 
Preparedness
Ten years ago, the September 11th and anthrax tragedies clearly demonstrated that the public health system was not prepared for the range of modern 
health threats we face.  Since then, significant investments have resulted in the 
country being much better prepared to respond to public health emergencies 
ranging from threats of bioterrorism to major infectious disease outbreaks like a 
pandemic flu to natural disasters like hurricanes, tornadoes and floods.  Since 2003, 
in the annual Ready or Not? Protecting the Public’s Health from Diseases, Disasters, and 
Bioterrorism, TFAH has documented progress and ongoing vulnerabilities in the 
nation’s ability to respond to health crises.  
a. pRogRess In pRepaReDness sInce 2001
Since 2001, major investments in improving pre-
paredness have led to significant improvements 
in preparedness planning and coordination; 
public health laboratories; vaccine manufac-
turing; the SNS; pharmaceutical and medical 
equipment distribution; surveillance; communi-
cations; legal and liability protections; increas-
ing and upgrading staff; and surge capacity.
3S e c T i o n
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Planning and 
coordination
n  In June 2002, congress passed the public health security and bioterrorism Response act of 2002, which 
included cooperative agreement funding support for states around the country.  In 2006, congress 
reauthorized the legislation as the pandemic and all-hazards preparedness act (pahpa).  congress is 
considering reauthorization of the bill in 2011.  
n  homeland security presidential Directive-21 (hspD-21) was issued in 2007 setting a national strategy for 
public health and medical preparedness.
n  Release of the national health security strategy in 2009.
n  creation of the Iom Forum on medical and public health preparedness for catastrophic events.
n  all 50 states and Washington, D.c. completed initial bioterrorism response plans by september 2003.
n  the federal government created a comprehensive national strategy for pandemic Influenza, involving all 
federal agencies and partners within state and local governments, businesses, and communities around the 
country.  president bush requested and congress appropriated more than $6 billion to support the national 
strategy, and another $7.7 billion was provided to help respond to the h1n1 pandemic flu outbreak.
n  all 50 states and Washington, D.c. developed pandemic flu plans that were reviewed by hhs before the 
2009 outbreak of h1n1.  In 2003, only 13 states had pandemic flu plans.
n  44 states and Washington, D.c. activated their emergency operations center (eoc) a minimum of two 
times in a year as of 2008.***
n  44 states and Washington, D.c. reported that pre-identified staff were able to acknowledge notification of 
emergency exercises or incidents within a target time of 60 minutes at least twice as of 2008.***
n  48 states and Washington, D.c. developed at least two after-action Reports/Improvement plans within 
60 days of an exercise or actual incident as of 2008.***
n  all 50 states and Washington, D.c. reported conducting an emergency preparedness drill or exercise that 
included both the health department and the national guard as of 2007.
Public Health 
Laboratories
n  47 states reported having enough staffing capacity to work five, 12-hour days for six to eight weeks in response 
to an infectious disease outbreak, such as novel influenza a h1n1 from august 10, 2009 to august 9, 2010.
n  49 states and Washington, D.c. increased or maintained their laboratory Response network for chemi-
cal threats (lRn-c) chemical capacity from august 10, 2009 to august 9, 2010.  In 2005, only 10 state 
public health labs had adequate chemical terrorism response capabilities.
n  by 2007, 44 states and Washington, D.c. reported sufficient bio-testing capabilities, an increase from 6 in 2003.
n  In 2007, only one state and Washington, D.c. reported their labs did not have the capability to provide 
24/7 coverage to analyze samples.
n  by 2006, 47 states reported having sufficient numbers of trained scientists to test for possible anthrax and 
plague, an increase from 10 in 2004.
Vaccine 
manufacturing
n  congress appropriated billions of dollars through project bioshield and baRDa to invest in vaccine 
research and development, but there are still limited financial and business incentives for companies to 
pursue research and development.
n  baRDa awarded a contract to develop the first cell-based flu vaccine.
Strategic national 
Stockpile (SnS)
n  the sns has been substantially upgraded to maintain a variety of critical pharmaceuticals and medical 
supplies including antibiotics, chemical nerve agent antidotes, antiviral drugs, pain management drugs, 
vaccines for a number of agents, and radiological countermeasures.  the sns is positioned in undisclosed 
locations throughout the united states and is configured to provide flexible response strategies.
n  In advance of the h1n1 outbreak, the sns contained pandemic flu countermeasures, including 50 million 
antiviral treatment courses, 105.8 million n95 respirator masks and 51.7 million surgical masks. 
Pharmaceutical 
and medical 
equipment 
Distribution
n  all 50 states and Washington, D.c. have adequate plans to receive and distribute supplies from the sns 
based on a cDc evaluation of planning and management.  In 2003, only two states had adequate plans 
according to cDc.
n  47 states and Washington, D.c. increased vaccination rates for seniors against the seasonal flu from 2008 
to 2009.  In 2006, only 38 states increased rates from the year before.
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Surveillance n  44 states and Washington, D.c. reported using a disease surveillance 
system that is compatible with cDc’s national electronic Disease surveil-
lance system (neDss), as of 2009.  In 2004, only 18 states had disease 
surveillance systems that were neDss-compatible.
n  43 states and Washington, D.c. can send and/or receive electronic health 
information with health care providers.**
n  40 states and Washington, D.c. have an electronic surveillance system 
that can report and exchange information.**
n  29 states were able to rapidly identify disease-causing e.coli o157:h7 and 
submit the lab results in 90 percent of cases within four days.***
n  cDc, in partnership with state and local health agencies, was able to 
provide real-time summarized daily data for flu surveillance ahead of the 
second wave of the h1n1 flu outbreak in the fall of 2009.
n  by working with state health departments, cDc was able to provide 
weekly surveillance summaries of oil spill-related health complaints from 
the affected gulf states following the 2010 Deepwater horizon oil spill.
communications and 
community resiliency
n  25 states and Washington, D.c. mandate all licensed child care facilities to 
have a multi-hazard written evacuation and relocation plan.  
n  pahpa, hspD-21 and the national health security strategy make 
community resiliency a top priority of preparedness.
n  the long-term Disaster Recovery group, composed of the secretaries 
and administrators of more than 20 federal departments, agencies and 
offices, was created in 2009 to strengthen disaster recovery and help 
communities recover more quickly and effectively after emergencies.  
Legal and Liability 
Protections
n  every state had adequate statutory authority to implement quarantine in 
response to a hypothetical bioterrorism attack as of 2005.
n  by 2009, at least 33 states had liability protection for entities or 
organizations that provide volunteer assistance during emergencies.
increasing and 
Upgrading Staff and 
Volunteer Health 
responders
n  all 50 states and Washington, D.c. met three key criteria for the medical 
Reserve corps (mRc) (having a coordinator, a majority of units in the 
state meeting incident management guidelines, and the majority of units 
are part of a registry). the mRc is a national network of community-
based groups which engage volunteers to strengthen public health 
emergency response and community resilience.  In 2007, 13 states did 
not meet a minimum threshold for mRc volunteers for every 100,000 
citizens.  In 2008, 16 states did not have mRc coordinators.
Surge capacity n  In 2002, the national bioterrorism hospital preparedness program — 
renamed the hospital preparedness program (hpp) in 2006 — was 
created and has provided around $400 million annually to support hospital 
preparedness and surge capacity development.  
n  In 2009, the Iom published Guidance for Establishing Crisis Standards of 
Care for Use in Disaster Situations: A Letter Report, which included a five-
step process for emergency planners to follow when developing crisis 
standards of care.
source:  tFah’s Ready or not reports, data from 2003-2010.
**  source: astho profile survey, data from 2010.
*** source: cDc’s strengthening the nation’s emergency Response state by state Report, data from 2007-08.
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b. ongoIng gaps In pRepaReDness 
The United States often takes a band-aid 
approach to public health preparedness.  As 
new emergencies and concerns emerge and 
attention shifts, resources are often diverted 
from one pressing priority to another, leaving 
other ongoing areas unaddressed.
After September 11th and the anthrax attacks, 
the federal government made an unprece-
dented investment to quickly shore up areas of 
preparedness, which have led to major improve-
ments. However, it was not at a sufficient level 
to backfill long-standing gaps in infrastructure 
or update technologies to meet state-of-the-art 
standards to protect the public’s health.
There is a new threat to preparedness and con-
sequently to the public’s health and safety: the 
current economic climate and budget cuts at the 
federal, state and local level mean that the prog-
ress made over the past decade could be lost.  
mAJor onGoinG GAPS
A Funding Gap historically, funding for emergencies is often substandard until there is an actual 
emergency, and then there is a call for emergency supplemental support.  this 
dynamic means the country is often unprepared to immediately respond during 
crises.  the current economic difficulties have led to major cuts in federal, state 
and local support for public health and preparedness, leaving americans more 
vulnerable during emergencies.  the economic impact of a disaster can also 
be more significant if the community cannot return to normal after an event.  
adequate preparedness allows for a strong and more timely recovery.
n  State cuts:  40 states and Washington, D.c. cut funding for public health from 
fiscal year (FY) 2009-2010 to 2010-2011, 30 of these states cut funding for a 
second year in a row.  according to the center on budget and policy priorities 
(cbpp), states have experienced overall budgetary shortfalls of $425 billion 
since FY 2009.53
n  Local cuts:  since 2008, 34,400 local public health jobs have been lost, and 
in the past year, close to half of all local public health departments reported 
reducing or cutting at least one program altogether;54
n  Federal cuts:  between FY2005 and 2011, federal support for state and local 
public health preparedness, including the phep cooperative agreements was 
also cut by 38 percent.  since FY 2010, the grant program will have sustained a 
$72 million cut.
A Workforce Gap there is already a major shortage of trained public health workers and funded 
positions.  there are not enough workers, particularly experts, to effectively 
respond during public health emergencies.  the united states has 50,000 fewer 
public health workers than it did 20 years ago, and one-third of public health 
workers will be eligible to retire within five years.56, 57  as baby boomers begin 
to retire, there is not a new generation of workers being trained to fill the 
void.  also, under current policies and, in some cases, public health workers 
in one area are not allowed to be shifted to help in other areas, even during 
emergencies.  the recent budget cuts are intensifying the problem, with a 
reduction of 15 percent of the local public health workforce since 2008, and, 
at the same time, health departments around the country are experiencing 
furloughs or shortened work weeks.  
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mAJor onGoinG GAPS
A Surge capacity 
Gap
In the event of a major disease outbreak or attack, the health care system is 
stretched beyond normal capabilities.  surge capacity, the ability of the medical 
system to care for a massive influx of patients, remains one of the most serious 
challenges for emergency preparedness.  a large-scale disaster also requires 
having enough equipment and appropriate space to treat patients.  there are 
numerous ongoing surge capacity issues related to response in primary care 
settings beyond just hospitals, including crisis standards of care, alternative 
care sites, coordinating volunteers to help and providing them with adequate 
liability protection and regional coordination among health care facilities.
A Surveillance Gap the united states still lacks an integrated, national approach to biosurveillance 
— which would dramatically improve response capabilities ranging from a 
bioterrorism attack to catastrophic disasters to contamination of the food 
supply.  there is not a standardized, interoperable system using up-to-
date technology.  currently, there are major differences in states’ ability to 
collect and report data, which hampers bioterrorism and disease outbreak 
identification and control efforts.  timeliness in identifying and emerging health 
threats can prevent disease and save lives.
A Gap in community 
resiliency Support
the ability of public health to work with communities to cope and recover 
from a disaster or public health emergency is another major challenge.  It 
is particularly difficult to address the needs of at-risk, special needs and 
vulnerable populations, such as children, the elderly, people with underlying 
health conditions and lower-income communities.  the gaps in day-to-
day public health departments, such as enough staff to engage community 
members in preparedness and limits in cultural competencies, make it 
challenging to build and maintain the relationships needed to identify and work 
with vulnerable americans who need the most help during emergencies.
Gaps in Vaccine 
and Pharmaceutical 
research, 
Development, and 
manufacturing
Research and development of medical countermeasures — including diagnostics, 
antiviral medications and vaccines — is outdated in the united states, in large 
part because it is not a particularly profitable venture for pharmaceutical 
investors.  project bioshield and baRDa were developed to spur innovation and 
investment in medical countermeasures, but, so far, the result of new, effective 
products has been limited.  the investments made in vaccine research and 
development did help lead to the production of a vaccine for the h1n1 flu strain 
in record time, but manufacturers were only able to produce limited quantities 
by the beginning of the flu season because of insufficient capacity and a reliance 
on an outdated egg-based production strategy.
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c. pRepaReDness hIstoRY tImelIne, 2001-2011
The September 11, 2001 and anthrax attacks re-
vealed significant deficiencies in the country’s 
disaster preparedness for health emergencies, 
and led to a paradigm shift in how the govern-
ment and public view disaster readiness. The 
following timeline highlights many of the major 
public health emergencies and policy and re-
search events from the past decade.  
2001
major Public Health emergencies
n  September 11 — Al Qaeda terrorists hijacked 
four planes and crashed them into the World 
Trade Center, the Pentagon and a field in 
Shanksville, Pennsylvania, killing nearly 3,000 
people.  In the aftermath, public health of-
ficials activated a range of responses, includ-
ing readying the SNS and providing services, 
including mental health counseling.
n  October — A series of anthrax attacks oc-
curred; five people were killed, 17 were 
sickened and thousands were potentially 
exposed.  Public health officials were at the 
lead of the anthrax response –diagnosing and 
treating victims, running more than a million 
tests on hundreds of thousands of potentially 
life-threatening samples, providing useful 
guidance to the public to address their fears 
and supporting efforts to decontaminate 
postal facilities and other properties contami-
nated with anthrax spores.
major Policy or research events
n  March -– CDC released a new report, Public 
Health Infrastructure — A Status Report, in the 
wake of the tragedies, that concluded the 
U.S. public health infrastructure “is still struc-
turally weak in nearly every area.”58  
n  September — President George W. Bush ap-
pointed Gov. Tom Ridge as the director of 
the new Office of Homeland Security within 
the White House.59 
n  October — The USA Patriot Act became law, 
expanding definitions and discretion of law 
enforcement to investigate and prevent do-
mestic and international terrorism. 
2002
major Public Health emergencies
n  Spring/Summer — Public health officials 
around the country developed strategies for 
responding to the continuing spread of the 
West Nile Virus (WNV) — in 2002, the virus 
spread to nearly every state while more than 
4,000 Americans developed West Nile Virus 
and 284 died from the illness.60  The WNV 
response helped inform future disease track-
ing and containment approaches.
n  Fall — Severe acute respiratory syndrome 
(SARS) first emerged in Foshan City, Guang-
dong Province, China.61  Chinese officials 
originally withheld information about the 
outbreak.  The disease was later identified to 
be a new coronavirus.  There were no exist-
ing vaccines for the disease and treatments 
did not offer a clear benefit.  The full impact 
of SARS would not be recognized until 2003.
n  October -– Pilgrim’s Pride recalled over 27 
million pounds of frozen and prepared poul-
try products after Listeria was found at a pro-
cessing plant.  Eight people died, 53 became 
seriously ill and three women had miscar-
riages or stillbirths.62, 63
major Policy and research events
n  January — HHS announced $1.1 billion in 
funding for state public health, hospital and 
medical preparedness planning for a bioter-
rorist event.64
n  June -– The Public Health Security and Bioter-
rorism Act became law.  It provided guidance 
to public health officials, created the Assistant 
Secretary for Public Health Emergency Pre-
paredness and the National Disaster Medical 
System and provided cooperative agreement 
grant funds to states for public health emer-
gency preparedness, including:  
s  The HPP, which is designed to help hospi-
tals respond more effectively to bioterror 
attacks and other public health emergen-
cies such as pandemic flu outbreaks.  HPP 
provides money for hospitals to buy medi-
cation, medical supplies, communications 
equipment and other resources that can 
help during an emergency.65
s  PHEP, which provides money to states, ter-
ritories and urban areas to improve public 
health lab testing, health surveillance, train-
ing, planning and other aspects of disaster 
response.  PHEP currently gives out 62 grants 
a year to the 50 states, four large metropoli-
tan areas (Chicago, Los Angeles County, New 
York City and Washington, D.C.) and eight 
U.S. territories and freely associated states.66
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n  November -– The Homeland Security Act be-
came law, creating the Department of Home-
land Security (DHS), which incorporated a 
number of existing federal agencies, includ-
ing the Customs Service, the Coast Guard and 
the Secret Service.67, 68
n  November — The MRC was established to help 
communities respond to disasters.  Community-
based units made up of volunteers now exist 
across the country, ready to be activated when 
necessary.  As of 2011, there are more than 950 
units, with more than 200,000 volunteers.69
n  November — Then-U.S. Senate Majority 
Leader Bill Frist, MD, authored an analysis in 
Health Affairs that concluded that “over the 
past two decades, the [nation’s public health] 
infrastructure has greatly deteriorated.”70  
2003
major Public Health emergencies
n  March — The World Health Organization 
(WHO) issued a global alert for SARS and WHO 
and CDC issued travel alerts for Vietnam, China 
and Hong Kong.71  In April, CDC issued a travel 
alert for Toronto, which was the center of the 
outbreak in Canada.  A week later the agency 
lifted the Toronto alert.72  CDC issued another 
travel alert for Toronto in April that was soon 
lifted.  SARS proved to be highly contagious only 
in hospitals, so the spread of the virus was able to 
be controlled by isolation of the sick and other 
public health interventions.73  In July, WHO 
announced that SARS’ chain of transmission 
had been broken.74  Overall, more than 8,400 
people were infected with SARS, and more than 
800 died.  The disease spread to 29 countries. 
In the United States, there were 33 confirmed 
cases.  None of these patients died.75, 76
n  June — There were 37 confirmed cases of the 
monkeypox virus in Midwestern states.  There 
were no fatalities, but two children were hos-
pitalized, one with encephalitis.  The illness is 
in the same family of viruses as smallpox, al-
though its symptoms are generally milder.  In-
vestigators traced the outbreak to pet prairie 
dogs, which had contracted it from rodents 
imported from Africa.77, 78 
n  October — A Hepatitis A outbreak began, 
which was linked to contaminated green on-
ions and caused more than 600 illnesses and 
four deaths.  The onions were served in salsa 
and a cheese dip at a Chi-Chi’s restaurant 
outside Pittsburgh.  Investigators traced the 
onions to farms in Mexico.79, 80
n  December -– The first case of mad cow disease 
(bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE)) was 
discovered in the United States.  The United 
States Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
began widespread testing.  After detecting very 
few cases, it scaled back testing in 2006.81
major Policy and research events
n  January — CDC launched a national cam-
paign to vaccinate 500,000 emergency and 
medical workers on a voluntary basis against 
smallpox. The disease was eradicated in the 
1970s, but officials were concerned that ter-
rorists could get samples and use them as a 
bioweapon.  Fewer than 40,000 medical and 
emergency personnel — less than 10 percent 
of the campaign’s goal — received the shots. 
According to a GAO report, many health 
workers were concerned about the health 
risks of vaccination.82
n  March — The previously existing National 
Pharmaceutical Stockpile was expanded by 
the Homeland Security Act to become the 
SNS, a national repository of antibiotics, 
chemical antidotes and other medicines and 
medical supplies for use during a chemical 
or biological terror attack, or other public 
health emergency.83  
n  April — A GAO report examining state and 
local preparedness progress found deficien-
cies in capacity, communication and coor-
dination elements essential to preparedness 
and response, including workforce shortages, 
inadequacies in disease surveillance and labo-
ratories and a lack of regional coordination 
and compatible communications systems.84
n  September — CDC launched BioSense, a 
nationwide system to detect early signs of a 
bioterrorism attack or infectious disease out-
break.  Initially, BioSense focused solely on 
bioterror attacks, but it expanded over time to 
cover a range of threats, such as Dengue fever 
and health problems related to the Gulf Oil 
Spill.  The network receives information from 
a wide range of sources across the country: 
nearly 2,000 government and private hospitals 
and healthcare facilities, almost 2,800 labora-
tories and more than 49,000 pharmacies.85, 86
n  October — DHS launched BioWatch, a mon-
itoring system that tests air samples for bio-
logical agents.  As of 2011, there are sensors 
in more than 30 cities around the country, 
monitoring six major biological threats, in-
cluding anthrax.87
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n  November — The IOM published the Fu-
ture of the Public’s Health in the 21st Century 
report, which found that the public health 
system had:  “vulnerable and outdated health 
information systems and technologies; an 
inadequately trained public health work-
force; antiquated laboratory capacity; a lack 
of real-time surveillance and epidemiologi-
cal systems; ineffective and fragmented com-
munications networks; incomplete domestic 
preparedness and emergency response ca-
pabilities; and communities without access 
to essential public health services.” Overall, 
the report concluded that, “[t]hese problems 
leave the nation’s health vulnerable — and 
not only to exotic germs and bioterrorism.”88 
n  December — The White House issued Home-
land Security Presidential Directive-8 (HSPD-
8), which established new requirements for 
national preparedness.  HSPD-8 assigned 
DHS the lion’s share of responsibility for 
organizing the federal preparedness effort. 
The directive also established the National 
Preparedness Goal, Universal Task List and 
Target Capabilities List (TCL) to serve as 
baseline capabilities necessary for all aspects 
of preparedness, from prevention to recov-
ery.  HSPD-8 was the first in a series of Home-
land Security Presidential Directives related 
to bioterrorism and public health prepared-
ness issued between 2002 and 2009.89
n  December — For the first time, every state 
and Washington, D.C. were recognized for 
having CDC-approved bioterrorism and pub-
lic health emergency plans.90
2004
major Public Health emergencies
n  February — Ricin, a highly toxic protein made 
from the castor bean that is poisonous if in-
haled, injected or ingested, was detected in a 
U.S. Senate mailroom serving the office of Ma-
jority Leader Bill Frist, MD.  No illnesses were 
reported in the mailroom or in Sen. Frist’s of-
fice.91  News reports said it was unclear how 
the ricin was delivered and approximately 16 
people underwent decontamination.  An in-
vestigation into the incident is still open.  
n  March — The New York Times reported on a 
Pentagon report, Lessons Learned from the An-
thrax Attacks:  Implications for U.S. Bioterrorism 
Preparedness, which was written in 2002 but 
not previously publicly released.  The article 
described the report as “a sweeping assessment 
[that] identifies weaknesses in ‘almost every as-
pect of U.S. biopreparedness and response.’”92
n  May — A Salmonella outbreak linked to raw 
almonds sickened at least 29 people in 12 
states, leading to the recall of 13 million 
pounds of the nuts.93, 94
n  July — Tomatoes contaminated with Salmo-
nella caused more than 400 illnesses in nine 
states.  Investigators traced the problem to 
pre-sliced tomatoes served at a chain of con-
venience stores.95, 96 
n  Fall — A series of powerful hurricanes hit 
Florida.  In response, the U.S. Public Health 
Service sent nearly 500 members of the Com-
missioned Corps, a uniformed service of 
8,500 public health professional who are able 
to help during national and international 
health emergencies and offer aid.97
n  October — The United States faced a flu vac-
cine shortage, when the Chiron Corporation an-
nounced it would not be able to meet demand 
for its flu vaccine after problems at a British 
plant halted production of millions of doses.98 
The shortage highlighted gaps in vaccine re-
search and development in the United States.
n  October — the worldwide death toll from 
H5N1 avian influenza reached 32 in Asia, trig-
gering concerns of the potential of new pan-
demic flu outbreak.99  As of 2011, H5N1 still 
poses a potential threat and is being tracked 
by researchers.
major Policy and research events
n  April — President Bush signed a classified di-
rective, Biodefense for the 21st Century, to im-
prove coordination among the government’s 
bioterrorism programs and initiatives.100  
n  July — Project BioShield became law.  BioShield 
is a $5.6 billion effort to encourage biotech and 
pharmaceutical companies to develop prod-
ucts that will help treat or prevent the effects of 
a chemical or biological terror attack.  In 2007, 
BioShield became part of BARDA.
n  September — CRI was created, to help cit-
ies and large metropolitan areas prepare to 
dispense medicine quickly, on a large scale. 
From 2004 to 2010, CRI expanded from 21 to 
72 cities and metropolitan areas.101
2005
major Public Health emergencies
n  July  — Tomatoes contaminated with Salmonella 
sickened 29 people in 16 states.  Health officials 
traced the problem to a pair of Virginia farms.102 
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n  August and September — Two powerful hur-
ricanes, Katrina and Rita, hit the Gulf Coast. 
The storms killed approximately 1,900 people 
and caused more than $100 billion in dam-
age.103  In response, the Commissioned Corps 
carried out the largest deployment in its his-
tory, deploying some 2,119 Corps officers to 
the region between August 26 and November 
7.  Of these officers, 81 percent served on teams 
that provided healthcare and other services 
directly to the affected communities, while 19 
percent served on emergency response teams 
or at local operations centers.104, 105
n  September — A second major Salmonella out-
break occurred — more than 80 people were 
sickened after eating tomatoes at a chain res-
taurant.  Investigators identified the source to 
a farm in Florida.  Twenty-six people overall 
were hospitalized.106  
major Policy and research events
n  September — As part of HSPD-8, DHS re-
leased 15 National Planning Scenarios to 
help federal, state and local officials and the 
private sector develop better responses for a 
range of emergencies.107   
n  November — President Bush released a $7.1 
billion plan, the National Strategy for Pandemic 
Influenza, to guide the “nation’s preparedness 
and response to an influenza pandemic, with 
the intent of (1) stopping, slowing or oth-
erwise limiting the spread of a pandemic to 
the United States; (2) limiting the domestic 
spread of a pandemic, and mitigating dis-
ease, suffering and death; and (3) sustaining 
infrastructure and mitigating impact to the 
economy and the functioning of society.”108
2006
major Public Health emergencies
n  March — A cow in Alabama tested positive 
for mad cow disease.109, 110  The cow was not 
linked to a larger outbreak.
n  Summer and Early Fall — Nearly 200 people 
became sick and at least three died due to E. 
coli contamination in spinach.111, 112, 113
n  July to November — Two Salmonella outbreaks 
occurred, both linked to contaminated toma-
toes.  The first one took place in 19 states, while 
the second occurred in 21 states and Canada. 
Overall, more than 300 people were sickened. 
Investigators found that one outbreak was re-
lated to tomatoes consumed in restaurants, but 
could not determine the source of the contami-
nation.  In the second case, investigators traced 
the problem to a single restaurant, which had re-
ceived its tomatoes from an Ohio packinghouse 
that had been supplied by three growers.114
n  August — Between August 1, 2006 and Febru-
ary 16, 2007, Salmonella-tainted peanut butter 
from the Peter Pan and Great Value brands 
sickened 425 people in 44 states.  After an in-
vestigation, the manufacturer, ConAgra, said 
moisture from leaks and a faulty sprinkler sys-
tem likely led to the problem.115, 116, 117 
n  November and December — More than 70 
people who ate at Taco Bell restaurants in the 
Northeast were infected with E.coli bacteria. 
Three-quarters of these people were hospital-
ized and eight developed a type of kidney fail-
ure known as hemolytic-uremic syndrome.  At 
first, Taco Bell traced the problem to green 
onions, but FDA investigators later ruled out 
that possibility.  Officials eventually deter-
mined that lettuce was the likely source.118, 119
n  December — Five school-aged children in 
Rhode Island were diagnosed with encephali-
tis, an acute inflammation of the brain.  One 
of the children died.  The health department 
distributed antibiotics to all students, staff, 
and family members from the affected school. 
In early January of 2007, public health author-
ities also closed three nearby school districts 
as a precautionary measure.  The Department 
of Health was able to rapidly distribute antibi-
otics to more than 1,000 people.120, 121
the 15 natIonal plannIng 
scenaRIos:
n  Four biological attacks:  aerosol anthrax, 
plague, contamination of ground beef at a 
factory and Foot and mouth Disease;  
n  Four chemical attacks:  a blister agent, the 
nerve agent sarin, a toxic industrial chemi-
cal release and a chlorine tank explosion;  
n  the detonation of a 10-kiloton nuclear bomb;
n  a “dirty bomb” that spreads radiation 
throughout a city;
n  the bombing of a sports arena; 
n  a cyber attack that damages the nation’s 
financial infrastructure; and
n  three natural events: an 8.0 earthquake near a 
major city, a category 5 hurricane that strikes 
a major city and a pandemic flu outbreak.
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major Policy and research events
n  July —  The Uniform Emergency Volunteer 
Health Practitioners Act (UEVHPA) is adopted 
by the National Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) to address 
the lack of uniformity in state laws that were 
revealed during the major hurricanes in 2005, 
especially focused on the use and efficacy of 
volunteers and licensing and accreditation, lia-
bility protection and workers compensation.122 
n  December — The Pandemic and All-Haz-
ards Preparedness Act (PAHPA) became 
law.  PAHPA reauthorized several expiring 
programs in the Public Health Security and 
Bioterrorism Act, and established some new 
authorities.123  It broadened the government’s 
focus from bioterrorism to a more compre-
hensive, all-hazards approach that included 
infectious diseases and natural disasters, 
as well as chemical, nuclear, or radiologi-
cal terror attack.  It also placed HHS as the 
lead agency for the public health and medi-
cal response to a public health emergency 
and created BARDA within HHS to distrib-
ute funding for the development of medical 
countermeasures.  BARDA has funded about 
100 projects, including anthrax vaccines and 
antitoxins, radiation treatments and vaccines 
for smallpox and influenza.124, 125  As part of 
PAHPA, Congress also created the Office 
of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness 
and Response (ASPR), within HHS.  ASPR 
focuses on preparedness planning and re-
sponse, federal emergency medical capabil-
ity, countermeasures research and improving 
hospital and health care disaster response.126
2007
major Public Health emergencies
n  May — CDC announced that a patient with sus-
pected extensively drug resistant- Tuberculosis 
(XDR-TB), which is spread through the air trav-
eled to Europe and back, prompting an inter-
national public health scare.  The patient did 
not turn out to have the disease, but problems 
in the response raised concerns among public 
health experts about preparedness for manag-
ing a real multidrug resistant TB patient.127
n  June — Lead paint was found on a range of 
toys made in China, posing a significant pub-
lic health threat.  Over several months, mil-
lions of products were recalled.128
n  August — The Interstate 35W bridge collapsed 
in Minneapolis during the evening rush hour 
on August 1, leaving 13 people dead and more 
than 100 injured.129  Minneapolis Mayor R.T. 
Rybak attributed a quick emergency response 
to the city’s investment of some $50 million 
since 2001 in emergency preparedness, specifi-
cally, enhanced communication technology.130 
n  October — California saw the largest evacua-
tion in state history due to a series of wildfires 
that caused 10 deaths and 139 injuries and 
forced evacuation of approximately 350,000 
homes.  The California Department of Pub-
lic Health deployed 2,000 alternate care site 
beds that had been purchased by the state to 
improve the emergency preparedness capabil-
ities.  The department also coordinated evacu-
ations from 23 nursing homes, two acute care 
facilities and a psychiatric hospital.131  
n  September — Concerns about the H5N1 bird 
flu as a potential pandemic threat continued to 
grow as more than 200 cumulative human deaths 
had been linked to H5N1 at this time.132, 133
n  September — E.coli contamination in frozen 
hamburger meat prompted the third largest 
hamburger recall in USDA history.  Nearly 
22 million pounds of meat were recalled; the 
product caused 40 illnesses in eight states.134, 135
n  October — CDC reported that methicillin-re-
sistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), which 
can cause Staph infections, was responsible 
for more than 94,000 serious infections and 
nearly 19,000 deaths each year.  CDC identi-
fied MRSA as “a major public health problem 
primarily related to health care, but no longer 
confined to intensive care units, acute care 
hospitals, or any health care institution.”136
major Policy and research events
n  October — The White House updated the Na-
tional Strategy for Homeland Security for the first 
time since September 11, 2001 and also issued 
the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 
21 (HSPD 21), which established a National 
Strategy for Public Health and Medical Prepared-
ness.137  The directive was the most recent in 
a series of executive orders issued since Sep-
tember 11, 2001 to protect the nation in the 
event of terrorist attacks or other catastrophic 
health events.  The directive included four key 
parts: biosurveillance, countermeasure distri-
bution, mass casualty care and community re-
silience.138  The strategy included many of the 
requirements set forth in PAHPA and affirms 
the importance of the all-hazards approach 
to public health emergency preparedness. 
In addition, it established the Public Health 
and Medical Preparedness Task Force and re-
quired the Task Force to submit yearly status 
reports on the implementation plan and sug-
gested changes to HSPD 21.
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“Indeed, certain non-terrorist events that reach cata-
strophic levels can have significant implications for 
homeland security. The resulting national conse-
quences and possible cascading effects from these 
events might present potential or perceived vulnerabili-
ties that could be exploited, possibly eroding citizens’ 
confidence in our nation’s government and ultimately 
increasing our vulnerability to attack. This strategy, 
therefore, recognizes that effective preparation for cat-
astrophic natural disasters and man-made disasters, 
while not homeland security per se, can nevertheless 
increase the security of the homeland.”139 
n  National Strategy for Homeland Security, October 2007
n  December — Congress created the National 
Commission on Children and Disasters to ad-
dress the unique needs of children during a 
crisis.  The Commission issued its final report 
in October 2010, which included recommen-
dations for a National Strategy on Children 
and Disasters, establishing permanent chil-
dren’s and disaster coordination offices, fund-
ing disaster planning for schools and child 
care facilities and purchasing child-appropri-
ate supplies for shelters and hospitals.140
2008
major Public Health emergencies
n  January — A measles outbreak occurred in 
San Diego after a seven-year-old who had 
never been vaccinated for measles traveled to 
Switzerland and returned with a case of mea-
sles.  He spread the disease to 11 other chil-
dren, none of whom had been vaccinated.141 
n  January to April — The city of Chicago had 
10 cases of Group C meningococcal inva-
sive disease, which is best known as a cause 
for meningitis — compared with 13 cases 
in all of 2007.  The Chicago Department of 
Public Health launched a mass vaccination 
campaign focused on the at-risk population 
— children aged 11 to 18.  The city was able 
to vaccinate 7,213 children in two weeks.142
n  February — In the largest beef recall in history, 
143 million pounds of beef were deemed unfit 
for human consumption.  The recall occurred 
after the Humane Society of the United States 
released an undercover video showing workers 
at a California meat company kicking sick cows 
and using forklifts to force them to walk.143
n  February — Vials of ricin were found in a 
motel room in Las Vegas, Nevada after a man 
suffering from respiratory distress was taken to 
the hospital.144  According to news reports, the 
man said he had the ricin for his “self-defense.”
n  March — Salmonella in cantaloupes imported 
from a Honduran grower and packer was 
linked to 50 illnesses in 16 states, as well as 
nine illnesses in Canada.145
n  March — A Salmonella outbreak in Colorado 
was linked to the water supply.146
n  March and June — Heavy rains caused severe 
flooding in the Midwest.  In March, 17 people 
died as a result of the flooding, and, by the 
end of June, storms and flooding across six 
states caused 24 deaths, 148 injuries and more 
than $1.5 billion in damages to Iowa alone.147 
n  June — Outbreaks of Salmonella Saintpaul 
were linked first to tomatoes, and then, 
months later, to jalapeño and Serrano pep-
pers.  CDC identified more than 1,442 peo-
ple who were sickened by the outbreak in 43 
states, the District of Columbia and Canada.148
n  June — Lightning sparked thousands of wild-
fires across northern California. More than 
2,700 individual fires were recorded, causing 
mandatory evacuations and damaging thou-
sands of acres.149
n  September — Hurricane Gustav caused wide-
spread destruction in Louisiana, amounting 
to billions of dollars in damages.  Two weeks 
after Gustav, Hurricane Ike hit Texas as a 
Category 2 storm, causing extreme damage 
in the state.  Twenty-seven deaths were attrib-
uted to the storm, which forced hundreds of 
thousands of residents to evacuate.150
n  September — Melamine-contaminated in-
fant formula and related dairy products 
produced in China were found in countries 
across the globe.151
n  November — Federal health officials began 
tracking cases of Salmonella linked to tainted 
peanut butter products.152  Over the next four 
months, investigators tracked the problem to 
two peanut butter plants owned by the Pea-
nut Corporation of America.  The outbreak 
killed eight people and sickened more than 
700 in 46 states.153
major Policy and research events
n  February — CDC released its first report 
featuring state-by-state information on the 
progress states have made using PHEP grant 
funding, Public Health Preparedness: Mobilizing 
State by State.154  Some key areas of progress 
included increases in the number of epidemi-
ologists and labs with bio-testing capabilities 
and improvements in the ability to distribute 
vaccines and antiviral medications.
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n  Fall — The world economic crisis began, 
which has led to a continuing wave of public 
health budget cuts and worker layoffs.  Be-
tween 2008 and 2011, LHDs cut about 34,000 
jobs — almost a fifth of the entire local public 
health workforce.155  
2009
major Public Health emergencies
n  January — A severe ice storm struck Kentucky, 
and more than 85 percent of the state’s coun-
ties were declared disaster areas.  Immedi-
ately after the storm, approximately 800,000 
residential and commercial units lost power, 
including numerous hospitals and long-term 
care facilities.  At the height of the response, 
more than 200 shelters in 72 counties pro-
vided assistance to more than 7,800 people. 
In the largest statewide call-up ever, over 4,100 
National Guard members helped respond.156
n  March — An outbreak of H1N1, a novel flu 
virus, is identified in Veracruz, Mexico.  On 
April 26, officials from CDC and DHS de-
clared a national public health emergency 
as cases of H1N1 began to spread across the 
country.  In June, WHO and CDC classified 
the outbreak as a pandemic.  Hundreds of 
schools across the United States closed in 
the initial weeks of the H1N1 outbreak.   Al-
though it was viewed as a relatively moderate 
pandemic, the H1N1 virus had a serious im-
pact on the United States.  It infected around 
20 percent of Americans (approximately 
60 million people), leading to approxi-
mately 274,000 hospitalizations and 12,000 
deaths.157   About 90 percent of the Ameri-
cans who died were under the age of 65, in-
cluding at least 340 children, as confirmed by 
laboratory testing.158   According to CDC, the 
actual number of deaths in children could be 
between 910 and 1,880.159
major Policy and research events
n  June — In response to the H1N1 outbreak, 
Congress passed and President Obama 
signed the Supplemental Appropriations 
Act of 2009, appropriating $1.9 billion in 
emergency supplemental funding and an 
additional $5.8 billion in contingency fund-
ing.160  These funds helped enhance vaccine 
production capacity, purchase and distribute 
vaccines, upgrade surveillance capabilities, 
support the state and local pandemic re-
sponse and meet other needs.
n  September — The IOM released Guidance for 
Establishing Crisis Standards of Care for Use in 
Disaster Situations, which provided guidance 
to stakeholders to develop health care pro-
tocols when resources are scarce, including 
taking into account ethics, community en-
gagement, legal authorities, clear indicators 
and evidence-based clinical processes.161
n  December — HHS released the National 
Health Security Strategy to help galvanize ef-
forts to minimize the health consequences 
associated with significant health incidents. 
The strategy is built on a foundation of com-
munity resilience.162  
2010
major Public Health emergencies
n  January and February — More than 1.3 mil-
lion pounds of salami tainted with Salmonella 
were recalled after more than 250 people in 
44 states became ill.  Federal officials said the 
problem may have been related to black and 
red pepper coating the meat.163
n  April — The Deepwater Horizon oil platform 
exploded on the Gulf Coast, resulting in the 
deaths of 11 workers and the release of an esti-
mated 205 million barrels of oil into the Gulf.164, 
165  In response to the oil spill, with funding 
from the Substance Abuse and Mental Health 
Services Agency, CDC designed the Gulf States 
Population Survey to collect the data needed to 
assess the mental and behavioral health needs 
of the affected population.  Data collection 
began in December 2010 and will conclude in 
December 2011.  The complete public health 
impact of the explosion, spill, and dispersants 
on the safety of seafood, health of recovery 
workers, and psychological wellbeing of Gulf 
Coast residents remains unknown.166
n  May — An outbreak of Salmonella linked to 
eggs caused more than 1,900 illnesses.  The 
source of the problem was traced to two large 
egg farms in Iowa.  Eventually, more than 500 
million eggs were recalled.  FDA officials in-
vestigating the farms found a wide range of 
health violations, including rodents, maggots 
and improperly stored manure.167    
n  June — California public health officials de-
clared a Pertussis, also known as whooping 
cough, epidemic in the state.  Over the course 
of the year, the epidemic caused almost 8,000 
illnesses and 10 deaths and was the largest epi-
demic in the state in half a century.168  Pertussis 
vaccinations are recommended beginning at 
two months old, but infants are not fully pro-
tected until they reach six months of age and 
have received a series of shots.  Officials attrib-
uted the epidemic to gaps in vaccinations.
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major Policy and research events
n  August — The President’s Council of Advisors 
on Science and Technology (PCAST) issued: 
Report to the President on Reengineering the In-
fluenza Vaccine Production Enterprise to Meet the 
Challenges of Pandemic Influenza.  The report 
found that the response to the H1N1 outbreak 
was “impeded by unanticipated delays that arose 
in manufacturing what was supposed to be the 
most powerful tool for preventing widespread 
morbidity and mortality: a vaccine designed to 
protect against the 2009 H1N1 virus.”169  The 
report featured a series of recommendations to 
enhance the nation’s ability to produce influ-
enza vaccine in a timelier manner.  
n  August — HHS released a Public Health Emer-
gency Medical Countermeasures Review, Pub-
lic Health Emergency Countermeasures Review: 
Transforming the Enterprise to Meet Long-Range 
National Needs, a strategy to modernize the de-
velopment of medical countermeasures across 
the federal government, including addressing 
issues related to bureaucracy and profitability 
to help encourage private industry investment 
in the development of vaccines and other 
medical countermeasures.170  
2011
major Public Health emergencies
n  March — On March 11, 2011, northern Japan 
suffered first a magnitude 9.0 earthquake cen-
tered 130 miles off the eastern coast and then 
an ensuing tsunami. At the Fukushima Daiichi 
nuclear reactor complex, this caused a cascade 
of events including loss of electrical power to es-
sential cooling systems, reactor overheating and 
core meltdown, and radionuclide releases caus-
ing widespread radioactive contamination of 
residential areas, agricultural land, and coastal 
waters.  The Fukushima nuclear emergency 
response identified major public health and 
medical challenges in both Japan and in the 
United States; challenges in the U.S., included 
the need to identify potential contamination 
in food, water, and on returning travelers and 
cargo imported from Japan, as well as to protect 
the health of Americans in Japan.
n  May — A series of tornadoes in Southern and 
Central states resulted in more than $7 bil-
lion in damages and more than 140 deaths in 
Joplin, Missouri.171 
n  July — The first cases of illness associated with 
Listeria-tainted cantaloupes were reported. 
The outbreak has sickened more than 139 
people in 28 states, killing 30 of them. Mak-
ing it the deadliest foodborne outbreak since 
1924.  Investigators traced the outbreak to a 
Colorado farm.  Officials said this was the first 
known outbreak of Listeria in cantaloupe.172  
n  August — Hurricane Irene lead to 56 deaths, 
$10 to $25 billion in damages, including mas-
sive flooding in Vermont.  The storm resulted 
in nearly six million Americans losing electric-
ity and major transportation shut downs.173
n  August — A multistate outbreak of Salmonella 
was traced to ground turkey, sickening more 
than 136 people in 31 states and one death.174
n  October — A Halloween nor’easter became 
the 14th natural multi-billion dollar natural 
disaster in the United States in 2011, causing 
at least six deaths and transportation shut 
downs and millions to lose electricity on the 
East coast.175  
n  November — A Salmonella outbreak linked to 
boiled chicken livers sickened more than 179 
people in six states.176
major Policy and research events
n  January — The FDA Food Safety Modernization 
Act became law, giving the agency expanded 
powers to protect the nation’s food supply. 
The law, which made the first major changes 
to the country’s food safety system in 80 years, 
included authorization of $1.4 billion in fund-
ing over five years and a focus on prevention of 
foodborne illness, rather than response alone. 
Among the major changes, for the first time, 
FDA could order recalls of contaminated food. 
Previously, the agency had to work with compa-
nies to engineer voluntary recalls.177
n  March — President Obama issued Presiden-
tial Policy Directive-8 (PPD-8), the latest in a 
series of policy directives since September 11, 
2001, which laid out the country’s approach to 
preparing for acts of terrorism, cyber attacks, 
disease outbreaks and natural disasters.178   As 
part of PPD-8, DHS released an updated Na-
tional Preparedness Goal (NPG) in Septem-
ber 2011 to improve both local and national 
disaster response.  The top level summary of 
the goal is “to have a secure and resilient Na-
tion with the capabilities required across the 
whole community to prevent, protect against, 
mitigate, respond to, and recover from the 
threats and hazards that pose the greatest 
risk.”179  Additional requirements of the direc-
tive include: a National Preparedness System 
Description; a series of National Frameworks 
and Federal Interagency Operational Plans; 
a National Preparedness Report; and a Cam-
paign to Build and Sustain Preparedness.
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n  September — The Public Health Accredi-
tation Board launched the first national 
accreditation program for public health de-
partments, initiated and supported by the 
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (RWJF) 
and CDC, to protect and improve Americans’ 
health by advancing the quality and perfor-
mance of all of the nation’s public health de-
partments—state, local, territorial and tribal.
n  September — CDC released a new 10-year Na-
tional Strategic Plan for Public Health Prepared-
ness and Response.180 The plan builds on the 
experience the agency has had after a decade 
of major public health emergencies, includ-
ing the 2001 terrorist attacks, Hurricane Ka-
trina and the H1N1 flu pandemic.  The plan 
includes strategies to cooperate with state and 
local emergency management and health 
departments, the private sector and interna-
tional organizations.  It also identifies best 
practices for coordination between public 
health departments, emergency management 
groups and the healthcare system. In addi-
tion, it proposes methods to strengthen the 
surveillance of threats; improve epidemiology 
and laboratory science related to disasters; 
generate more ideas for improving training 
and efficient use of funds; increase the ways 
to improve cooperation and coordination 
across the federal government and among 
federal, state and local agencies; and develop 
improvements for evaluating progress.  
n  objective 1: prevent and/or mitigate threats 
to the public’s health 
n  objective 2: Integrate public health, the health-
care system and emergency management 
n  objective 3: promote resilient individuals and 
communities 
n  objective 4: advance surveillance, epidemiol-
ogy and laboratory science and service practice 
n  objective 5: Increase the application of sci-
ence to preparedness and response practice 
n  objective 6: strengthen public preparedness 
and response infrastructure 
n  objective 7: enhance stewardship of public 
health preparedness funds 
n  objective 8: Improve the ability of the public 
health workforce to respond to health threats
“These are challenging economic times. We must sustain existing public health capabilities and in-
frastructure while developing solutions to build the public health systems of the future. Looking ahead 
towards the year 2020, projected pressures on public health include the increase of the U.S. popula-
tion from 308 million to 336 million, more diversified age groups (including a 54% increase of citizens 
over 65, straining the already overburdened health care system), socio-economic tensions, and mass 
migrations due to adverse weather events. We also know that the advancement and diffusion of scien-
tific technologies will pose threats to health security. Improvements in DNA technologies will increase 
our vulnerability to attacks from groups who have adapted microbes or created entirely new pathogens 
with the intent to harm the population. We also face the risk of individuals acting on their own, com-
bining readily available chemicals and other materials to create improvised weapons. The increasing 
ease of global mobility means that bio-attacks, pandemics, and other health threats to our citizens 
can more easily travel across borders. Vigilance and forecasting are necessary to mitigate these sce-
narios and can only be done by sustaining and increasing public health capabilities.” 181  
 —  ali s. Khan, m.D., m.p.h., u.s. assistant surgeon general (Ret), Director, office of public 
health preparedness and Response, Dhhs/cDc from the national strategy
2011 cDc stRategIc pRepaReDness plan eIght  
oVeRaRchIng obJectIVes: 
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U.S. centers for Disease control and 
Prevention 
n  office of public health preparedness and 
Response:  leads the agency’s preparedness 
and response activities by providing strategic 
direction, support, and coordination for 
activities across cDc as well as with 
local, state, tribal, national, territorial and 
international public health partners.182
s  the public health emergency 
preparedness (phep) cooperative 
agreement program awards funds to 
states, territories and urban areas to build 
and sustain public health preparedness 
capabilities that enhance their ability to 
respond to public health emergencies.  
phep awards funds to 62 public health 
departments nationwide, including the 
50 states; four large metropolitan areas, 
chicago, los angeles county, new York 
city and Washington, D.c.; and eight u.s. 
territories and freely associated states:  
american samoa, guam, u.s. Virgin 
Islands, northern mariana Islands, puerto 
Rico, Federated states of micronesia, 
Republic of the marshall Islands and the 
Republic of palau.183  the distribution of 
phep funds is calculated using a formula 
that includes a base amount for each 
awardee plus population-based funding. 
Funding also is awarded for specific 
preparedness activities. the fiscal year 
2011 cooperative agreement includes a 
new pilot program that provides a year 
of funding to 10 urban areas to develop 
assessments of public health and medical 
risks, as well as accelerated development 
of risk reduction strategies that mitigate 
the public health risks associated with 
higher population areas.184
the 2011 phep cooperative agreement focuses 
on 15 key capability areas, including:  
n  community preparedness
n  community Recovery
n  emergency operations coordination
n  emergency public Information and Warning
n  Fatality management
n  Information sharing
n  mass care
n  medical countermeasure Dispensing
n  medical material management and Distribution
n  medical surge
n  non-pharmaceutical Interventions
n  public health laboratory testing
n  public health surveillance and epidemiological 
Investigation
n  Responder safety and health
n  Volunteer management
s  cRI is funded through the phep cooperative 
agreement to help cities and large metro-
politan areas prepare to dispense medicine 
quickly, on a large scale.185  
s  the sns is a national repository of antibiotics, 
chemical antidotes and other medicines and 
medical supplies for use during a chemical 
or biological terror attack, or other public 
health emergency.  started in 1999, sns is 
managed through ophpR.  the program 
focuses on responding quickly to a large-scale 
bioterror attack in a large city or metropolitan 
area (where more than half of the country’s 
population lives).  the first line of support is 
“12-hour push packages,” which contain over 
50 tons of medicines, antidotes and medical 
supplies designed to provide rapid immedi-
ate help, even when the cause of an attack or 
event is uncertain.  push packages are kept in 
secure warehouses across the country, ready 
for rapid deployment to a designated city or 
site.  sns also has further supplies, designed 
to arrive within 24 to 26 hours, if necessary.186  
examples of SnS contents (as of 2009)
n  enough smallpox vaccine to protect 300 million people, or every man, woman and child in america;
n  over 41 million regimens of countermeasures against anthrax;
n  therapeutic anthrax antitoxins to treat symptomatic patients;187
n  ten million anthrax vaccine (aVa) doses; and
n  countermeasures to address radiation exposure including 475,000 combined doses of cal-
cium-Dtpa (Diethylenetriamine pentaacetate) and Zinc-Dtpa.188
maJoR cDc anD aspR publIc health pRepaReDness pRogRams, 2011
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n  office of policy and planning (opp) advises 
hhs and aspR leadership through policy 
options and strategic planning initiatives to 
support domestic and international public 
health emergency preparedness and response 
activities.
n  office of preparedness and emergency op-
erations oversees a range of operational pro-
grams, three of which include:
s  Hospital Preparedness Program, which 
provides leadership and funding through 
grants and cooperative agreements to states, 
territories and eligible municipalities to im-
prove surge capacity and enhance community 
and hospital preparedness for public health 
emergencies.189  hpp provides support for 
hospitals to buy medication, medical sup-
plies, communications equipment and other 
resources that can help during an emergency. 
the program helps hospitals improve decon-
tamination capabilities and personnel man-
agement and hospital evacuation planning.  
It also pays for disaster training and helps 
local networks of hospitals — as well as local 
businesses and non-profit groups — work 
together to plan for emergencies.  
a 2009 hhs evaluation found that more 
than three quarters of hospitals participating 
in hpp met at least 90 percent of all mea-
sures for preparedness.190  
s  national Disaster medical System 
(nDms), a federally coordinated system that 
augments the nation’s medical response capa-
bility, which consists of more than 100 teams 
of trained doctors, nurses and other medical 
professionals to help respond to major emer-
gencies, and coordinates patient transport 
and hospital care.191  more than 1,000 hospi-
tals participate in nDms.  based throughout 
the country, these teams are brought to the 
disaster site to provide a range of services, 
including medical assessments, primary and 
emergency medical care, provision of medical 
equipment and supplies, victim identification 
and veterinary services.192
s  emergency System for Advance registra-
tion of Volunteer Health Professionals 
(eSAr-VHP), a federal program created to 
support states and territories in establishing 
standardized volunteer registration programs 
for disasters and public health and medical 
emergencies.  the program, administered on 
the state level, verifies health professionals’ 
identification and credentials so that they can 
respond more quickly when disaster strikes. 
by registering through esaR-Vhp, volunteers’ 
identities, licenses, credentials, accreditations 
and hospital privileges are all verified in advance, 
saving valuable time in emergency situations.193
n  baRDa encourages the development of vac-
cines, medicines and diagnostic tools that 
could be used in public health emergencies.  
established in 2006 by pahpa, baRDa 
works to speed up the development of medi-
cal countermeasures (mcms) by supporting 
advanced research, development and testing, 
working with manufacturers and regulators, 
and helping companies devise large-scale 
manufacturing strategies.  baRDa bridges the 
funding gap between early research and com-
mercial production. 
In 2011, baRDa has more than 100 ongo-
ing projects, including potential vaccines for 
smallpox, anthrax, influenza and radiation treat-
ments.194  In addition, the program is involved in 
helping to open the nation’s first cell-based flu 
vaccine factory.195
s  project bioshield, a program within baRDa, 
was set up to guarantee a market for newly 
developed vaccines and medicines needed for 
biodefense that would not otherwise have a 
commercial market.196, 197  
oFFIce oF the assIstant secRetaRY oF pRepaReDness anD Response 
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memoRanDum oF unDeRstanDIng FoR emeRgencY pRepaReDness 
gRant cooRDInatIon 
several federal departments and agencies 
distribute preparedness funds and/or provide 
technical assistance and national strategies in 
support of various preparedness activities. 
aspR, cDc, the health Resources and ser-
vices administration (hRsa), the Department 
of homeland security’s Federal emergency 
management agency (Fema), and the De-
partment of transportation’s (Dot) national 
highway transportation safety administra-
tion (nhtsa) recently agreed through a 
memorandum of understanding (mou) to 
cooperatively assess their current prepared-
ness grant programs and to engage in collab-
orative efforts to improve interagency grant 
coordination. the mou establishes a formal 
framework that supports joint federal plan-
ning designed to focus investments, measure 
and improve preparedness outcomes, reduce 
duplication, report results, and enhance re-
turn on investment.198
according to the agreement, senior leaders 
from each agency involved will participate in 
the Interagency grant coordination commit-
tee as well as the grant coordination Work-
ing group.  the committee and Working 
group will work to coordinate grants in the 
following areas:
1)  grant program policies to coordinate 
policy guidance and documents, including 
assuring consistency of grant guidance with 
national emergency preparedness strate-
gies and priorities.
2)  grant cycle/timeline to align the following: 
pre-award administration efforts; program-
matic fiscal years; joint application submis-
sions; and application reviews.
3)  grant administration/management to co-
ordinate the use of the grant funding for 
administration activities such as site visits; 
information sharing; co-presentation at na-
tional conferences/meetings; and coordina-
tion of programmatic support.
4)  grant Reporting mechanisms and evaluation 
to develop tools and resources to coordinate 
grant program performance measures.199
cDc and aspR have made significant prog-
ress in grant alignment, including improving 
coordination between hpp and phep co-
operative agreements.  the hpp-phep col-
laboration is working to improve capabilities, 
evaluation, framework, It systems, training 
and technical assistance, grants administration 
and policy and guidance development.  goals 
for the hpp-phep collaboration are to:
n  have a joint hpp-phep funding opportu-
nity announcement in 2012;
n  Reduce awardee burden, including during 
the application process;
n  Increase programmatic impact of state and 
local preparedness programs; and
n  Improve federal efficiencies to better sup-
port state and local preparedness programs.
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eXamples oF maJoR emeRgencY publIc health thReats
Agroterrorism: the “…deliberate introduc-
tion of an animal or plant disease with the goal 
of generating fear, causing economic losses, and/
or undermining stability.”200  agroterrorism can 
be considered a subcategory of “bioterrorism” 
and foodborne diseases.
bioterrorism: the intentional or deliberate use 
of germs, biotoxins, or other biological agents 
that cause disease or death in people, animals, 
or plants. examples include anthrax, smallpox, 
botulism, Salmonella, and E. coli.
blast injuries:  explosions, whether deliberate or 
accidental, can cause multi-system, life threatening 
injuries among individuals and within crowds.  In 
addition, blunt and penetrating injuries to multiple 
organ systems are likely when an explosion occurs 
and unique injuries to the lungs and central ner-
vous system occur during explosions.
chemical terrorism: the deliberate use of 
chemical agents, such as poisonous gases, arsenic, 
or pesticides that have toxic effects on people, an-
imals, or plants in order to cause illness or death. 
examples include ricin, sarin, and mustard gas. 
chemical incidents and accidents: the 
non-deliberate exposure of humans to harm-
ful chemical agents, with similar outcomes to 
chemical terrorism.
Foodborne diseases:  Food-borne illness is 
caused by harmful bacteria, viruses, parasites or 
chemicals that are found in food and beverages 
and enter the body through the gastrointestinal 
tract.  cDc estimates there are approximately 
76 million pathogen-induced cases of food-borne 
diseases each year in the united states, caus-
ing approximately 127,000 hospitalizations and 
3,000 deaths.  examples include botulism, salmo-
nella, e.coli 0157:h7, shigella, and norovirus.
natural disasters: harm can be inflicted during 
and after natural disasters, which can lead to con-
taminated water, shortages of food and water, 
loss of shelter, and the disruption of regular 
health care. examples include hurricanes, earth-
quakes, tornados, mudslides, fires, and tsunamis.
Pandemic flu: a novel, potentially lethal strain 
of the influenza against which humans have no 
natural immunity. the h1n1 flu was the first 
pandemic flu of the 21st century.  historically, 
pandemic flu occurs two to three times every 
hundred years or so.  In the 20th century the 
world experienced the 1918, 1957/58, and 1968 
pandemic flu, although the severity of the dis-
ease varied greatly among them.
radiological threats: Intentional or accidental 
exposure to radiological material. For example, 
a terrorist attack could involve the scattering of 
radioactive materials through the use of explo-
sives (“dirty bomb”), the destruction of a nuclear 
facility, the introduction of radioactive material 
into a food or water supply, or the explosion of a 
nuclear device near a population center.
Vector-borne diseases: Diseases spread by 
vectors, such as insects. examples include Rocky 
mountain spotted fever and malaria.  
Water-borne diseases: Diseases spread by 
contaminated drinking water or recreational 
water, such as typhoid fever and cholera.  ac-
cording to cDc, more than 4,100 persons 
become ill from contaminated drinking water 
and more than 13,000 persons become ill from 
recreational water disease outbreaks annually in 
the united states.201, 202
Zoonotic/Animal-borne diseases: animal 
diseases that can spread to humans and, in some 
cases, become contagious from human to human. 
examples include avian flu, West nile virus, and 
saRs.  In 2000, Who identified more than 200 
diseases occurring in humans that were known to 
be transmitted through animals.203 experts believe 
that the increased emergence of zoonotic diseases 
worldwide can be attributed to population dis-
placement, urbanization and crowding, deforesta-
tion, and globalization of the food supply.  
all-haZaRDs appRoach to emeRgencY publIc health thReats
the u.s. public health system is responsible for protecting the american people from a range of 
potential health threats. 
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In addition to the health toll that diseases, disasters and bioterrorism 
can take, they also have major economic implications.  For example:
n  September 11, 2001 Tragedies:  the total economic loss 
has been estimated at roughly $80 billion, of which $32.5 bil-
lion was insurable.204  the insurance industry paid the $32.5 
billion in insured losses from business interruption, property, 
workers’ compensation, aviation liability and other liability 
costs.205  In addition, World trade center workers received 
a $625 million settlement for their exposure to toxic dust.206
n  Anthrax Attacks:  according to an article in the Wash-
ington post, the clean up from the 2001 anthrax attacks 
exceeded $1 billion.207  a reported $42 million was spent to 
decontaminate the hart senate office building and other 
capitol hill offices and it cost in excess of $200 million to 
decontaminate the postal facilities at brentwood in Wash-
ington, D.c. and in hamilton township, new Jersey.208  
this does not include the cost of the public health response 
and laboratory testing of specimens around the country.
s  according to a report in the New York Times, under a hy-
pothetical scenario developed by Dhs involving an anthrax 
attack, if terrorists were to spray aerosolized anthrax from a 
van in three cities initially, followed by two more cities shortly 
afterward, casualties could well exceed 13,000, and result in a 
loss of billions of dollars.209  other estimates are that anthrax 
could result in more than 13,000 deaths in a single city. 
s  according to a study by towers perrin consulting, one anthrax 
attack in new York city could lead to $90 billion in workers’ 
compensation losses, which would be three times greater than 
the entire $30 billion workers’ compensation industry.210  
s  Risk management solutions (Rms), a leading risk consult-
ing firm, believes an attack on downtown new York 
city could result in 173,000 casualties.  In this scenario, 
anthrax is weaponized and dispersed in aerosol form, 
resulting in inhalation of anthrax by approximately one 
million people.  Rms estimates economic losses of $91 
billion from workers compensation alone.211  
n  nuclear, biologic, or chemical Attacks and the insur-
ance industry:  In 2005, the ceo of allstate corp, a lead-
ing insurance company, stated that nuclear, biological or 
chemical terrorist attacks “could literally destroy the entire 
capital base of the insurance industry.”212  In 2003, the capi-
tal base for the insurance industry was $347 billion.213  
n  Foodborne illness and Agroterrorism:  agriculture 
represents 1.2 percent of the u.s. gross domestic product 
(gDp), or $173 billion a year.214  agriculture and the food 
sector employed approximately 12.5 million workers in 
2008, or nearly nine percent of the total u.s. workforce.215
s  In 2001, a foot-and-mouth disease outbreak in britain led 
to an estimated economic loss of $6 billion to $18 billion, 
and led to the destruction of four million animals.216  a 
1999 report estimated that an outbreak of foot-and-mouth 
in california would lead to economic losses of $6 billion.217  
s  over the last few decades, the united Kingdom has battled 
bovine spongiform encephalopathy (bse), better known as 
“mad cow disease.”  as of march 2005, 149 people who 
were infected with the disease have died, and nearly four 
million cows have been slaughtered.218  If a significant out-
break of bse occurred in the united states, FDa estimates 
that there would be a loss of $15 billion, resulting from a 24 
percent decline in domestic beef sales and an 80 percent 
decline in beef and live cattle exports.  slaughter and dis-
posal costs of at-risk cattle could be additional $12 billion.219 
s  In 1978, the arab Revolutionary council engaged in bioter-
rorism, using mercury to poison Israeli oranges.  a dozen 
children in holland and West germany were hospitalized 
as a result.  ultimately, this act helped sabotage the Israeli 
economy, resulting in a 40 percent reduction in orange ex-
ports.220  at the time, oranges accounted for about a tenth 
of all Israeli exports.221  the united states produces over 20 
percent of the world’s citrus, or approximately 15.6 million 
tons in 2004.222  u.s. citrus exports are roughly $1 billion, 
while u.s. consumers spend more than $3 billion on citrus 
products (orange and grapefruit juice and fresh fruit).223  
n  new infectious Disease outbreak:  In 2003, saRs swept 
through southeast asia, infecting over 8,000 people and leaving 
774 dead.224  Its reach demonstrates the tremendous speed in 
which disease can spread.  originating in china, the saRs outbreak 
eventually infected individuals from 29 nations around the world.  
overall, the economic losses, due to deaths, quarantines and lost 
tourism dollars, may have been $30 to $50 billion, according to 
some estimates.225  In toronto alone (many thousands of miles 
away from the initial outbreak), more than 27,000 people in and 
around the city were forced into quarantine during two outbreaks, 
which led to an estimated economic loss of nearly $1 billion.226
n  Severe Pandemic Flu outbreak:  a severe pandemic 
flu similar to the 1918 pandemic could lead to a significant 
drop in the u.s. gross Domestic product (gDp).227
n  Gulf coast oil Spill:  there was a loss of an estimated 
$1.2 billion in economic output and 17,000 jobs in 2010 ac-
cording to an analysis from moody’s analytics.228 
economIcs anD publIc health pRepaReDness
D.  specIal topIcs — a DecaDe aFteR 9/11 anD anthRaX
The following expert commentaries feature a set of 
topics that are essential components of prepared-
ness, including:  bringing a range of community 
leaders together to prepare together for potential 
health emergencies through Meta-Leadership ef-
forts; defining the research agenda to further pre-
paredness systems and services; ensuring that laws 
are in place to protect the public and health officials 
during emergencies; and focusing on injuries, which 
is often an overlooked component of preparedness.
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Meta-Leadership Empowers Community Leaders 
to Act Together in Times of Crisis
By Charles Stokes, president and chief executive officer of the CDC Foundation, an independent, nonprofit organization established by 
Congress to help CDC do more, faster. 
The events surrounding 9/11, hurricane Katrina and h1n1 should be a wakeup call for america. From my perspec-
tive, these emergencies underscore the urgent need for leaders 
to act collaboratively across public and private sectors in times 
of crisis. as ongoing public health budget cuts strain the capacity 
of cDc and state and local health agencies across the country, it 
is critical for communities to find ways to close the gaps to keep 
america healthy, safe and secure. 
the meta-leadership summit for preparedness, a five-year 
initiative funded by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation 
(RWJF), is a model approach for bringing communities together 
to respond to crises. since 2006, the initiative has connected 
close to 5,000 business, government and nonprofit leaders in 36 
communities representing approximately 139 million americans. 
the cDc Foundation partnered with cDc, the Robert Wood 
Johnson Foundation and the national preparedness leadership 
Initiative-harvard school of public health to host the successful 
networking and training events.  
What makes the meta-leadership summit for preparedness 
program unique is its focus on cross-sector collaboration and 
community action.  as summits took place across the country, 
local host committees were crucial to endorsing the sum-
mit and getting the right leaders in the room. local sponsors 
supplemented the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation’s national 
support, covering local event expenses so that participants 
could attend at no cost.  Frontline meta-leaders from cDc and 
other federal agencies joined with harvard faculty to provide 
real-world perspectives on leading in emergencies. high profile 
speakers — including governors, mayors and ceos — elevated 
the profile of the initiative and attracted local media coverage.  
Realistic scenarios, developed by harvard faculty in collabora-
tion with local leaders, helped participants envision the serious 
consequences that could emerge in their own communities fol-
lowing a terrorist attack or natural disaster. 
sometimes connections among summit participants were not 
immediately obvious.  For example, at the boston meta-lead-
ership summit, a leader from the boston ballet attended the 
event.  some wondered what role the arts could possibly play 
in community preparedness.  however, when leaders identified 
gaps in preparedness — and how they might contribute their 
own resources and capabilities to fill those gaps — the boston 
ballet offered its space as a shelter for disaster victims.  a syn-
ergy occurs when leaders connect face-to-face to create better 
prepared, more resilient communities. 
although the final meta-leadership summit took place in long 
Island, new York, in June 2011, the initiative is far from over.  
a cDc post-summit team reconvenes leaders approximately 
six months after each summit to continue building cross-
sector connectivity and applying meta-leadership concepts to 
preparedness planning.  through post-summit activities unique 
to each community, cDc casts a wider net, encouraging 
participants to address preparedness gaps identified at the 
summit and through evaluation results.  to date, more than 
2,000 leaders have participated in post-summit presentations 
and discussions related to cross-sector preparedness.  topics 
include addressing the needs of vulnerable populations, engaging 
faith-based organizations in preparedness planning, enhancing 
corporate security and leveraging virtual communities.  
summit participants are also invited to join a meta-leadership 
online community (www.meta-leadershipcommunity.org) that 
extends their collaboration.  With thoughtful cultivation and 
ongoing support from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, 
the online community continues to thrive. more than 2,800 
members have joined to share resources, discuss topics of 
interest and connect with other summit participants, locally 
and nationally. 
throughout the initiative, all partners and stakeholders 
sought clear evidence of summit outcomes and continuous 
improvement in the program’s design and implementation.  
cumulative evaluation results are extremely positive: 94 percent 
of respondents agreed that attendance at the summit was a 
valuable use of their time, 91 percent rated the overall quality of 
the summit as “good” or “outstanding” and 91 percent would 
recommend the summit to their colleagues. 
practical examples of meta-leadership are evident across the 
country.  For example, in san Diego, a public-private coalition 
established by the san Diego county office of emergency 
services experienced a significant boost in nonprofit and 
business participation after the summit.  In boston, mayor 
menino held a cross-sector boston Influenza preparedness 
summit, building on the meta-leadership model.  eight Illinois 
meta-leaders who participated in a university of Illinois at 
chicago (uIc) school of public health fellowship program 
made the case for the nation’s first meta-leadership Institute 
and applied meta-leadership to community issues beyond 
preparedness, including school violence, flu vaccination and 
faith-based outreach.  Following the gulf oil spill, southeast 
louisiana meta-leaders developed a proposal template and 
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process for bp-funded emotional support services that are 
essential to long-term community support.  Kay Wilkins, ceo, 
american Red cross southeast louisiana chapter said, “What 
the meta-leadership summit did was open avenues to other 
people and groups we might not have thought about.” 
as others learn about meta-leadership, interest continues to 
build. In september 2011, the cDc Foundation was invited 
to help the Federal emergency management agency (Fema) 
develop and implement a “Whole community” approach to 
emergency management. the effort includes methods to build 
on the lessons learned through the meta-leadership Initiative 
— from summits to post-summit activities to the online 
community — to help Fema identify and test ways to better 
engage with communities, and to integrate preparedness 
into community and civic organizations that serve those 
communities. 
cDc and public health leaders across the nation shoulder 
the considerable and singular duty to protect the nation from 
major health threats 24/7, including catastrophic events. In 
light of the ongoing budget cuts, and at a time when the 
united states and the world faces increasing threats from 
nature, technology and human action, helping leaders 
understand their counterparts’ interests and establishing 
connectivity before disaster strikes is imperative. 
What is a Meta-Leader? a meta-leader is a leader of leaders, who 
mobilizes people and organizations to collaborate in times of crisis.
When disaster strikes, meta-leaders reach across organizations 
and sectors to build cross-cutting strategies to protect the safety 
of their families, businesses and communities. they exchange 
information, share resources and coordinate systems and 
personnel. they use their influence and connections to guide a 
cooperative course of action.
being a meta-leader requires a unique mindset and skill set, 
which often goes beyond the scope of an individual’s previous 
experiences. and it requires building strong alliances with a 
diverse array of leaders before an event occurs.
the meta-leadership summit for preparedness cultivates the 
critical problem-solving skills and connectivity that leaders need 
to be effective meta-leaders during times of crisis.
meta-Leadership Summit for Preparedness impact
From 2006-2011, the meta-leadership summit for preparedness connected close to 5,000 business, government and nonprofit 
leaders in 36 communities representing approximately 139 million americans.
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Preparedness and Public Health 
Systems and Services Research
By F. Douglas Scutchfield, M.D., principal investigator, Center for Public Health Systems and Services 
Research at the University of Kentucky College of Public Health
The 10th anniversary of 9/11 and the anthrax scare give us an occasion to pause and con-
sider a vital question. We moved, as a nation, to 
assure that we were protected from bioterrorism 
and were prepared for the natural and unnatural 
disasters that we will likely experience. We have 
had other reminders of the importance of that 
capacity, hurricane Katrina being a classic ex-
ample. one of the key components of our ability 
to respond to either of these sorts of events is our 
public health system and its backbone, the local 
health department. 
unfortunately, as a nation we have a tendency to 
“fight the last war” and to gear up in response to a 
major event, but as those problems fade into time, 
we tend to neglect the lessons, and allow those ef-
forts we invested in preparedness to deteriorate 
and return to the status quo that existed before the 
event.  Recently, a colleague and I were working on 
a public health book, in which there was a chapter 
on the history of public health. We were both struck 
by the history of public health, gearing up to respond 
to a major public health event and then watching as 
public health gains that were achieved diminish with 
time and a loss of support and interest. 
unfortunately, that is the current state of public 
health. We don’t learn our history lessons, so fol-
lowing the build-up of public health in 2001, we 
are now allowing the system we established to de-
teriorate — two steps forward, three steps back. 
as certain as the sun will rise in the east, we will 
experience another event that will demonstrate 
our inability to cope, as the resources for public 
health are scarce, and it will prompt the cycle of 
build-up, neglect, event, build-up, etc. 
Following 9/11 we created, in our nation’s schools 
of public health, preparedness centers that were 
responsible for developing training for preparedness 
capacity in our nation’s public health system. these 
centers quickly realized that there was information 
that they needed in their training efforts, information 
that wasn’t available in the lexicon of public health 
and where they needed research and investigation 
to respond to this need. this need prompted con-
gress to establish authority to empower prepared-
ness centers, previously created by cDc as the 
result of congressional action, to answer some of 
the most difficult questions in how best to address 
public health preparedness. With this authority, the 
cDc created a few select preparedness centers 
to help find and make this information available to 
those who are and were training the individuals that 
we needed for preparedness. as an example of the 
work of these research centers, the university of 
north carolina at chapel hill demonstrated that, in 
north carolina, which has a state public health de-
partment accreditation program, accredited health 
departments were more likely to score higher on 
their preparedness profiles than health departments 
that were not accredited. With the advent of na-
tional public health accreditation, this information is a 
powerful tool to encourage and support those health 
departments seeking and obtaining accreditation, as 
there is the assurance that they are more likely to be 
prepared for dealing with disasters.  these centers, 
preparedness and emergency Response Research 
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centers, unfortunately lost their funding two years 
ago. that left a major hole in the capacity to help 
develop and train the individuals and organizations, 
as critical gaps exist in knowledge that would impact 
our ability to cope with disasters.
this is not an uncommon problem. one of the first 
cuts made in tight budget times is the activities that 
produce new data and knowledge. often the as-
sumption is made that we can move on programs, 
including preparedness, without understanding 
what’s necessary to develop, implement and evalu-
ate health or public health programs. the required 
knowledge and skills come as the result of efforts 
to examine the questions and find answers that 
have utility and can be used to deal with whatever 
the problem is that presents itself. In fact, one of 
the most useful things we can engage in, during 
tight budget times, is the questions of efficiency 
and effectiveness of our programs. We need to use 
limited resources as best we can — and research is 
key to knowing how best to accomplish our goals.
as with other public health programs, successful 
implementation depends on the infrastructure to 
deliver the program. the workforce, technology, 
finances and organization influence tremendously 
the capacity of the public health system and its 
units to respond to any eventuality. It is impera-
tive that we have the best knowledge possible on 
the infrastructure that allows us to be successful 
in our efforts to implement any public health pro-
gram, including preparedness. 
Recently, the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation and 
cDc led an effort to establish an agenda of the re-
search questions we need to know in order to most 
effectively develop and implement public health pro-
grams. the list of research questions that covered 
workforce, structure, finance and other infrastruc-
ture issues was several pages long, and reflected 
the questions and concerns of practitioners, policy-
makers, and public health academicians alike. the 
agenda is rich with issues that stand in the way of 
our being able to carry out the programs and proj-
ects that include not only preparedness, but also the 
myriad of public health problems that face america, 
from childhood obesity to the increased concerns 
with chronic diseases, such as cancer and heart 
disease. questions from that agenda include issues 
such as how should state health departments be 
organized, independent entities or part of a health 
and social services umbrella organization? how can 
local health departments develop and sustain shar-
ing agreements across jurisdictional boundaries to 
assure that the capacity for emergency response 
exists for the communities they serve? how are 
broad categorical areas of public health, including 
preparedness, funded? how do decisions about this 
funding impact other areas of public health responsi-
bility? Does, for example, an emphasis on prepared-
ness detract from the community’s immunization 
efforts and lead  to the increase in whooping cough 
cases we are experiencing in the u.s.? 
these are not trivial questions; in fact the latter 
issue has prompted a study by gao and one in the 
Department of health and human services assis-
tant secretary of planning and evaluation’s office. 
over the past century, public health has played a 
vital role in efforts to address these issues. strong 
public health programs are a critical component 
to our nation’s ability to thrive, even in trying eco-
nomic times. In order to have those programs, it 
is imperative that we have the knowledge that lays 
the groundwork for that success. Working with 
all segments  of the health community in a time 
of economic instability and tremendous change in 
our health care system, we can and must have the 
information and knowledge that allows for suc-
cessful public health programs and assures that we 
are prepared for either natural or unnatural disas-
ters. as gandhi observed, “It is health that is real 
wealth and not pieces of gold and silver.” 
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Public Health Legal Preparedness in the United States
An Interview with James G. Hodge, Jr., J.D., LL.M., Lincoln Professor of Health Law and Ethics and director of the Public Health Law 
& Policy Program and director of the Network for Public Health Law-Western Region at the ASU Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law
On september 27, 2011, the trust for america’s health conducted an interview with professor James g. hodge, 
Jr. regarding the nature, scope and challenges of emergency 
legal preparedness.  edited for content, questions and responses 
are as follows:
What is the role of law in emergency preparedness from 
your point of view?
law is an essential component of emergency preparedness.  laws 
define what constitutes an emergency, disaster, or public health 
emergency. they authorize (and at times prohibit) specific actions. 
laws set roles, responsibilities, and liabilities for public and private 
sector responders and entities. ultimately, it is law that helps to 
provide guidance for emergency responses, and, when practiced 
appropriately in real-time, laws can contribute to declinations in 
preventable morbidity and mortality in declared emergencies.  
What types of legal challenges do states and other gov-
ernments face in emergency preparedness?
legal preparedness challenges across jurisdictions are immense. 
one central challenge of public health legal preparedness relates 
to meeting surge capacity (i.e., the ability of public health and 
medical systems to care for a massive influx of patients during 
public health emergencies). meeting surge capacity is key to sav-
ing lives and preventing the spread of communicable diseases 
in emergencies. major concerns surrounding surge capacity 
include distributing and dispensing  antivirals, vaccines, or other 
medicines; increasing health care staffing; and securing adequate 
and safe spaces for the influx of patients. none of these objec-
tives is possible without real-time legal assistance and support. 
For example, personnel required in a crisis (including out-of-state 
physicians, nurses, and assistants, as well as mental health provid-
ers) must be capable of adapting quickly to implementing a crisis 
standard of care under potentially changing rules regarding scope 
of practice. these adaptations necessitate legal changes, as well, 
inherent in declarations of public health emergency that may typi-
cally precede major jurisdictional shifts in health care personnel. 
How can law specifically facilitate health care voluntarism 
during emergencies? 
there are many legal paths to ensuring adequate and skilled 
numbers of volunteer health practitioners in declared emergen-
cies. Whether coming through state-based esaR-Vhp pro-
grams, locally-run mRc units, or other routes, civilian volunteers 
strengthen public health and emergency response efforts by 
providing essential personnel for overrun medical systems dur-
ing a crisis. thousands of skilled, vetted volunteers streamed to 
louisiana and surrounding states post-Katrina in 2005. their ef-
forts were greatly facilitated through legal interventions designed 
to support trained volunteers and encourage their participation. 
normally, you cannot just bring in out-of-state practitioners 
and let them practice medicine in any given state. In non-emer-
gencies, state-based licensing laws and other legal liability issues 
would stop the deployment and use of out-of-state volunteers. 
the emergency legal environment has to evolve quickly to allow 
skilled volunteers to step in seamlessly and aid in the response. 
legal techniques that provide licensure reciprocity and liability 
coverage for volunteers make their contributions possible. each 
of these and many other legal tools have been crafted in the last 
decade following the terrorist acts of september 11, 2001, and 
the ensuing anthrax exposures that fall.  my esaR-Vhp legal 
and Regulatory Issues Report, prepared for Dhhs’ assistant 
secretary for preparedness and Response, provides some helpful 
tables and analyses across the 50 states related to these issues.  
the report and other helpful documents are available online at 
http://www.publichealthlaw.net/projects/esaR-Vhp.php. 
Are there any major gaps in state or local public health 
preparedness laws?
over the last decade, there have been systematic, wholesale changes 
to emergency response laws and policies at all levels of government. 
Despite solid models introduced to help policymakers considering 
reforms, many of the legal changes are not uniform across states. 
While most emergency laws are written broadly enough to allow ex-
tensive and flexible responses, sometimes the breadth of these laws 
leads to confusion, debate, and delay in actual emergencies. 
In addition, there are extensive variances in the legal frameworks 
related to surge capacity, especially in licensing and reciprocity. 
lacking uniform protections concerning common negligence 
claims, for example, it is empirically shown that volunteers might 
hesitate to help during a crisis.  Volunteers and entities that 
deploy or host them seek strong protections from liability, but 
sometimes find divergent standards across jurisdictions.  
What can jurisdictions do to address these gaps?
active, advance efforts to assess and address legal preparedness 
gaps are key. there are several excellent models that provide 
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uniform approaches to key legal preparedness issues. the 
model state emergency health powers act, drafted in 2001 by 
the centers for law and the public’s health at georgetown and 
Johns hopkins universities, provides a comprehensive series 
of legislative and regulatory provisions for state and local public 
health emergency responses. nearly every state legislature has 
considered its provisions in whole or part, and 38 states, as well 
as the District of columbia, have passed related bills, according 
to the center’s legislative tracking available at http://www.publi-
chealthlaw.net/modellaws/msehpa.php. 
the emergency management assistance compact (emac), ex-
ecuted now by all states, provides licensure reciprocity automati-
cally for all “state or local agents” serving across state borders 
during declared emergencies. It also provides clear limitations on 
liability. of course, not all volunteers are state or local agents. 
private sector volunteers through esaR-Vhp or mRc systems 
may garner similar protections under the uniform emergency 
Volunteer health practitioners act of 2007, but only if  states 
have adopted its provisions. presently, only 12 states, the District 
of columbia, and the Virgin Islands have done so according to 
the uniform law commission (available at http://www.nccusl.
org/act.aspx?title=emergency Volunteer health practitioners). 
How do federal, state and local preparedness laws differ? 
Federal, state and local governments have very different legal 
authorities. states possess the broadest authority to address 
public health threats, which they may share in part with local 
governments depending on the degree of “home rule” that 
is assigned to these local governments. this varies consider-
ably across states. historically, the federal government’s public 
health emergency law responsibilities are more limited to pro-
viding significant guidance, resources and expertise, except as 
related to emergencies implicating national security interests for 
which federal jurisdiction is extensive. 
While the federal government has reorganized itself since 2001 
to better handle national response efforts during emergencies, 
state and local governments ultimately remain on the frontlines. 
the federal government defers to state and local agencies in 
many cases, subject to some prominent exceptions.  
How can these differences in federal, state, and local powers 
complicate or impede emergency response efforts?
one example concerns the distribution of antivirals, vaccines, 
and other medicines or supplies. to alleviate the potential for 
national shortages in public health emergencies, congress has 
authorized the creation of stockpiles of antivirals and vaccines 
kept by the sns, controlled by cDc. these assets are available 
to supplement state and local response efforts at the discretion 
of cDc. legally, cDc may be positioned not only to distribute 
sns supplies, but also determine the priorities through which 
the supplies may be dispensed across states.   
During the 2009/2010 h1n1 pandemic, cDc dispensed avail-
able vaccines to states together with its policy outlining who 
should be first in line to receive them. many state and local 
actors adhered to cDc’s guidance; others did not, however. 
once these supplies get to points of dispensing, cDc ultimately 
may lose control over how they are provided to local popula-
tions, although legally it can set a prioritization plan.   
What steps can be taken to improve public health legal 
preparedness across all jurisdictions? 
While emergency legal preparedness has improved immensely 
over the prior decade since 9/11, there are still important gaps 
to be filled at every level of government, but most notably at 
the state level given their prominence in protecting the public’s 
health. states seeking to improve preparedness through law 
might consider actions to: 
1. Assess critical legal and policy issues that need to be ad-
dressed in advance of the next emergency. events like Katrina, 
the h1n1 pandemic and regional emergencies provide ample il-
lustrations of potential gaps in law and policy. so do specific ob-
servations among emergency and public health responders wary 
of key dilemmas before they arise. policymakers must routinely 
study and seek to address these issues affirmatively. 
2. Address the gaps. Identifying gaps is one thing; solving them 
is another. hoping for real-time solutions during an emergency 
is counter-productive. lives may be lost while legal issues are 
hammered out. this is unacceptable and yet easily corrected. 
using existing models, practice guidance, or comparisons to pol-
icy fixes that work in other jurisdictions, states can legislatively 
or via regulation address gaps without waiting for inevitable 
complications during the next emergency.  
3. Practice legal preparedness. like other preparedness skills 
and capacities, legal preparedness must be practiced to be ef-
fective. everyone involved in law and policy responses during 
emergencies should work through legal scenarios in “real-time” 
during training exercises. practicing what I like to call “legal triage” 
through actual exercises or education efforts helps to identify and 
remedy gaps — it is an investment that will facilitate future emer-
gency responses in real-time. cDc and naccho have worked 
recently with the network for public health law to develop a 
brief public health legal preparedness curriculum of particular value 
for state and local officials (which is still under federal review). 
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Disaster Preparedness for Mass Casualties from 
Explosive Devices—the Role of Injury Prevention 
and Control
By Richard W. Sattin, M.D., F.A.C.P., president-elect, Society for Advancement of Violence and Injury Research and professor and research 
director at the Department of Emergency Medicine at Georgia Health Sciences University
Tornadoes, earthquakes, hurricanes, tsunamis and terrorist bombings have one major health outcome in common—
most deaths during these disasters occur due to injury. Drown-
ing, being crushed by a collapsing building or other structure, 
being struck by a moving object, being thrown against a struc-
ture or an object are common outcomes and are predictable.  
many non-medical types of preparedness exist that reduce inju-
ries and deaths from natural disasters, including building codes 
(retrofits for earthquakes, construction of safe rooms in tornado 
areas, use of hurricane shutters and elevated construction in 
hurricane/typhoon areas), and improved planning and regulation 
for land use and building of homes and businesses. better and 
more effective preparedness and evacuation plans could lessen 
the impact of these injuries on individuals, families and society.  
as we remember 10 years later the events of 9/11, it is clear that 
there remain critical issues on how to prevent and lessen the 
complications of injuries, including death, disability and emotional 
stress during catastrophic events.  much of the preparedness 
for mass casualty events in the united states has focused on the 
threat of biological, chemical, radiation and nuclear incident.  
as events in oklahoma city, new York city, madrid, london, 
mumbai, bali and elsewhere have shown, the use of conventional 
weapons and explosive devices is a far more likely scenario, 
and the resultant injuries present unique triage, diagnostic and 
management challenges to health care providers.  Injuries from 
explosive materials due to terrorism or other causes are a con-
stant threat that happens worldwide.  the remainder of this 
commentary will primarily use mass casualties from conventional 
explosive devices to explain current injury prevention and con-
trol principles and ways to strengthen policies and procedures. 
Few physicians in the united states, other than those who 
have served in combat areas, have been trained in the care of 
the injured blast victim or have taken care of a patient who 
has sustained injuries from an explosion. persons injured from 
an explosion often have a much greater number of penetrat-
ing wounds compared with the routine trauma patient. most 
hospitals have emergency response plans and do have regular 
exercises, but exercises do not approach the chaos which ac-
companies a mass casualty event.   Identifying weak points in 
those plans and testing alternative strategies are critical to en-
sure the care for those injured from explosive devices during 
a real episode is optimal, especially if a large explosion-related 
mass casualty event occurs on our already fragile and overbur-
dened response system.  the ability to push out key information 
on best practices quickly and efficiently to health professionals 
who are suddenly faced with a situation with which they are not 
familiar will be essential to optimizing care. 
During a mass casualty event, health professionals use triage 
protocols to identify those persons needing immediate, lifesav-
ing care and transport to critical care hospitals while avoiding 
overcrowding at those hospitals. Due to the potential extensive 
nature of a mass casualty event, outcomes are dependent on 
a broad continuum and rapid coordination of multidisciplinary 
care together with the availability of hospital resources (e.g., 
operating theaters, radiology suites, number of intensive-care 
beds and respirators, medical specialty care). the number of 
victims can quickly overwhelm the capacity of the health care 
system. health care providers can expect casualties to arrive 
within 20 minutes of the bombing, with most of the total victims 
presenting for care within two hours. most current planning for 
mass casualty events assumes that the emergency medical re-
sponse will function normally.  auf der heide provided a review 
of the literature regarding disaster planning (the importance of 
evidence-based disaster planning Annals of Emergency Medicine 
2006;47, 34–49) indicating, however, that the actual response 
differs considerably from these planning assumptions; there is 
uncoordinated emergency dispatch, lack of hospital notifica-
tion and communication, significant bystander involvement and 
rescue, absent or ineffective scene triage, self-referral and the 
transport of many, if not most, patients to the nearest health-
care facility.  What occurs is, therefore, reverse triage, that is, 
the least-injured patients arrive at the nearest hospitals before 
the critically injured patients do.  the extent of this reverse tri-
age has been shown to correlate directly with the mortality of 
those patients who were critically injured in the event. 
Injury has been described, until recently, as the “neglected dis-
ease” since it occurs in such great numbers, but has been tacitly 
accepted as a normal occurrence of living in a modern society. 
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the 1985 report, Injury in America, noted, however, that a public 
health approach similar to that used for other diseases could 
lead to significant reduction in injuries. to understand the con-
cepts of injuries from explosions, one must also understand the 
basic paradigm of injury control.  Injury can affect any person’s 
body part, organ, or system and its functioning and can have 
both short-term and long-term effects.   It is not merely survival 
after an explosion-related injury that is important, but rather the 
ability of the individual to attain maximum physical recovery, to 
survive financially, and to enable secure, productive lives regard-
less of functional status. as with other diseases, injuries can be 
viewed as a relationship between a person (the host), an agent 
and the environment.  unlike other diseases, the underlying 
agent of injury is not a microbe or carcinogen, but is energy, 
most often in the form of mechanical force. the dose of energy 
received, the dose’s distribution, duration and rapidity, and the 
individual’s response to the transfer of the energy can determine 
if a physical injury occurs or is prevented.  For example, a large 
mechanical energy load quickly transmitted to a hip during a fall 
involving an older person may lead to a fracture. If that same 
energy load could be dissipated through use of energy-absorbing 
flooring or mats or through hip pads or other new technologies, 
fewer persons would sustain hip fractures. similarly, the design 
of safer buildings (e.g., the use of blast-resistant materials such as 
tempered glass and window coverings) dissipates the energy load 
and reduces the numbers of persons injured from an explosion.  
the basic injury paradigm of host, agent and environment also 
needs to include the effect of the social environment. Victims 
of explosions can also experience adverse mental health conse-
quences including depression, anxiety and low self-esteem, and 
harmful physical health consequences such as suicide attempts, 
cardiovascular disease and substance abuse. the emotional, 
financial, and psychosocial effects of an acute injury may be 
even more debilitating than the actual physical injury. an acute 
injury has not just an immediate effect on the injured person, 
but also a long-term “ripple effect” on that person’s life and the 
lives of others in his or her family and community.  temporary 
or permanent loss of income, changes in personal relationships 
including income responsibilities, and difficulty in care and finan-
cial support for one’s children or parents may be a significant 
social outcome from the injury.  health care providers may also 
be subject to psychosocial problems resulting from caring for 
so many injured persons in such a short time period.  a com-
munity’s societal and functional infrastructure may be affected 
extensively during a mass casualty event. 
an understanding of the epidemiology of explosion-related 
injuries also requires surveillance data to help identify ways to 
prevent or reduce vulnerability to these types of events. surveil-
lance data are analyzed to determine the magnitude, scope and 
characteristics of a health problem; to study the factors that 
increase the risk of disease, injury, or disability; to determine 
which risks are potentially modifiable; to assess what can be 
done to prevent the problem using the information about causes 
and risk factors; to design, pilot test and evaluate interventions, 
and to then implement the most promising interventions on a 
broad scale.  much data during a mass casualty event are perish-
able since there are no active plans to collect these data.   this 
is unfortunate since determining ways to prevent and improve 
outcomes from injuries are dependent on understanding what 
took place and how patients were managed. standardized mini-
mum data collection instruments and definitions are essential 
to generate reliable intra- and inter-country comparisons of 
injuries from explosions. Data collected through this integrated 
approach can be used to make the case for the design of safer 
buildings, improve evacuation plans and plan the allocation of 
medical and rescue resources and operations (e.g., ambulances, 
blood supply).  these enhanced surveillance systems can help 
public health professionals link the findings to the management 
decision process and disseminate the data collected to improve 
the level of preparedness nation-wide.
over the last decade, we have made significant strides in caring 
for the explosion-related victim but further progress in learn-
ing how to maximize care and protect the public is needed.  
Further integration of trauma systems and evaluation of that 
integration with law enforcement, fire prevention, power supply 
and other infrastructure issues should take place to improve the 
care of the acutely injured.  as communication can be difficult 
during the chaos following a mass casualty event, it is important 
to continue to improve communication systems’ interoperabil-
ity. accurate and reliable data systems are critical to determine 
how best to prevent injury and care for the injured so identify-
ing and improving ways of collecting data, making full use of 
existing data systems and having access to the real-time use of 
data during an event would be major steps forward.  educa-
tional programs for health care providers are currently available, 
but the exact type and extent of education and the need for and 
amount of refresher courses for various providers (pre-hospital 
and hospital) to ensure an appropriate level of knowledge and 
expertise is not precisely known.  many serious secondary inju-
ries occur after a disaster so further coordination between di-
saster preparedness and acute injury care management of these 
difficult environments and situations is necessary.  by integrating 
further injury prevention and control into disaster preparedness, 
we will continue to make major strides in preventing injury and 
in providing improved medical, mental health and rehabilitative 
services to survivors of disaster events.

TFAH has identified some top areas of concern, 
including:
A. Assuring dedicated and ongoing funding for 
emergency preparedness and strengthening the 
core public health infrastructure nationwide;
n  Commentary:  Improving Collaboration between 
Federal, State and Local agencies in Planning for a 
Worst Case Scenario: A Broad Aerosolized Dispersal of 
Weaponized Anthrax in a Major Metropolitan Area. 
By Alonzo Plough, PhD, MPH, Director, Emergency 
Preparedness and Response of the Los Angeles County 
Department of Public Health and Member of the 
Board of Directors of the Trust for America’s Health
b. Modernizing biosurveillance to rapidly and 
accurately detect outbreaks and threats;
c. Improving the research, development and 
availability of vaccines and medications;
n  Commentary: Surveillance: Essential for Public Health 
Preparedness and Response, By, Jeffrey Engel, M.D., 
State Health Director, Division of Public Health, North 
Carolina Department of Health and Human Services
D. Increasing the ability of the public health 
and health care systems to provide mass care 
during emergencies; 
e. Working with communities to cope with 
and recover from emergencies, particularly 
for the more vulnerable members of commu-
nities including children, seniors, people with 
underlying health conditions, racial and ethnic 
minorities and lower-income individuals; 
n  Commentary: Vulnerability, Resilience and Mental 
Health Considerations in Disaster Planning and Re-
sponse:  Do Resources Match the Rhetoric?  By David 
Abramson, PhD, MPH and Irwin Redlener, MD, Co-
lumbia University Mailman School of Public Health
F. Coordinating public health preparedness 
with strategic implementation of the FDA Food 
Safety Modernization Act of 2011.
n  Commentary:  Food Safety: New Law Takes a Big 
Bite Out of the Problem, but Leaves Much on the 
Plate.  By Erik D. Olson, Director of Food Programs 
at The Pew Charitable Trusts
a.  assuRIng DeDIcateD FunDIng anD stRengthenIng 
publIc health pRepaReDness InFRastRuctuRe
The United States made a significant investment 
to improve public health preparedness after the 
September 11, 2001 and anthrax tragedies.  The 
main funding streams have included bolstering 
basic federal capabilities; improving national 
vaccine and medication development, stockpil-
ing and distribution; improving state, local and 
hospital preparedness; and a one-time funding 
influx to support pandemic flu preparedness.  
While the funding has resulted in significant 
progress in the past decade, the Ready or Not? 
reports have documented a number of major 
gaps that still remain, particularly in maintain-
ing a fully-staffed and trained workforce, vac-
cine and medical countermeasure research and 
production, biosurveillance programs, medical 
surge capacity and providing support for com-
munities to cope with and respond to crises.
Historically, the federal approach to prepared-
ness has not provided a stable or sustained level 
of support for federal, state or localities.  The 
most consistent pattern in U.S. preparedness 
funding is inconsistency.  These inconsistencies 
make it difficult for states to maintain programs, 
capabilities and enough employees, particularly 
trained scientific experts, for emergencies.  
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Federal Policy Issues and 
Recommendations
In the coming year, implementation of the reauthorized public health preparedness legislation provides a new opportunity to address ongoing challenges that public 
health preparedness faces while the field considers how to allocate increasingly scarce 
resources during budget cutbacks.
4S e c T i o n
Preparedness requires ongoing funding dedi-
cated to ensure that basic capabilities are in 
place and that experts have the training and sys-
tems to quickly act in the face of emergencies. 
Ten years ago, the nation was caught off-guard 
when the public health system was unprepared 
for emergencies.  Many core public health func-
tions, including epidemiology, laboratories and 
outbreak surveillance were lacking.  Reviews by 
the IOM, CDC, GAO and other experts found 
the country’s public health “infrastructure had 
greatly deteriorated.”229, 230, 231  On top of that, 
little groundwork was in place for hospitals 
and public health departments to respond to 
the massive influx of potential anthrax samples 
and there was a lack of coordination, training, 
leadership and communication within the field 
and for public health departments to work with 
other first responders.  
The United States has learned several lessons 
from the September 11, 2001 and anthrax trag-
edies, Hurricane Katrina, the H1N1 pandemic 
flu and other emergencies, most notably that 
being prepared means having: 
n  Functional core public health systems in place, 
including epidemiology, laboratories, commu-
nication and outbreak surveillance; and
n  Emergency-specific training and systems 
across a variety of threats. Similar to military-
readiness, public health emergency readiness 
necessitates ongoing planning, training and 
upgrading of systems and technology.  
Basic preparedness involves:
n  Rapid detection of and response to emer-
gency disease threats, including those caused 
by bioterrorism.
n  Intensive investigative capabilities to quickly 
diagnose an infectious disease outbreak or to 
identify the biological or chemical agent used 
in an attack.
n  Surge capacity for mass events, including 
adequate facilities, equipment, supplies and 
trained health professionals.
n  Mass containment strategies, including phar-
maceuticals needed for antibiotic or antidote 
administration and isolation and quarantining 
when necessary.
n  Streamlined and effective communication 
channels so health workers can swiftly and ac-
curately communicate with each other, other 
front line workers and the public about 1) the 
nature of an emergency or attack, 2) the risk 
of exposure and how to seek treatment when 
needed, and 3) any actions they or their fami-
lies should take to protect themselves.
n  Communication that is able to reach and take 
into consideration at-risk populations.
n  Streamlined and effective evacuation of at-
risk populations with special medical needs.
n  An informed and involved public that can pro-
vide material and moral support to professional 
responders, and can render aid when necessary 
to friends, family, neighbors and associates.
Dedicated funding is needed to support the 
unique capabilities and training required to 
maintain adequate levels of emergency pre-
paredness, including:
n  Leadership, planning and coordination: An 
established chain-of-command and well de-
fined roles and responsibilities for seamless 
operation across different medical and lo-
gistical functions and among federal, state 
and local authorities during crisis situations, 
including police, public safety officials and 
other first responders.
n  Core public health capabilities:  Basic public 
health systems and equipment, including lab-
oratory testing and communications that keep 
pace with advances in science and technology. 
n  An expert and fully-staffed workforce: Highly 
trained and adequate numbers of public 
health professionals, including epidemiolo-
gists, lab scientists, public health nurses and 
doctors, and other experts, in addition to 
back-up workers for surge capacity needs.
n  Modernized technology: State-of-the-art labo-
ratory equipment, information collection and 
health tracking systems.
n  Rapid development and ability to manufac-
ture vaccines and medications:  A streamlined, 
safe, effective system to ensure rapid research 
and production of medical countermeasures 
to protect people from emerging threats.
n  Pre-planned, safety-first rapid emergency re-
sponse capabilities and precautions: Tested 
plans and safety precautions to mitigate po-
tential harm to communities, public health 
professionals and first responders.
n  Immediate, streamlined communications ca-
pabilities: Coordinated, integrated communi-
cations among all parts of the public health 
system, frontline responders and the public. 
Communications capabilities must include 
back-up systems in the event of power loss or 
overloaded wireless channels.
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It is also essential to consider the costs of re-
sponding to disasters and the toll it takes on 
health departments — to find mechanisms to 
provide support for rebuilding after an incident 
and response have happened.
The current economic situation is compound-
ing the problems created by the historic incon-
sistent funding for emergency preparedness. 
Combined federal, state and local budget cuts 
are resulting in the loss of core programs and 
functions and major staff losses.  Even before 
the recession, federal support for preparedness 
began to decline.  Federal funds for state and 
local preparedness declined by 38 percent from 
fiscal year (FY) 2005 to 2012 (adjusted for infla-
tion) — and additional cuts are expected under 
budget sequestration.
A decade of progress in preparedness is at risk due 
to the cuts.  Federal, state and local health depart-
ments will no longer be able to maintain basic 
functions needed to respond to emergencies.  
For the future, this is likely to mean a reliance 
on emergency supplemental funding to try to 
quickly ramp up response efforts after an event 
has happened.  
This puts states and localities in the position 
of trying to respond without core capabili-
ties — and trying to build capacity during an 
emergency response.  In these situations, as was 
evident during the anthrax attacks and H1N1 
outbreak, states and localities have to deal with 
contracting and bureaucratic restrictions, which 
often limit the ability to spend funds quickly or 
to enter into fast, short-term contracts.  Develop-
ing emergency capacity as an event is unfolding 
is particularly challenging when health depart-
ments do not know how long they will have re-
sources to sustain their capabilities or needs.  
States and localities have reported it will take 
them longer to achieve the 15 national capabili-
ties for public health preparedness due to lim-
ited resources.232
Many states and localities have taken creative 
approaches to budget and spending restric-
tions, such as making flexible use of their public 
health employees during disasters, to reassign 
individuals to other duties for the time of emer-
gencies.  But in some cases, federal grants re-
strict this ability if the personnel are funded to 
support other specific programs, such as mater-
nal and child health.  CDC and ASPR are cur-
rently working with the states and localities to 
find ways to be able to make quick use of emer-
gency supplemental funds easier, but emer-
gency support cannot fill ongoing gaps.
recommenDATionS
In addition to dedicated and sustained support 
for preparedness, TFAH also recommends a se-
ries of actions to ensure preparedness funding 
is more predictable, to cut down on federal bu-
reaucratic red tape and to ensure flexibility so 
that when emergencies happen, resources and 
emergency supplemental support can be used 
quickly and effectively.  This effort requires:
n  Establishing multi-year grant cycles with 
greater flexibility in states’ retention and use 
of carry forward and unexpended funds;
n  Creating a mechanism to fast track the award-
ing and programming of emergency supple-
mental funds into existing grant mechanisms 
without additional requirements; 
n  Granting  authority to the U.S. Secretary of 
HHS to allow states to also use personnel 
that are part of other federal programs in re-
sponse to a public health emergency; and
n  Improving coordination among emergency pre-
paredness grant programs, including PHEP, 
HPP, FEMA and CDC grants, through increased 
leadership and direction and by encouraging 
uniformity of guidelines and requirements to 
maximize efficiency, carrying out the MOU 
agreements that the agencies have entered into.
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In early 2002, hhs announced $1.1 billion in 
funding for state public health, hospital and 
medical preparedness planning for a bioterror-
ist event.233  In June 2002, congress passed the 
public health security and bioterrorism act and 
appropriated new federal funds to fill gaps and 
help modernize the public health system to be 
able to respond to bioterror and health threats.  
the funds were devoted to:
n  Improving national capabilities and policies at 
cDc and other areas within hhs; 
n  expanding the sns, which is a federal reposi-
tory of vaccines, medications and other medi-
cal equipment for use in emergencies; 
n  creating a medical reserve corps and volun-
teer networks for support; and 
n  Developing two grant new programs, phep, 
which supports state and local public health 
preparedness, was initially funded just under 
$1 billion annually in FY 2003 — and the 
hospital preparedness program (hpp) was 
funded at around $400 million annually.  
In 2004, congress passed the bioshield act 
and appropriated $5.6 billion to help fill a major 
gap in the country’s ability to quickly develop 
and procure vaccines and other medications 
that could be needed to prevent or respond to 
health threats.
In 2005 and 2006, following hurricanes Katrina 
and Rita, national awareness of the implications 
of a potential pandemic flu outbreak made it 
clear that while initial progress had been made 
to begin to improve federal, state and local 
public health preparedness, major areas of vul-
nerability could not be addressed with the level 
of resources provided.  In 2005, president bush 
announced the national strategy for pandemic 
Influenza and in FY 2006, congress appropri-
ated more than $5.6 billion in one-time funds to 
support pandemic flu preparedness activities, 
particularly to support vaccine research, produc-
tion and delivery and surveillance, and included 
$600 million in grants to state and local health 
departments.
In 2006, congress passed papha, reauthoriz-
ing the 2002 bill to expand the focus toward 
more of an “all-hazards” approach to improve 
readiness for a wider range of potential threats. 
the bill created aspR to better coordinate and 
develop policy at hhs, which included baRDa 
to provide an integrated, systematic approach to 
the development and purchase of the necessary 
vaccines, drugs, therapies and diagnostic tools 
for public health medical emergencies, which 
includes overseeing project bioshield, as well as 
taking over management of the medical reserve 
corps and volunteer programs, the hpp grants 
and other programs.
When the h1n1 pandemic flu began, congress 
allocated more than $8 billion in one-time funds 
in FY 2009 to fill immediate needs and gaps to 
respond to the outbreak.234, 235
oVeRVIeW oF FeDeRal FunDIng FoR pRepaReDness sInce 2001
cDc oFFice oF PUbLic HeALTH PrePAreDneSS AnD reSPonSe FUnDinG ToTALS  
AnD SeLecT ProGrAmS 
FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 
CDC Total $1,747,023,000 $1,533,474,000 $1,507,211,000 $1,622,757,000 $1,631,173,000 $1,472,553,000 $1,479,455,000 $1,514,657,000 $1,522,339,000 $1,415,416,000 $1,306,906,000
State and Local 
Preparedness 
and Response 
Capability*
$940,174,000 $1,038,858,000 $918,454,000 $919,148,000 $823,099,000 $766,660,000 $746,039,000 $746,596,000 $760,986,000 $664,294,000 $658,850,000
SNS $645,000,000 $298,050,000 $397,640,000 $466,700,000 $524,339,000 $496,348,000 $551,509,000 $570,307,000 $595,661,000 $591,001,000 $509,486,000 
*Includes public health emergency preparedness (phep) cooperative agreements, centers for public health preparedness, advanced practice centers (FY2004-
09), cities Readiness Initiative, u.s. postal service costs (FY 2004), all other state and local capacity, and smallpox supplement (FY 2003)
cDc Funding  
source: FY 2002-09: http://www.cdc.gov/phpr/publications/2010/appendix3.pdf    
source: FY 2010-11:  u.s. centers for Disease control and prevention.  2011 operating plan. http://www.hhs.gov/asfr/ob/docbudget/2011operatingplan_cdc.pdf.   
source: FY 2012: http://rules.house.gov/media/file/pDF_112_1/legislativetext/hR1540crsom/psconference%20Div%20F%20-%20som%20ocR.pdf, p. 26
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oFFice oF ASSiSTAnT SecreTArY For PrePArDneSS AnD reSPonSe FUnDinG  
ToTALS AnD SeLecT ProGrAmS
FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 
ASPR Totals -- -- -- -- $632,000,000 $694,280,000 $632,703,000 $788,191,000 $891,446,000 $913,418,000 $926,724,000 
HPP^ $135,000,000 $514,000,000 $515,000,000 $487,000,000 $474,000,000 $474,030,000 $423,399,000 $393,585,000 $425,928,000 $383,858,000 $380,466,000
BARDA -- -- -- $5,000,000 $54,000,000 $103,921,000 $101,544,000 $275,000,000 $304,948,000 $415,000,000 $415,000,000 
Bioshield Special 
Reserve Fund -- -- $5,600,000,000* -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
* one-time Funding 
^hpp moved from hRsa to aspR in 2007 and includes esaR-Vhp
source: hpp FY 2002: http://archive.hhs.gov/budget/04budget/fy2004bib.pdf, p. 14 
source: hpp FY 2003: http://archive.hhs.gov/budget/05budget/fy2005bibfinal.pdf, p. 16 
source hpp FY 2004:http://archive.hhs.gov/budget/06budget/FY2006budgetinbrief.pdf, p. 16 
source: hpp FY 2005: http://archive.hhs.gov/budget/07budget/2007budgetInbrief.pdf, p. 20 
source: baRDa FY 2005-06: http://www.hhs.gov/asrt/ob/docbudget/2010phssef.pdf, p. 45. 
source: FY 2006: http://www.hhs.gov/asfr/ob/docbudget/2008budgetinbrief.pdf, p. 109 
source: FY 2007: http://www.hhs.gov/budget/09budget/budgetfy09cj.pdf, p. 288 
source: FY 2008-09: http://www.hhs.gov/asfr/ob/docbudget/2010phssef.pdf, p. 8 
source: FY 2010-11: http://www.hhs.gov/asfr/ob/docbudget/2011operatingplan_phssef.pdf 
source: FY 2012: http://rules.house.gov/media/file/pDF_112_1/legislativetext/hR1540crsom/psconference%20Div%20F%20-%20som%20ocR.pdf, p. 26
FLU FUnDinG ToTALS AnD SeLecT ProGrAmS 
FY 2004 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012
Flu Total1 $50,000,000 $183,000,000 $5,590,000,000* $138,000,000 $299,000,000 $8,456,000,000 $572,000,000 $300,525,000 $159,681,0002
State and Local 
Pandemic Grants -- -- $600,000,000^ -- -- $1,444,000,000 -- -- --
Vaccine Develop-
ment and Purchase $50,000,000 $183,000,000 $2,963,000,000 -- -- $1,944,000,000 $158,000,000 -- --
1 may include hhs agency budgets, office of the secretary and one-time funding. 
2 this only reflects cDc’s influenza budget, other agency budgets were unavailable as of publication 
^ appropriated in FY2006 to be used over the following three years 
* obligated over three years
Flu Funding 
source: FY 2004-05: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/Rs22576.pdf, p. 2-3 
source: FY 2006: http://www.hhs.gov/asfr/ob/docbudget/2008budgetinbrief.pdf, p. 105 
source: FY 2007: http://www.hhs.gov/budget/09budget/2009budgetInbrief.pdf p. 107 
source: FY 2008: http://dhhs.gov/asfr/ob/docbudget/2010budgetinbrief.pdf p. 107 
source: FY 2009: http://dhhs.gov/asfr/ob/docbudget/2011budgetinbrief.pdf, p. 9 
source: FY 2010: http://dhhs.gov/asfr/ob/docbudget/2011budgetinbrief.pdf p. 104 
source: FY 2011: correspondence with liz DeVoss at hhs november 4, 2011 
source: FY 2012: http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/t?&report=hr331&dbname=112&
58
the affordable care act (aca) included the 
creation of a prevention and public health Fund 
(Fund) to provide communities around the 
country $16.5 billion over the next 10 years to 
invest in effective, proven prevention efforts 
and to build the public health infrastructure. the 
Fund is being used to support community and 
clinical prevention efforts, strengthen state and 
local health departments and the public health 
workforce, and support science and research.
the Fund has the potential to have a tremendous 
impact on the nation’s preparedness.  the Fund 
is helping to build resilient communities through 
investments in:
n  laboratory and epidemiology capacity — pre-
vention Fund money has been used to hire 
and train epidemiologists and laboratory scien-
tists and expand the number of public health 
laboratories using electronic laboratory infor-
mation systems.236, 237  as part of public health 
infrastructure grants, hhs is also promoting 
the capacity of health departments to use 
electronic health records through participation 
in electronic laboratory reporting and training 
health information specialists.  these special-
ized systems are critical to the public health 
system’s ability to quickly detect, pinpoint and 
respond to an emergency such as an emerging 
infectious disease or foodborne outbreak.   
n  Workforce training and fellowships — grants 
may help mitigate the devastating impact of 
budget cuts on the public health workforce, 
allowing more trained personnel to engage in 
preparedness and response activities. 
n  Immunizations — grants have been allocated 
to improve the Immunization Information 
systems (registries) and other immunization 
information technologies and to expand adult 
immunization programs and vaccination capac-
ity in schools.238  growing the ability to quickly 
and accurately vaccinate the population and 
improving vaccine access and acceptance will 
be vital during an infectious pandemic that re-
quires mass vaccination of the public.  
n  community prevention — In addition to ac-
cess to vaccines and clinical prevention, the 
Fund is supporting chronic disease prevention 
through community-level efforts to combat 
obesity, tobacco use and poor nutrition.  Indi-
viduals with chronic conditions are particularly 
vulnerable during a disaster because of the 
need for specialized equipment and medicines 
and difficulty with evacuation and sheltering.  
healthy communities, with an informed popu-
lation and strong connections between the 
public, healthcare system, and public health, 
are better able to weather a disaster.    
pReVentIon anD publIc health FunD: buIlDIng  
pRepaReD communItIes
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EXPERT COMMENTARY
A Decade of Public Health Preparedness:   
A Focus on Oregon
By Mel Kohn, M.D., MPH, State Health Officer and Public Health Director, Oregon Health Authority
I must be getting old because I remember the days before we had a public health preparedness program.  outbreak investi-
gations were handled almost exclusively by our communicable dis-
ease epidemiologists.  even in oregon, which witnessed the only 
bioterrorist incident on u.s. soil in recent memory prior to 2001 
— the salmonella outbreak engineered by followers of bhagwan 
shree Rajneesh in a small town near the Dalles, oregon — pre-
paredness was not a core public health activity.  It almost seems 
quaint in retrospect, but I remember when we got our first fed-
eral preparedness grant, and used it to hire a single staff person.
but everything changed with the 9/11 and anthrax attacks 
of 2001.  these events, together with the saRs outbreak of 
2003 and hurricane Katrina in new orleans in 2005, spurred 
a dramatic federal investment in public health preparedness 
at the state and local level.  after many years of neglect of the 
public health infrastructure, preparedness dollars were used 
to plug holes in our fraying epidemiologic and laboratory infra-
structure, as well as to build new capacity in incident command 
structures, agency operations centers, and communications.  
In oregon, here’s a list of some of the most important things 
that these investments have bought for us: 
n  capacity for laboratory testing that enables us to investigate 
and respond to threats in a more timely way (think the spate 
of white powder incidents in the wake of the anthrax at-
tacks, or the rapid testing in-state of flu samples during the 
h1n1 influenza pandemic);
n  24-7 responsiveness of the public health system so when 
someone calls the health department for an emergency 
there is someone to answer the phone and provide help; 
n  communications hardware, software and training that enable us to 
provide accurate and timely information to the public — the best 
antidote to the fear and anxiety that are a major part of any disaster; 
n  the ability to use incident command methodology so that 
we can quickly and effectively communicate with partners 
in other agencies and utilize the state and local emergency 
management system including our national guard; and
n  the capacity to monitor healthcare system capacity and 
needs so that life-saving resources in short supply during an 
emergency can be targeted to where they are most needed.
these investments have yielded substantial returns numerous times 
in recent years.  Without our preparedness program, our response 
to the (hopefully) once-in-a-lifetime h1n1 influenza pandemic 
would have been impossible to mount; we could not have effectively 
coordinated vaccine distribution, provided information to the public 
and monitored and helped manage our health care systems’ needs.  
because oregon is on the pacific rim, there was a very high level of 
concern about how the nuclear accident in Japan would affect the 
safety of our food and water.  our agency operations center and 
our communications skills and infrastructure made it possible for us 
to provide reliable information to a fearful public on these issues.  
While by definition none of us can predict what the next major 
emergency will be, climate change, regardless of one’s beliefs 
about its causes, is likely to be a major factor.  climate change-re-
lated extreme weather events such as floods, forest fires, droughts 
and heat waves, are already becoming more common, and each of 
these will bring the potential for serious health effects that a robust 
public health preparedness system can do a great deal to mitigate.
today there is no doubt that the public expect the public health sys-
tem to have the capability to competently protect their health dur-
ing emergencies.   this is not an optional service.  so in the face of 
major budget cuts, how will we be able to meet those expectations?
We should use this budget crisis to look for efficiencies and new 
ways of working that will enable us to stretch our dollars further.  
For example, integration of healthcare and community-based 
preparedness activities could yield some efficiencies, and should 
be done whether or not there is a budget crisis.  but it’s fantasy to 
think that we will be able to absorb reductions of this magnitude 
simply by finding efficiencies.  next year we are expecting ad-
ditional reductions in federal preparedness funding. should they 
come to pass, public health in oregon will be forced to reduce our 
capacity in some serious ways that will not be overcome by finding 
efficiencies.  We have reached the point where we will lose ground 
on the investments we’ve made, and our ability to do this work will 
be seriously compromised, with life and death consequences.
It’s difficult to predict how or where the funding-induced deficien-
cies in our preparedness system will manifest themselves.  new or-
leans survived for many years, despite design defects and insufficient 
maintenance of its levee system.  Funds that would have been spent 
on the levees were used for other priorities that probably seemed 
more urgent at the time.  those funding decisions either went un-
noticed, or perhaps were even applauded as good stewardship of 
public funds.   and each individual decision about funding may have 
appeared at the time as if it could be absorbed with little impact.  
but in the hindsight of hurricane Katrina, it’s clear that over time 
the net effect of all those decisions was disastrous and tragic.
We should think of our public health preparedness system as a levee 
system that protects us at times of critical need and cannot be fixed 
on the spur of the moment.  can we really afford to let that erode? 
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training and exercises are essential for public health 
workers to be ready for emergencies.  training is 
important so public health workers have the skills 
to perform in situations that are outside of day-to-
day activities, so they are prepared ahead of time to 
deal with unexpected issues that arise during crises.
exercises provide public health workers the op-
portunity to test out their plans and capabilities 
before an actual event arises, and are an impor-
tant aspect of training, to understand roles and 
responsibilities during crises and to understand 
how to coordinate with other first responders.  
these are often the only time and mechanism 
for understanding the roles and responsibilities of 
other first responders — and often the only way 
other first responders, ranging from fire and po-
lice departments, gain an understanding of the ca-
pabilities and limits that public health departments 
have.  they are essential for minimizing confusion 
and maximizing efficiency during emergencies.
according to a June 2011 paper, the Impact of 
state and local budget cuts on public health 
preparedness, by pRtm, commissioned by the 
Iom, “from table-top exercises to more realistic 
event simulations, exercises provide a chance to 
analyze the strengths, weaknesses, and areas of 
improvement in public health response.”239  
the paper found that training “has been one of 
the first areas to be de-prioritized during budget 
cuts.  In general, state and local health depart-
ments are running low funding, human resources 
and time necessary to train staff….   efforts to 
standardize and align training throughout the 
states, such as by integrating core curricula and 
standardizing core competencies, have also suf-
fered.”240  In addition, according to the paper, 
exercises are being cut back, particularly in scope 
and sophistication.
tRaInIng anD eXeRcIses:  maJoR component oF ReaDIness
photo courtesy of aphl:  anthony barkey, mph, senior specialist, public health preparedness and Response, aphl, 
providing information on public health laboratory outreach to first responder communities.
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Improving Collaboration between Federal, State 
and Local agencies in Planning for a Worst Case  
Scenario: A Broad Aerosolized Dispersal of 
Weaponized Anthrax in a Major Metropolitan Area
By Alonzo Plough, PhD, MPH, Director, Emergency Preparedness and Response of the Los Angeles County Department of Public Health 
and Member of the Board of Directors of the Trust for America’s Health
On september 8, 2011, the los angeles county De-partment of public health hosted a tabletop exercise 
requested by Fema’s national exercise Division’s. goals were 
to review and discuss emergency response plans, policies, 
and procedures for rapid mcm dispensing. the exercise was 
prompted by presidential executive order 13527 to establish 
the federal capability for the timely provision of mcm follow-
ing a biological attack, and involved several federal agencies 
including Dhs, Fema, hhs, cDc, DoD, and others. 
even though los angeles county and other large urban areas 
have worked extensively with the cDc, especially under the 
cities Readiness Initiative (cRI) — which is directly responsible 
for enhancing our ability to distribute mcms through the sns 
— this work was not well known by many other federal agen-
cies, including those who could play an integral role in WmD 
response. the exercise expanded the list of federal agencies 
participating in this planning, and aligned them on how they 
could best support local and state efforts to provide prophylaxis 
to at-risk populations within 48 hours of a decision to dispense 
if aerosolized weaponized anthrax was broadly dispersed using 
the newly drafted Federal Interagency concept of operations 
(conops)—Rapid medical countermeasures Dispensing.
months before we began planning for the exercise, los an-
geles county had begun working with the Department of 
Defense northern command to develop interagency plans for 
rapid medical countermeasure dispensing in an anthrax-type 
event (the worst case scenario for a widespread weapons of 
mass destruction (WmD) type event). at the request of the 
national security council and White house, we welcomed 
the opportunity to show how ready large jurisdictions are to 
respond to such an event, and how willing we are to partner 
with federal agencies to further improve timely response.
the goal during those meetings was to develop DoD’s concept 
of operations and to establish requirements for a federal rapid 
response to dispense mcm to an affected population following 
a large-scale biological attack. In short, the DoD wanted to learn 
from us how we would respond to a WmD situation, what re-
sources and plans we had in place and how best they could sup-
port our efforts to organize and distribute federal resources.
the DoD came to los angeles in December of 2009, and 
went through our anthrax response plans in detail. they 
quickly learned that we had been doing this planning, training 
and testing for nearly a decade under cRI, and that these plans 
had been strengthened and honed by experiences during the 
h1n1 pandemic. the agency began to digest what supporting 
roles they could play to improve response to a WmD event.
In march of 2011, we met in colorado springs at northern com-
mand headquarters with representatives from DoD, Dhs, hhs, 
cDc, and the city of chicago and District of columbia health 
departments to develop the commander’s estimate for deploying 
DoD assets (for example, the national guard) in this kind of sce-
nario. the focus was on what kind of supports could be delivered 
to large urban areas such as los angeles county in 24 hours. at this 
point, this project showed the wonderful interaction between pub-
lic health and DoD — something that had not previously existed. as 
a result, DoD realized the agency had to adopt and adapt strategies 
to what public health had already built up and put in place. these 
findings, plans and outcomes were taken to the pentagon.
Following this planning project, this summer, we received a 
request from the White house to host a national level anthrax 
exercise, with an eye toward the 10th anniversaries of the 9/11 
and anthrax tragedies. the objectives of the exercise were to: 
n  examine the approach and mechanisms for organizing and 
managing the federal response to support medical counter-
measure dispensing operations in a large urban area as out-
lined in the draft the Federal Interagency conops–mcm 
Rapid Dispensing;
n  assess the viability of the Federal Interagency conops–
mcm Rapid Dispensing; and 
n  Identify policy and operational issues associated with the ef-
fectiveness and timeliness of the federal capability to support 
initial state and local dispensing of mcm.
In addition to the federal agencies mentioned above, state and 
national guards, local, county and state health departments, 
city, county and state emergency management agencies and 
local/first responders (fire, police, etc.) took part. 
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the exercise was based on a massive anthrax 
attack that was identified by multiple biowatch 
monitors across the county. It was designed for 
a “worst case” type scenario:  broad aerosolized 
dispersal of weaponized anthrax. We did not 
design the exercise to test capabilities beyond 
dispensing to focus the play (i.e., what happens 
once an attack is identified and whether 10 mil-
lion people could receive prophylaxes in 48 
hours). hopefully, at the end, we would have the 
framework of how the federal family could assist 
state and local government in improving timely 
response during such a situation.
the exercise went extremely well. planning for 
it opened a dialogue between federal response 
agencies and public health. prior to this exercise, 
there had not really been a deep knowledge 
at Dhs, Fema or DoD of all that was accom-
plished by the cDc investments, especially in 
directly funded cities like la. Federal agencies 
came out of the exercise with a much clearer 
idea of what local and state capabilities had been 
built up through cDc funding. specifically, op-
portunities for federal mcm support in the first 
48-hours were identified in the area of logistics 
(drivers and vehicles, or access to federal logis-
tics contractors to move supplies to dispensing 
sites), and less so on access to federal personnel 
to assist with dispensing because of planning ef-
forts with DoD.  the exercise also provided the 
backdrop for a good discussion of what types of 
nearby federal resources can be put into place 
(postal trucks, military bases, people etc.) in the 
48 hour dispensing window.
basically, the participating federal agencies learned 
about the return on investment from the cDc 
dollars and saw that local mcm distribution plans 
were solid and had been tested both through 
annual exercises and actual response during the 
h1n1 pandemic. before the exercise, there just 
wasn’t a lot of knowledge about the planning, 
training, exercises and performance measure re-
quirements that go with the cRI — there wasn’t 
widespread understanding of the accountability 
mechanisms that have been in place for years.
While the exercise was successful, it did expose 
some gaps in a unified federal-state-local response 
to a WmD. there is clearly still confusion and lack 
of widespread information on the capabilities of 
large urban areas (especially if you look the WmD 
center bio-Response Report card which was 
released on october 12, 2011). the exercise and 
that report card reflects a lack of engagement and 
understanding of the great successes and advances 
that have been made in high threat areas as a re-
sult of cDc funding, particularly for mcms. 
as a result of these meetings and the exercise, 
we were able to show how federal investment 
has improved local response to WmDs, and 
how closer interagency planning can improve 
response even further. this work is not finished; 
if these resources don’t continue or are cut, 
we’re in trouble. the public health emergency 
preparedness budget should be protected the 
same way other national security budgets are 
protected.
over the last ten years, through the cDc fund-
ing and cRI, large urban areas have built up a 
tremendous capacity to respond to and stave off 
a WmD attack. cDc should be applauded for 
what they have put on the ground, especially in 
highly populated high threat large urban areas. 
quite simply, there is a logic of preparedness and 
response that operates inside the beltway that is 
sometimes divorced from what has been accom-
plished by and what would happen in the rest of 
the country during a WmD attack. It is encourag-
ing that federal agencies are reaching out to local 
and state governments to see what has been 
built, and to develop interagency plans to improve 
readiness to response. this enhanced partnership 
will allow us to save lives, reduce human suffer-
ing, and speed recovery after a WmD attack.
Improving Collaboration between Federal, State and 
Local agencies in Planning for a Worst Case Scenario
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b.  ImpRoVIng bIosuRVeIllance: 
The United States lacks an integrated, national 
approach to biosurveillance — which hampers 
the country’s ability to rapidly detect and track 
bioterrorism attacks or disease outbreaks.  
In a 2009 review, the National Biosurveillance 
Advisory Subcommittee (NBAS) found that there 
“are more than 300 separate biosurveillance ef-
forts underway in various federal, state and local 
government agencies. These efforts are, for the 
most part, neither integrated nor interoperable, 
and propose to serve an array of purposes. The 
effectiveness of many of these systems remains 
untested and, in some cases, undefined.”241 
The existing structure is an assortment of many 
different systems that were built one disease or 
crisis at a time, and the result is a set of frag-
mented, uncoordinated systems that cannot 
share information effectively or quickly.  
Remaining constantly aware of surrounding 
threats and our capacity to respond is critical to 
dealing with emergencies. The U.S. disease sur-
veillance system has been built one disease or cri-
sis at a time, resulting in archaic and static silos 
of information rather than as an interoperable 
system with a focus on prevention.   Fixing the 
system will require that the nation fundamentally 
rethinks how to do biosurveillance — for both 
emergencies and routine public health issues. 
The particular challenge in the field of prepared-
ness is that officials don’t necessarily know in ad-
vance what they will need to know, and thus the 
most comprehensive approach to data collection 
is needed.  Right now, the fragmented system of 
data reporting drastically weakens our nation’s 
defense against emergency outbreaks.
Improving the system means harnessing the op-
portunities afforded by the nation’s transition 
to an integrated health information technology 
(HIT) system with electronic health records at 
the core.  This could create economies of scale 
and provide more useful information to public 
health and national security officials.  Currently, 
the White House is examining the national bio-
surveillance system.  TFAH believes that any 
new national strategy should examine means to 
achieve interoperability, efficiency, and trans-
parency among various surveillance systems in 
order to create an integrated biosurveillance 
operation.  In particular, HIT must strengthen 
meaningful use requirements, which currently 
contain weak public health reporting require-
ments.  Building the capacity of health depart-
ments to receive this data started through grants 
from the Recovery Act and Prevention and Pub-
lic Health Fund, but these investments need to 
continue and grow.  TFAH also urges ongoing, 
enhanced communication between Congress, 
CDC and the Office of the National Coordinator 
for Health IT (ONC) to ensure that ONC con-
siders the preparedness implications of EHRs.
recommenDATionS
TFAH recommends modernizing and coordinat-
ing the biosurveillance system — using up-to-date 
health information technology (HIT) to be able 
to receive, compile and analyze data in a more 
rapid and accessible fashion.  This requires: 
n  Implementing a new national strategy that 
examines means to achieve interoperability, 
efficiency and transparency among various 
surveillance systems in order to create an in-
tegrated biosurveillance operation; 
n  Leveraging new epidemiological data that 
results from health IT developments and 
electronic health records (EHRs) through 
enhanced communication between CDC and 
the Office of the National Coordinator for 
Health Information Technology (ONC); 
n  Ensuring the system includes electronic report-
ing of laboratory test requests and results; and 
n  Allowing Poison Control Centers to be eligible for 
grants to establish surveillance networks, along 
with hospitals, public health and other facilities.  
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biosurveillance is complicated by the fact that:
n  Different data is required for detecting and 
managing different types of emergencies;
n  health departments rely on receiving informa-
tion from hospitals and doctors — and there 
is often a lag time in the transmission of that 
information and another lag in the types of 
technologies used (phone reports, faxes, emails 
that are not linked directly to databases).  
currently, only a small number of health de-
partments have agreements with hospitals to 
obtain direct access to a hospital’s electronic 
medical records for investigations; and
n  many health departments lack the capacity 
to receive and analyze data from electronic 
health records.
Recent developments in hIt — both from the 
standpoint of technologies and standardization — 
are providing new opportunities to rethink and har-
ness new capabilities for biosurveillance.  Issues of 
how to quickly and effectively standardize, transfer, 
sort, analyze and store data are keys for building an 
effective system.  major retail chains, which rapidly 
track inventories and customer patterns, and insur-
ance companies, could serve as models for devel-
oping such a system that tracks health patterns, 
claims and billings, among other factors.
according to a recent study from harvard university 
researchers, allowing practitioners (hospitals, doctors 
and clinicians) access to data on infections in their 
community as diagnoses occur would greatly im-
prove patient care. While hospitals, clinics and doc-
tors report symptoms to public health departments, 
the information typically stops there. If two doctors 
in different hospitals report the same symptoms, 
it is unlikely they will ever know there are similar 
cases in a neighboring hospital. however, based on 
the harvard study, if there were real-time relays of 
information, more than 166,000 patients would be 
prevented from receiving unnecessary antibiotics to 
treat suspected strep throat, for example.242 
moving from the current system, which is com-
prised of a range of different systems in each state 
and for different diseases and health conditions, 
to a standardized, interoperable, rapid system will 
require a full modernization of u.s. biosurveil-
lance.  For instance, a recent report from gao 
outlined a set of common challenges state and 
city official identified as obstacles to developing 
and maintaining their biosurveillance capabili-
ties: “(1) state policies that restrict hiring, travel, 
and training in response to budget constraints; 
(2) ensuring adequate workforce, training, and 
systems; and (3) the lack of strategic planning and 
leadership to support long-term investment in 
cross-cutting core capabilities, integrated biosur-
veillance, and effective partnerships.”243
Key findings from a november 2011 article ex-
amining the state of biosurviellance in the united 
states today in biosecurity and bioterrorism: 
biodefense strategy, practice, and science by the 
center for biosecurity of umpc included that:244
1.  a single comprehensive biosurveillance sys-
tem is probably not possible, and many sys-
tems would be needed.
2.  Rapid laboratory reporting or clinical care 
reporting are the most important means by 
which health departments detect outbreaks.
3.  public health departments have systems to 
answer a number of the key outbreak ques-
tions, but this takes time.
4.  private sector medical resource and logistical 
information is often not readily available to 
public health departments.
5.  state and local health agencies do not have 
sufficient numbers of professionals with the 
special skills needed to build or run biosur-
veillance systems.
6.  Federal grant language may prevent health 
departments from reassigning staff during a 
public health crisis.
7.  exchange of electronic health information 
between clinical and public health communi-
ties has the potential to substantially improve 
biosurveillance.
8.  state and local public health information technol-
ogy infrastructure has improved over time, but 
budget cuts threaten to erode this infrastructure.
the authors provided a series of recommenda-
tions, including to:
1.  provide appropriate levels of funding and ex-
plicit grant guidance for state and local public 
health surveillance.
2.  Improve public health agencies’ ability to ac-
cess and use electronic health information.
3.  promote the integration of electronic labora-
tory reporting and electronic death registries.
4.  address key gaps in biosurveillance for respond-
ing to public health emergencies: advanced epi-
demiology and supply/logistical information.
the cuRRent state oF bIosuRVeIllance
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Surveillance: Essential for Public Health 
Preparedness and Response
By, Jeffrey Engel, M.D.; State Health Director, Division of Public Health, North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services
Surveillance, the Science of Gathering  
Data on Populations 
surveillance has always been a core public health function and 
it is essential to effectively monitor the health of a community.
over the last 60 years, the science of surveillance has been 
refined and is the cornerstone on which we base every public 
health intervention. as public health practice is largely per-
formed at the state and local level, so it is for surveillance.
the u.s. constitution leaves this responsibility up to states in 
their police powers. the major role of the federal government, 
largely through cDc, lies in coordinating and standardizing 
surveillance across jurisdictions to ensure reports can be com-
pared and to provide a national profile.
after the 9/11 and anthrax attacks, gaps in surveillance systems 
became apparent:  most notably there was no formal portal 
into the hospitals (anthrax disease was best tracked in emer-
gency departments). this was just a decade ago, yet, basically, 
our surveillance system was a handful of epidemiologists on 
the phone calling hospitals to obtain information and ask if they 
had seen patients with particular symptoms. out of this experi-
ence, public health and the hospitals recognized that they had 
to build a more robust and real time system — which is what 
north carolina has now.
implementation of Surveillance: influenza
During 2009 pandemic influenza a (h1n1), surveillance was 
essential for understanding the activity and severity of the pan-
demic. to monitor seasonal flu and potential flu pandemics, 
public health departments rely on non-specific case definitions 
because of the common nature of flu. 
With pandemic h1n1, public health had to quickly understand 
the activity of the strain, in particular the proportion of the 
population that would be affected and the subsequent severity 
measured by hospitalizations and mortality. In the early days of 
the pandemic, states needed to understand rapidly what was 
going on since there was no available vaccine. antiviral stock-
piles needed to be deployed to providers in a way that made 
sense based on the surveillance. community isolation and 
quarantine decisions relied on timely and accurate estimates of 
disease activity and severity. 
because pandemic h1n1 had its origins in north america, 
international port plans were already out of play:  the first 
step in disease prevention is to keep it off shore as long as 
possible. Instead, public health had to shift and rely on rapid 
assessments of community disease, which was based on 
existing biosurveillance systems.
at the local and state level, surveillance begins with clinician 
and lab reporting. public health relies heavily on the medi-
cal care system to be the “boots on the ground” for initiating 
reports and intelligence. north carolina has two systems for 
influenza reporting.
the first is the cDc’s sentinel provider network which in-
cludes volunteer clinics/private care providers that file reports 
to cDc on a weekly basis. our state laboratory of public 
health  uses the sentinel sites (we have 70 in north caro-
lina serving our population of 9.5 million people) to request 
that approximately one of every ten patients presenting with 
influenza-like illness (fever and respiratory symptoms) submit 
a nasal swab for inoculation. the samples are then transported 
to the state lab for isolation and characterization of flu viruses. 
the second system is a syndromic surveillance system oper-
ated through the emergency departments across the state. 
the emergency departments gather data elements for every 
hospital emergency department visit and state law mandates 
reporting all visits electronically. to my knowledge, we are the 
only state that has mandated emergency department report-
ing. For every visit, we collect 18 data elements and use natural 
language algorithms from the chief complaint and nurses notes 
to categorize a human illness into various syndromes. For flu, 
the surveillance system looks for temperature (if it is greater 
than 100.5 degrees) and respiratory symptoms. 
this syndromic surveillance system is much timelier because it 
is reported to the state every 12 hours via an automated trans-
fer to our analytical partner, the university of north carolina 
school of medicine. they then analyze the data and provide 
aggregated summaries to state public health officials and to the 
cDc’s biosense system.
consequently, we rely on our two parallel systems to track 
and understand the development of pandemics and other seri-
ous public health threats.
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north carolina also has a third system that focuses on mor-
bidity and mortality of unusual events. this system revolves 
around public health epidemiologists which are stationed in 10 
of the largest hospital systems in the state. the epidemiolo-
gists report on patients admitted to the hospital with suspected 
reportable community acquired infections. While the other 
systems are centered more on population dynamics, this last 
surveillance system would be the most important one early on 
in the event of an anthrax attack or other bioterror event. 
the hospital emergency department syndromic surveillance 
system and hospital-based epidemiologist positions were made 
possible by the cDc’s emergency preparedness funding to the 
states after 9/11 and the anthrax attacks. unfortunately, these 
funds have been dwindling for the past two years and we have 
lost some hospital positions. 
The ideal Surveillance System
enhanced electronic health records (ehRs) and reporting has the 
potential to be, at least on the data collection side, completely 
automated from the second a patient has an encounter with the 
health system. Ideally, if a person presents with an illness and goes 
to a “doc in a box”, emergency department or any other provider, 
all symptoms and information are entered into the ehR and key 
data elements are automatically reported to a repository where 
they are analyzed and translated into actionable information. 
the steps would be synchronous and automated: a patient has 
the clinical encounter, then a specimen is obtained, then the lab 
isolates an organism on the specimen and health data and re-
ports are sent to the relevant parts of the public health system. 
the lab reporting is actually the easiest to automate first and we 
are beginning to do this. In north carolina, we have implemented 
the cDc’s national electronic Disease surveillance system 
(neDss) that can capture lab reports through a health information 
exchange interface. For example, a patient has diarrhea:  a speci-
men is transferred to lab, toxin-producing e. coli is identified and 
the information is electronically transferred to the local and state 
health department.  the local health department contacts the 
patient and begins an investigation as to where the e. coli came 
from. electronic lab reporting is beginning to work; the problem is 
every lab needs its own interface to neDss, and this is costly. 
barriers to building the Future  
Surveillance Systems
a completely seamless, ideal surveillance system faces several 
barriers at the moment.
the barrier to building the electronic lab reporting mentioned 
above is finding the money to create the interfaces:  each lab 
would need to communicate via standard messaging to neDss 
and this function can cost up to $50,000 per lab.
When it comes to fully optimizing ehRs, a larger barrier is 
going to be confidentiality and permissions for health informa-
tion exchanges and proper governance of the exchanges. While 
in public health we have certain exemptions (hIpaa exemp-
tions for reportable diseases and conditions within state laws, 
for example), public health and state law has to sort what falls 
under these exemptions and then how the information can be 
transferred securely.
lastly, sustainability is a huge piece. currently, we are build-
ing systems largely on federal dollars via health information 
technology grants and others. however, there is a big question 
of where sustained funding will come from. ultimately is this 
going to be funded by the health care financing system? or will 
it be the duty of government to pay for? this remains an unan-
swered issue because we do know that funding for health care 
financing is getting less and less and state governments don’t 
have money to invest in these systems.
The Future of Surveillance
We are now on the cusp of modernization of our state and 
federal public health surveillance system. that said, the system 
will always rely on the standardization and epidemiologic sci-
ence that was established and promulgated over the last 60 
years by the cDc and state and local public health depart-
ments. Regardless of the technological advancements, accurate 
and timely surveillance will always need the human element to 
determine national case definitions for reporting, data collec-
tion tools, analysis and communication of actionable informa-
tion to the agencies and people that need to know.
there are two possible, realistic scenarios for the development 
of automated surveillance systems: 
surveillance systems will be built steadily and slowly one brick 
at a time, i.e., one hospital system will agree to submit ehR lab 
reports and pay for it and set up the interface, then others will 
follow as they see fit. this is, mostly, what is happening now. 
occasionally we will find federal dollars to assist, but mostly 
modernization is born from public-private partnerships with 
private entities taking on a large burden. here, modernization 
of surveillance will be an iterative accomplishment. this is slow 
and not strategic, because progress will involve whether it is 
financially advantageous for a system to come on board. this 
is, likely, the best case scenario.
the worst case scenario would be a horrible event that is exac-
erbated by weaknesses in the system. the public and policymak-
ers will be appalled and there will finally be the political will to do 
something and modernize the surveillance systems. that event 
will likely be an act of bioterrorism — the biggest and most plau-
sible fear that everyone is concerned about in public health.
Surveillance: Essential for Public Health Preparedness and Response
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History of biosurveillance in the United States
a modern biosurveillance system would allow public health 
departments to quickly detect a catastrophic biological event 
and then rapidly share pertinent and accurate information 
across jurisdictions, counties and states. 
How Federal Policies and biosurveillance have 
developed over time:
n  July 2002: Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Prepared-
ness and Response Act of 2002 requires the establishment 
of a system of public health alerts and surveillance.
n  January 2004: Homeland Security Presidential Directive-9 
(HSPD): Defense of United States Agriculture and Food 
directs several federal agencies to create surveillance 
systems coordinated across agencies for animals, plants, 
wildlife, food, human health and water.
n  April 2004: HSPD-10: Biodefense for the 21st Century be-
gins the process of developing a system capable of quickly 
recognizing and analyzing potential biological attacks.
n  December 2006: Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness 
Act of 2006 calls for the creation of a nationwide, intercon-
nected, electronic surveillance system.
n  August 2007: Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission Act of 2007 requires the creation of the na-
tional biosurveillance Integration center.
n  october 2007: HSPD-21: Public Health and Medical Prepared-
ness calls for establishing an operational national epidemiologic 
surveillance system for human health, with international con-
nectivity where appropriate and created the national biosur-
veillance advisory subcommittee (nbas) and requires the 
united states to develop biosurveillance capabilities across the 
country that can link with international systems. 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive-21 (HSPD-21) was 
largely focused on surveillance. Dr. Engel was co-chair of the Na-
tional Biosurveillance Advisory Subcommittee to the Advisory Com-
mittee to the Director of CDC sanctioned under HSPD-21.
The directive, which began under President Bush, was extended 
by President Obama to allow the committee to publish the 
second report in April 2011 (www.cdc.gov/osels/pdf/NBAS_Final_
Report_2011.pdf).
The report identified four major areas for recommendation for im-
provement for national biosurveillance: 
1. Governance: coordinate under the Executive Office of the Presi-
dent the federal agencies that oversee biosurveillance, including 
CDC, Homeland Security, Department of Defense, USDA and oth-
ers that have a hand in surveillance.
2. Information exchange: methods used in acquiring biosurveillance 
data are highly variable; efficient and comprehensive aggregation 
of these data must occur among the human health, animal, food, 
vector and environmental sectors.  
3. Workforce development:  need more skilled workers, particularly 
in the area of public health informatics and social and behavioral 
epidemiology (community resiliency).
4. Research and development: the federal government needs to 
invest in new areas including information technology, molecular and 
cellular sciences and communication.
“Biosurveillance in the context of human health is a new term for the science and practice of managing health-related data and 
information for early warning of threats and hazards, early detection of events, and rapid characterization of the event so that effective 
actions can be taken to mitigate adverse health effects. It represents a new health information paradigm that seeks to integrate and 
efficiently manage health-related data and information across a range of information systems toward timely and accurate population 
health situation awareness.”245 — National Biosurveillance Strategy for Human Health
“Biosurveillance is the process of active data-gathering with appropriate analysis and interpretation of biosphere data that might relate to disease ac-
tivity and threats to human or animal health — whether infectious, toxic, metabolic, or otherwise, and regardless of intentional or natural origin — in 
order to achieve early warning of health threats, early detection of health events, and overall situational awareness of disease activity.”246 – HSPD-21
bioSense 2.0 
biosense 2.0, launched in november 2011, is the first hhs 
program to move to a distributed computing platform (Internet 
cloud) which allows for rapid sharing of data across jurisdic-
tions and with cDc.  It is also designed to support enhanced 
interchange of critical public health information necessary for 
accurate early notification of outbreaks, pandemics, and terror-
ist events. by integrating local and state-level information, it is 
expected that biosense will be able to provide a more timely 
and cohesive picture at regional and national levels by:
n  having a health monitoring infrastructure and workforce ca-
pacity where needed at the state, local, tribal, and territorial 
(sltt) levels; 
n  having a user-centered approach to increase local and 
state jurisdictions’ participation in biosense; 
n  supporting meaningful use adoption at the sltt levels; and
n  supporting state and local capability to conduct syndromic 
surveillance is key in helping to implement meaningful use. 
c.  ImpRoVIng meDIcal counteRmeasuRe ReseaRch, 
DeVelopment anD manuFactuRIng
Anthrax vaccine, botulinim antitoxin and small-
pox vaccine all have something in common: the 
government is the only real customer for these 
products.  As a result of the lack of a natural 
marketplace, the U.S. government has invested 
in the research, development and stockpiling 
of emergency MCM for a pandemic, bioterror 
attack or emerging infectious disease outbreak. 
Development of medical products for the na-
tion’s biodefense is a key piece of any public 
health emergency response.  By preparing for 
a bioterror attack with adequate supplies of 
countermeasures, the nation can effectively 
neutralize that threat.  A successful domestic 
MCM enterprise will prepare the nation for 
new threats, expected or unexpected, by build-
ing the science, policy and production capacity 
in advance of an outbreak.  
Congress created Project BioShield in 2003 to 
spur development and procurement of MCM 
and authorized BARDA in 2006 to support the 
development of domestic manufacturing capac-
ity.  However, industry was still reluctant to invest 
in vaccine and countermeasure development in 
large part due to limited profit incentives and 
slow bureaucratic processes. 
In August 2010, the Secretary of HHS released 
The Public Health Emergency Medical Counter-
measures Enterprise Review, which laid out strat-
egies for addressing chokepoints in research and 
advanced development, improvements in domes-
tic manufacturing capacity and enhancing pub-
lic-private partnerships.247  The review concluded 
that new strategies were needed to creative in-
centives for private industry while protecting the 
public’s interest and safety, including:
n  Enhancing regulatory innovation, science 
and capacity;
n  Improving domestic manufacturing capacity;
n  Providing core advanced development and man-
ufacturing services to development partners; 
n  Creating novel ways for the enterprise to work 
with partners;
n  Developing financial incentives;
n  Addressing roadblocks from concept develop-
ment to advanced development; and
n  Improving management and administration 
within the enterprise.
Since release of the Review, the national coun-
termeasure enterprise has made progress in 
some notable ways:
n  BARDA has issued a request for proposals for 
Centers for Innovation in Advanced Develop-
ment and Manufacturing (CIADM), a strategy 
from the Review which would create flexible 
facilities to produce MCM on a routine basis 
for CBRN threats as well as a manufacturing 
process for emergency or pandemic condi-
tions.248  The proposals are currently being 
reviewed, with awards expected in FY2012. 
HHS is using $478 million in unspent H1N1 
funds for these facilities.  
n  FDA launched the Medical Countermeasures 
Initiative (MCMi) to establish regulatory 
pathways to accelerate MCM development, 
including modernizing the review process 
and updating the legal and policy framework 
for regulating these products.249  FDA has al-
located $170 million from H1N1 emergency 
funds for this initiative.
n  The National Institute for Allergy and Infectious 
Diseases (NIAID) has introduced the Concept 
Acceleration Program, which enables coordina-
tion of teams of scientific, medical and product 
development experts to guide MCM research-
ers with the goal of nurturing promising con-
cepts that might otherwise not be pursued.250 
NIH has begun staffing the program.251
n  ASPR has convened interagency coordina-
tion, including an Enterprise Senior Coun-
cil, which meets regularly to discuss lifecycle 
management of biodefense products.  Par-
ticipants include representatives from ASPR, 
CDC, FDA, NIAID, DHS, Veterans Affairs 
(VA), USDA and DOD.
n  BARDA has issued significant new contracts, 
including for recombinant vaccine technol-
ogy, which could significantly shorten the 
production timeline for seasonal and pan-
demic flu vaccine;252 and new contracts under 
the Broad Spectrum Antimicrobial Program, 
including what would be the first new class 
of antibacterial agents to treat Gram-negative 
infections in 30 years.253
n  HHS has begun to develop a five-year bud-
get planning process to help project fund-
ing needs for development and stockpiling 
throughout the countermeasure lifecycle.254
68
The national countermeasure enterprise still 
faces challenges in fully implementing the strat-
egies laid out in the Review, including:
n  BARDA has requested congressional authori-
zation as well as $100 million to launch a MCM 
Strategic Investor, which would be an inde-
pendent 501(c)(3) venture capital firm that 
would provide both investment and business 
management to biotechnology companies to 
bring commercially-viable platforms to frui-
tion.  Although the Strategic Investor would 
be independent, BARDA would house an In-
terface Center to communicate with the firm.
n  Funding for research and development is still 
far below recommended levels.255  Although the 
President requested $655 million for BARDA 
for FY 2012, in addition to funding for the Stra-
tegic investor, the enacted FY 2012 budget only 
approved $415 million.  
n  After its initial investment, future funding for 
FDA’s MCM Initiative is uncertain, and pro-
posed cuts to that agency could significantly 
hamper the program’s potential.
n  Cuts to the public health workforce could hin-
der the success of any dispensing plans.  ASPR 
has begun outreach to the public health com-
munity to discuss these plans, but these con-
versations need to be more extensive and take 
into account drastic workforce reductions.  
n  The Bipartisan WMD Terrorism Research 
Center recently issued a “D” grade for the na-
tion’s MCM development and approval pro-
cess, based on failure to meet criteria such 
as clearly defined requirements, a common 
set of prioritized research and development 
goals, coordinated budget requests and suf-
ficient, sustained funding.257
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recommenDATionS
TFAH recommends that the United States must 
place a higher priority on research and develop-
ment of MCM, including vaccines, medicines and 
technology. Policymakers must ensure that the 
public health system is involved in this process, 
from initial investment through distribution and 
dispensing.  The nation’s MCM enterprise could 
be advanced through the following activities:
n  Authorizing the President’s requests for MCM 
advancement: building an MCM Strategic Inves-
tor to leverage capital for new technologies; and 
developing end-to-end leadership to oversee 
products from initial research to dispensing;
n  Improving oversight and management of 
national stockpiles through ongoing replace-
ment of expiring products and expansion of 
the Shelf-Life Extension Program (SLEP) to 
state stockpiles to maintain supplies in a cost-
effective manner; 
n  Building increased flexibility for FDA to issue 
Emergency Use Authority of medical products 
necessary to respond to an emergency; and
n  Increased focus on special pediatric needs, 
including in the development, testing and 
dosages of MCMs.
In september 2010, baRDa awarded contracts, 
worth up to $100 million over three years, to 
eight biotech and pharmaceutical companies 
researching a range of innovative countermea-
sures.  one company, pfenex, is working to 
develop a faster way to make anthrax vaccine; 
others, including novartis and Rapid micro bio-
systems, are looking into methods to speed up 
flu vaccine manufacturing.258
In september 2011, baRDa awarded $153 mil-
lion to cellerant therapeutics, a biotech firm 
working on a new drug that may protect humans 
from nuclear radiation and awarded up to $94 mil-
lion to glaxosmithKlein for a dual-purpose broad 
spectrum antibiotic with potential to treat illnesses 
caused by bioterrorism threats such as plague and 
tularemia, as well as certain life-threatening infec-
tions, known as gram-negative infections, associ-
ated with prolonged hospitalization.259, 260
eXamples oF baRDa actIVItIes
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FDa is responsible for getting lifesaving drugs 
and devices to market as quickly as possible 
while ensuring safety.  the spectrum of the 
mcm enterprise includes vaccines, antiviral 
and other lifesaving drugs and devices such 
as diagnostics that are used to determine if 
someone has been exposed to a biologic, 
chemical, nuclear or radiologic threat.
mcms pose unique challenges, since it is often im-
possible or unethical to safely test these products on 
humans.  For instance, while it is possible to test a 
product for safety in humans, it is not feasible to ex-
pose people to the threat itself to test whether the 
vaccine or the treatment works.  It is essential that 
new vaccines, antiviral medications and devices in-
tended to save lives do not cause unintentional harm 
and endanger the health of americans — but it is 
also essential to have effective countermeasures in 
place to respond to man-made and natural threats. 
FDa must take steps to minimize red tape, maxi-
mize innovation and maintain safety when it comes 
to reviews and standards for medical countermea-
sures.  additional coordination with baRDa and 
private industry is essential to understand priorities 
and to find ways to improve processes to make 
them less burdensome on companies.
the agency is developing new scientific and 
analytic tools to speed the approval of lifesaving 
drugs and devices.  Innovative approaches can be 
used to more efficiently manage the movement 
of potential treatments from idea to reality.   
In august 2010, the agency launched a new 
medical countermeasures Initiative (mcmi), 
which was first limited to preparing for respond-
ing to a flu pandemic.261  In april 2011, congress 
enacted legislation to allow the project to also 
address chemical, biological, radiological and 
nuclear (cbRn) threats.262  
examples of the efforts FDa is taking to expand 
and be more flexible in testing and review of 
products include:
n  Developing genetically modified animals for test-
ing, such as an engineered modified mouse to test 
the smallpox vaccine and potential side effects;
n  expanding testing on cell cultures created in labs 
combined with more research into how humans 
are likely to react differently than test animals 
conducted lab-created materials or rodents;
n  Implementing supercomputing and It en-
hancements to better simulate the effect of 
mcms on humans;
n  creating research metrics, such as bio-
mimetrics, which create artificial ways to 
model natural biology;
n  Researching adjuvants to maximize the 
amount of vaccine available during crises;
n  advancing treatment for acute radiation 
syndrome;
n  enhancing the ability to test for multiple 
pathogens simultaneously; 
n  Improving the ability to rapidly and accurately 
test for new potential threats; and
n  Focusing significant research on the impact of 
mcms on children and other at risk patients.
examples of FDa efforts to expand and be 
more flexible to ensure life-saving drugs and 
devices are sped to market and available for use 
in crises include:
n  enhancing clarity and flexibility for emergency use 
authorization (eua), which permits FDa to ap-
prove the emergency use of drugs, devices, and 
medical products (including diagnostics) that were 
not previously approved, cleared, or licensed by 
the agency or the off-label use of approved prod-
ucts in certain well-defined emergency situations;
n  Issuing an eua so doxycycline can be used as 
a prophylaxis for people exposed to anthrax;
n  expanding the shelf-life extension program to 
use drug stockpiles beyond formal expiration 
dates when safe; 
n  Improving risk-benefit analyses; and
n  Developing models for predicting and mitigat-
ing the potential for shortages of mcm drugs, 
biologics and devices during emergencies.
InnoVatIons FoR FDa anD meDIcal counteRmeasuRes
“The mission of the FDA should continue to ensure that new devices and drugs reaching the public 
in the U.S. are safe and effective. We encourage fostering innovation, without lowering evidence 
standards or putting the public at risk.”263
—testimony from america’s health Insurance plans (ahIp) to the house oversight and 
government Reform committee in June 2011
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D.  enhancIng suRge capacItY
The ability of our health care system to quickly 
provide care for an influx of patients during an 
emergency is critical. 
During a severe health emergency, the health care 
system would be stretched beyond normal limits. 
Patients would quickly fill emergency rooms and 
doctors’ offices, exceed the existing number of 
available hospital beds, and cause a surge in de-
mand for critical medicines and equipment.  
The challenge of how to equip hospitals and train 
health care staff to handle the large influx of criti-
cally injured or ill patients who show up for treat-
ment after or during a public health emergency 
remains the single, most challenging issue for 
public health and medical preparedness.264   
In public health emergencies, such as a new dis-
ease outbreak, a bioterror attack, or catastrophic 
natural disaster, U.S. hospitals and health care 
facilities are on the front lines providing triage 
and medical treatment to individuals.  In the 
best of times, however, most emergency rooms 
and intensive care units (ICUs) must confront 
bed shortages and staffing issues; in a mass casu-
alty event — particularly a pandemic influenza 
or mass bioterror attack — the situation could 
quickly spiral out of control.  
recommenDATionS
TFAH recommends:
n  Enhancing the HPP to create coalitions 
among hospitals to share surge burdens 
within a region with emphasis on develop-
ing creative strategies, intensive training and 
providing additional funding, particularly in 
large urban centers;
n  Clarifying crisis standards of care via creation of 
a national framework to guide states and local 
entities in the event of a mass casualty or crisis; 
n  Eliminating the need for dual declarations to 
be made by the President and U.S. Secretary 
of HHS to implement Section 1135 waivers to 
allow rapid availability of healthcare services 
for individuals affected by a disaster; and
n  Clarifying federal laws to implement a broad 
liability protection that applies to all volun-
teer health professionals during a nationally-
declared public health emergency, creating a 
Federal Tort Claims Act protection for Medical 
Reserve Corps volunteers year-round, as these 
personnel participate in public health drills and 
training during times of non-disaster, and mech-
anisms for ensuring hospital and provider costs 
incurred during disaster response are covered. 
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e.  ImpRoVIng communItY ResIlIence:  helpIng 
communItIes cope anD RecoVeR
Ensuring communities can cope with and re-
cover from emergencies is a significant chal-
lenge to public health preparedness.  
The most vulnerable members of a community, 
such as children, the elderly, people with un-
derlying health conditions and racial and ethnic 
minorities, face special challenges that must be 
planned for prior to emergencies happening.  
Building community resilience is one of the 
two overarching goals identified by HHS in the 
release of the draft Biennial Implementation 
Plan for the National Health Security Strategy. 
It calls for fostering informed, empowered indi-
viduals and communities.  
Improving relationships with the community 
and the health of the community are both 
strongly tied to resiliency.  The aftermath of 
Hurricane Katrina provides a strong reminder 
of the importance of engaging all members of 
a community to be prepared for emergencies. 
For instance, according to one study in the An-
nals of Emergency Medicine, 55.6 percent of 
individuals displaced in the aftermath of Hur-
ricane Katrina had a chronic disease, such as 
hypertension, hypercholesterolemia, diabetes 
or pulmonary disease, which compounded the 
challenges of evacuation and support.265  Simi-
larly, during Hurricanes Gustav and Ike, 40 
percent of evacuees were obese and many were 
unable to stay in local shelters because they were 
morbidly obese or on oxygen.266  Currently, two-
thirds of Americans are overweight or obese.
Experts recommend that improving resiliency, par-
ticularly among vulnerable populations, requires:
n  Improving the overall health status of com-
munities, so they are in better condition to 
weather and respond to emergencies, such as 
through initiatives and programs supported 
by the Public Health and Prevention Fund’s 
Community Transformation Grants (CTGs);
n  Providing clear, honest, straightforward guid-
ance to the public;
n  Health officials developing ongoing relation-
ships with members of the community, so, 
when emergencies arise, they are trusted and 
understood; and
n  Engaging members of the community directly 
in emergency planning efforts.
To reach diverse communities, experts also 
recommend information must be provided in 
channels beyond the Internet, such as radio and 
racial and ethnic publications and television, and 
in languages other than English.  In addition, 
idiomatic translations are important to reach 
specific cultural perspectives effectively, and 
messages should be delivered by trusted sources, 
such as religious and community leaders.
recommenDATionS
TFAH recommends leveraging new opportunities 
created by the ACA, which includes several provi-
sions to improve overall health of communities 
that support community resiliency, including:
n  The Prevention and Public Health Fund pro-
vides a $16.5 billion investment over the next 
10 years for communities around the coun-
try to use for proven, effective ways to keep 
Americans healthier and more productive; 
n  A National Prevention Strategy which aims to 
improve health and reduce disease rates by 
ensuring health departments work with other 
sectors, such as housing, transportation, 
education and businesses, to ensure healthy 
choices are more widely available and 
accessible to Americans in their daily lives 
and during emergencies;
n  As part of the Prevention Fund, CTGs, in 
particular, support building community coali-
tions to address obesity, tobacco and other 
public health problems, which also help forge 
ongoing relationships between the community 
and public health professionals, particularly 
with underserved communities.  
73
“Total Force Fitness is more than a physical fitness. It is the sum total of the many facets of individuals, 
their families, and the organizations to which they serve. It is not something someone achieves twice  
a year for a test. It is a state of being.”267  
— ADM Michael Mullen, (former) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
In 2009, the chairman of the Joint chiefs of 
staff (Jcs), aDm michael mullen asked the con-
sortium for human and military performance 
(champ) to develop what has become known 
as total Force Fitness (tFF) to ensure service 
members and their families are prepared for the 
rigors of war and a constant state of readiness. 
lessons learned from the total Force Fitness 
initiative can be used to help inform engagement 
and resiliency planning for communities around 
the country.
During wartime, service members are trained and 
forced to adapt to chaotic and life-threatening situ-
ations. When they return home, service members 
must maintain a state of preparedness while, at the 
same time, living according to the norms of a civil 
society. consequently, the fitness of service mem-
bers is not merely physical, it has to be holistic.
per the chairman’s directive, champ coordinated 
with the samueli Institute, the Institute of alterna-
tive Futures and members of the Jcs to create a 
new fitness doctrine that took a holistic approach to 
military preparedness and the fitness and resiliency 
of service members. the project sought to expand 
the definition of health promotion and prevention 
and create a different model from the typical medi-
cal approach, i.e. one that is more comprehensive.
the group worked with over 70 scientists, health, 
social, community and spiritual leaders to define, 
evaluate and measure everything involved in keep-
ing service members fit, resilient and prepared. 
ultimately, the group created a framework fo-
cused on the mind, body and the communities 
and environments supporting a service member. 
the final structure depicts the service member 
surrounded by family, community and environ-
ment as these impact health and resiliency. In 
addition, the framework found eight domains of 
total Force Fitness:  1) physical, 2) nutritional, 
3) medical, 4) environmental, 5) behavioral, 6) 
psychological, 7) spiritual and 8) social. 
as the military views it, total fitness is a state 
where mind and body are one:  the perfect bal-
ance between readiness and well-being, where 
each condition supports the other. a service 
member who achieves total fitness is healthy, 
ready and resilient. under tFF, to support service 
members, the military takes the preventive steps 
to ensure health across all fronts. For example, 
diet and nutrition are just as important as mental 
acuity and physical strength. to be completely fit, 
a service member must go beyond maintaining an 
ideal body weight to instead combine diet, nutri-
tion and physical and mental training.
consequently, tFF provides the foundation 
for how any military fitness program could be 
evaluated and measured. the framework in-
cludes metrics that could be used for monitoring 
program effectiveness and for improving and 
comparing programs that already exist. tFF has 
become a new military doctrine that builds a 
dialogue and strategy among everyone involved 
with health. 
pReVentIon, pRepaReDness, the aRmeD FoRces anD  
total FoRce FItness
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EXPERT PERSPECTiVE
Vulnerability, Resilience and Mental Health 
Considerations in Disaster Planning and Response: 
Do Resources Match the Rhetoric?
By David Abramson, PhD, MPH and Irwin Redlener, MD, Columbia University Mailman School of Public Health
Over the past decade, policymakers, leading public health officials and scientists have acknowledged the 
importance of addressing mental health issues in the wake of 
a disaster, but the practice of disaster mental health has yet to 
match the rhetoric.  this rhetoric, embodied in such recent 
policy documents as the president’s policy directive on national 
preparedness (ppD-8, released march 30, 2011)268 and the 
cDc’s public health emergency preparedness capabilities 
(march 2011),269 appropriately links mental health with disas-
ter resilience.  the capacity of individuals and communities to 
withstand, adapt or recover quickly from emergency events 
and disasters is clearly related to their mental welfare both 
before and after a disaster.  and yet the practice of disaster 
mental health is mired in old and generally untested thinking, 
still mainly focused on the identification and treatment of post-
traumatic stress Disorder (ptsD), using practices that are 
only minimally-related to an evidence base. moreover, public 
health practice is often overseen by public health systems gen-
erally ill-equipped and under-funded to coordinate or provide 
complex mental and behavioral health services.
mental health effects 
Disasters and complex emergencies leave their mark on those 
exposed to them, although perhaps in ways contrary to popu-
lar belief.  Responders to a disaster can certainly suffer psycho-
logical consequences, as can the populations affected by them.  
but in one recent comprehensive review of the disaster mental 
health research, the authors pointed out that severe cases 
of ptsD, in which survivors “re-experience” the event, may 
occur at most in 30 percent or fewer of the exposed popula-
tion, and that generally within one to two years people have 
returned to a psychological “equilibrium”.270  the bigger issues 
noted in this seminal review are those pre-disposing factors of 
risk and resilience which protect individuals and communities 
or make them more vulnerable.  
nearly a decade ago, norris and colleagues reviewed the re-
search literature regarding the individual-level risk factors com-
plicit in poor mental health outcomes following a disaster.271  
one very important finding was that the exposure to the dev-
astating effects of a disaster were compounded by pre-disaster 
stressors in people’s lives, such as living in blighted communities 
and dealing with the stresses of poverty.  a household’s compo-
sition made a difference as well: regardless of income, women 
were more susceptible to poor mental health outcomes, par-
ticularly if they were married and had children in the home.  
Furthermore, those individuals who had lost confidence in their 
ability to cope or control outcomes, or who had few social re-
sources, were highly susceptible to mental health problems.  
community-level factors make a difference in survivors’ mental 
health as well.  Disasters can sever social networks, particularly 
when populations are evacuated or displaced.  Disasters also un-
dermine the capability of civic institutions to support the physical 
and social welfare of people in the community — hospitals and 
health systems, as well as social services and systems of justice.  
International disaster mental health providers have witnessed this 
time and again.  When the social supports and institutions in a 
community unravel, the mental health of its residents plummets.272
our own studies of the mental health of individuals affected 
by the 2005 hurricane Katrina and the 2010 Deepwater ho-
rizon oil spill have certainly reinforced these findings.  our 
gulf coast child & Family health study, which followed 1,079 
randomly sampled households in louisiana and mississippi for 
five years after the hurricane, revealed the long tail of mental 
health distress, and how much of it was due to neighborhood 
conditions, chronic uncertainty, and pre-disposing economic 
risk factors.  When we first interviewed parents in 2006, over 
60 percent were suffering mental health distress and disability.  
by the fourth time we spoke to them in 2010, things had im-
proved — although 40 percent of them were still experiencing 
lingering mental health effects.  and among their children, even 
years after the hurricane they were five times as likely as similar 
“non-exposed” children to be experiencing serious emotional 
disturbance.  over one in three children was still experiencing 
depression, anxiety or behavioral effects.273  these mental health 
effects were far subtler than ptsD, since they reflected depres-
sion, anxiety, and complicated grief, and interfered with people’s 
ability to recover and return to stable and productive lives.
shortly after the rupture of the Deepwater horizon macando 
well in the mississippi gulf last year, we conducted town hall 
meetings and focus groups in communities along the gulf 
coast.  Residents were clearly distressed by the environmen-
tal disaster, and even children expressed concerns for their 
futures and for their way of life.  When we followed this with 
a random survey of 1,203 residents living within ten miles of 
the coast in louisiana and mississippi, we found that slightly 
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less than 20 percent of parents reported that their children 
had emotional or behavioral problems since the oil spill, and 
among those families who thought they might have to move 
as a result of the oil spill, over a third reported mental health 
problems among their children.274
these studies, and many others, serve to illustrate the complex-
ity of the problem.  communities are more resilient to a disaster 
when they are psychologically stronger before the event occurs, 
yet there is little political impetus to recognize this link. after the 
event, mental health problems are not restricted to ptsD, can 
last for years after an event, and are often the consequence of 
household, neighborhood, and larger political forces.  the solu-
tion has to extend beyond “psychological First aid” (pFa), the 
“intervention du jour” in most disaster response circles.
The disaster mental health practice environment
although not the sole mental health intervention, pFa is one 
of the federal government’s primary tools.  under provisions 
of the stafford act, Fema employs the crisis counseling as-
sistance and training program, in consultation with samhsa, 
to fund states and localities to deliver pFa, often through the 
use of community health workers.  as noted in a recent report 
to the national biodefense science board, the administrative 
rules and constraints imposed by this program are so restric-
tive that some states have decided not to even apply for the 
funds after a disaster.275  When deployed, these community 
health workers serve a critical community outreach function, 
although once cases have been identified there are meager or 
no resources available for addressing complex psychological 
problems.  the case-finding may be good, but the follow-
through treatment is often non-existent; furthermore, the staf-
ford act cannot adequately pay for the treatment needed.276  
perhaps most importantly, the “treatment” needs to be able to 
address the larger household and community factors that have 
led to the mental health problems.  this requires a systems-
view entirely absent from most recovery efforts — not be-
cause it’s not valued, but because it’s not funded.
organizationally, the responsibility for disaster mental health 
efforts falls within emergency support Function 8, as articulated 
in the national Response Framework, and is squarely within 
the public health domain, although crisis counseling is a task 
designated to emergency support Function 6 (mass care, led 
by Fema and the american Red cross). compounding the 
problem is that local public health has little experience oversee-
ing or assuring networks of mental health services.  according 
to a 2010 profile of 2,033 local health departments conducted 
by the national association of city and county health officials 
(naccho), over 84 percent of all health departments do not 
offer mental health or behavioral services, nor do they oversee 
them.277 and, as noted in the report to the national biodefense 
science board, “Responders often do not know what mental 
and behavioral health resources and interventions are available, 
useful, and effective, and do not have training in principles of di-
saster behavioral health” (p. 6).278  the source of the problem, 
the authors conclude, is that, “Federal agencies do not have 
a clear understanding of state and local capabilities in disaster 
mental and behavioral health response (p. 10).”
the responsibility sits with public health, but it is essentially an 
unfunded mandate.  as the country’s economic crisis deepens, 
public health and emergency preparedness have absorbed 
enormous funding cuts.  over one year’s time, preparedness 
and response funding within Dhhs and Dhs dropped by nearly 
$900 million, from $5.3 billion in FY10 to $4.4 billion in FY11, 
a 17 percent overall reduction.  according to the nacccho 
2010 health department survey, the average local health depart-
ment receives $2 per capita within its catchment for emergency 
preparedness activities, and even that meager amount is being 
eroded.  With that money, smaller health departments fund a .5 
Fte to do their emergency preparedness, and the largest agen-
cies fund an average of 4 Fte.  as often occurs in public health, 
its mandate increases even as its budget shrinks.
conclusion
many challenges remain with respect to meeting the complex 
mental health needs of individuals and communities exposed 
to disasters.  perhaps most challenging — and most demand-
ing of resources — is the capacity to reduce vulnerability and 
increase resilience prior to a major catastrophic event.  this, of 
course, speaks to broader public policy issues such as poverty 
reduction, improved access to health care and early, effective 
intervention for mental health concerns long before the disas-
ter exposure.  In the current economic environment, where 
public spending on discretionary programs is on a clearly 
downward trajectory, the likelihood of substantive investments 
in these critical areas is virtually inconceivable.
Where does this leave us?
at the very least, we have to develop strategies that:
•  maximize existing resources;
•  reverse the cuts which have left the nation’s public health 
workforce dangerously depleted and underfunded;
•  ensure that interventions deployed in post-disaster public 
health practice are based on data-driven, evidence-influ-
enced recommendations; and,
•  remove bureaucratic barriers which have been memo-
rialized in existing regulations or legislation (a poignant 
example being the service restrictions imposed by current 
stafford act provisions).
Failure to provide pro-active improvements in u.s. capac-
ity to prevent and intervene effectively with respect to the 
mental health consequences of disasters will leave the nation 
increasingly vulnerable to the catastrophic events which are 
sure to appear with regularity in the years to come.
F.  cooRDInatIng oVeRall pRepaReDness anD FooD 
saFetY pReVentIon:  stRategIc ImplementatIon oF 
the FDa FooD saFetY moDeRnIZatIon act oF 2011
In addition to the reauthorization of overall 
public health emergency preparedness, the 
FDA Food Safety Modernization Act was signed 
into law in 2011.  The law contained many pro-
visions to help reorient the nation’s food safety 
system to prevent outbreaks instead of detecting 
problems after they already occurred.  
TFAH recommends that sufficient resources 
and administration actions be taken to fully 
implement the law.    
TFAH asked Erik Olson, Director of Food Pro-
grams for The Pew Charitable Trusts to provide 
an overview of the opportunities and challenges 
for implementing the new act.
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Reaching diverse communities during a public 
health emergency requires providing informa-
tion to the public via multiple channels including 
the Internet, social media and traditional, racial 
and ethnic publications and broadcast outlets. 
according to the pew Internet & american life 
project, 93 percent of 12-17 year-olds go online 
and 65 percent utilize a social networking plat-
form; 87 percent of 18-32 year-olds go online 
and 67 percent use social media.279 meanwhile, 
older generations prefer traditional media:  56 
percent of 64-72 year-olds are online and 31 
percent of those older than 73 go online.280
During the 2009 outbreak of h1n1, while tra-
ditional media was utilized, social media played 
a special role in the government’s response, 
especially because of that medium’s ability to 
reach younger populations.281  cDc focused on 
social media to ensure messages about the out-
break reached younger populations which were 
most at-risk during h1n1.282 the agency also 
continues to use twitter and Facebook to com-
municate about h1n1 and other public health 
information programs, and their Facebook page 
has more than 20,000 “fans.”283 
going beyond communication and education, 
the national Institutes of health (nIh) used 
twitter to monitor the spread of the h1n1 
outbreak.284 
Increased outreach on social media and via the 
Internet may be necessary to reach a younger au-
dience during a pandemic. In addition, traditional 
media is important when trying to reach older and 
poorer populations that typically do not engage in 
comparable rates of Internet communication.
publIc communIcatIon anD socIal meDIa usage DuRIng h1n1
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Food Safety: New Law Takes a Big Bite Out of the 
Problem, but Leaves Much on the Plate285
By Erik D. Olson, Director of Food Programs at The Pew Charitable Trusts
The Promise of the Food Safety modernization Act
the FDa Food safety modernization act (Fsma), a landmark 
law passed with broad bipartisan support in December 2010 
and signed into law by president obama on January 4, 2011, 
will help tackle foodborne illness by setting up a new, preven-
tion-based safety system for the 80 percent of our food supply 
that is regulated by FDa. this was the first significant overhaul 
of FDa’s food safety authorities since the great Depression 
when president Franklin Roosevelt signed an update of the law 
in 1938. major advances anticipated under this important new 
law include new national standards for the safety of produce 
and processed foods, stronger inspection requirements, stricter 
imports controls, and more muscular FDa authorities to help 
the agency deter practices that can cause foodborne illnesses. 
however, as the late-summer 2011 outbreak of Listeria mono-
cytogenes infections from colorado cantaloupe that killed at 
least 28 people (with a staggering fatality rate of over 20 per-
cent) has reminded us, substantial challenges lie ahead. For all 
of the crucial steps forward included in the new Fsma law, it 
will take many years to reverse over 100 years of accumulated 
neglect of the food safety system’s basic infrastructure, which 
was designed primarily to track down the causes of illnesses 
and contamination problems after they have occurred.  these 
problems have gradually manifested themselves since the origi-
nal pure Food and Drug act of 1906 was enacted. 
remaining concerns with Foodborne illness 
according to cDc, each year, an estimated 47 million americans 
suffer from foodborne illnesses caused by pathogens — disease-
causing microbes such as bacteria or viruses. these illnesses send 
127,000 people to the hospital and kill approximately 3,000, cDc 
estimates.286,287 In addition, according to cDc, about two to three 
percent of those who are stricken with the illnesses will suffer 
from long-term chronic complications — approximately one mil-
lion americans, many of whom were not originally hospitalized for 
their infection. these complications can include reactive arthritis, 
autoimmune thyroid disease, kidney disease, neural and neuro-
muscular dysfunctions, and heart and vascular disease.288 
to more effectively reduce foodborne illnesses, FDa needs 
substantial additional human, scientific, and financial resources 
and quite honestly needs to reinvent itself — to make the shift 
to a prevention-based approach in order to give real life to the 
ambitious new food safety law.  the president identified FDa’s 
overhaul of its food safety program as a top priority, recom-
mending an increase of $118 million dollars for Fiscal Year (FY) 
2012 above the previous year’s budget; these additional funds 
would help the agency beef up its scientific staff, expand its 
inspection efforts, strengthen its ability to check up on imports, 
and take other key steps to improve the safety of the food sup-
ply. the house of Representatives disagreed with the proposed 
increase, and, instead, passed an austere budget for FDa, slash-
ing its food safety budget by $87 million compared to the previ-
ous year (FY 2011). the senate approved a modest $40 million 
increase, and  in the final law enacted in november, congress 
approved a $39 million bump-up in FDa’s food safety funding.
a wide range of stakeholders — the food industry(including 
the grocery manufacturers association, which represents food 
processing companies), consumer and public health groups (in-
cluding pew and the trust for america’s health), organizations 
representing the victims of foodborne illness and their families, 
and others — have been urging congress to provide FDa with 
the resources it needs to carry out the critical components of 
the food safety law to enable the agency to protect the ameri-
can public and reduce the scourge of foodborne illness.
concerns with Heavy non-Therapeutic Use of 
Antibiotics in Animal Agriculture
even if the Fsma were to be fully funded, however, key food 
safety issues untouched by the 2011 statute include the lack of 
effective restrictions on antibiotic use in animal agriculture, and 
aging laws governing meat and poultry safety, and the use of 
chemicals in food. these laws should be reviewed and updated 
as necessary — using the latest science — to tighten the focus 
on preventing disease. 
of particular continuing concern is the extensive non-therapeu-
tic use of antibiotics in animal agriculture — that is, antibiotic 
use to promote the animal’s growth or to compensate for the 
effects of overcrowding or unsanitary conditions, not to treat 
clinically ill animals with curative doses. such practices carry the 
potential to breed antibiotic-resistant bacteria, which can cause 
human illnesses that do not respond to the most commonly used 
antibiotics.289 In one example of   a serious public health prob-
lem that some experts have been warning about for years there 
was a large outbreak of multi-drug resistant Salmonella infec-
tions linked to consumption of ground turkey; as of september 
29, 2011 cDc confirmed that 129 people were sickened by a 
Salmonella strain a strain that is resistant to many forms of com-
monly-prescribed antibiotics.290   cDc noted that this “antibiotic 
resistance may be associated with an increased risk of hospital-
ization or possible treatment failure in infected individuals.”6 
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FDa data show that 29.2 million pounds of anti-
microbial active ingredients were sold for use in 
food-producing animals in 2010, an increase of 
nearly 1.3 percent from the previous year.291 be-
cause the agency does not publicly track compara-
ble data for human use, it currently is not possible 
to determine with certainty the exact percentage 
of antibiotics sold for use in food animals. how-
ever, recent estimates are that approximately 70 
percent of all antibiotics in the united states are 
used non-therapeutically in food animal produc-
tion; earlier estimates were lower.292, 293, 294 
cDc, FDa, the u.s. Department of agriculture, 
the World health organization, and others have 
noted the link between the use of non-therapeutic 
antibiotics in animal agriculture and antibiotic-
resistant pathogens that can impair the useful-
ness of antibiotics prescribed to treat human 
disease.295, 296, 297, 298 some representatives of the 
meat and poultry industry, however, contend that 
the problem of antibiotic resistance in humans is 
“overwhelmingly an issue related to human anti-
biotic use,” rather than from the consumption of 
antibiotics in food animals.299
concerns with chemicals Added to Food
In addition to pathogen-related illnesses attribut-
able to food production, processing, handling, 
or preparation, there are other risks posed by 
chemicals that are added, intentionally or not, to 
the food supply. often these chemical hazards are 
less well characterized than the microbiological 
risks, which have been studied for decades. 
according to a review published in a peer-re-
viewed journal by experts from the pew health 
group’s food additives program, more than 
10,000 chemicals were allowed to be added to 
human food in the united states as of January 
2011.300 of particular concern, the study found 
that the safety of more than 3,000 chemicals 
added to food has not been reviewed or evalu-
ated by FDa. this is because under the current 
outdated system, food companies or trade as-
sociations are allowed to make their own de-
termination that a chemical they want to add to 
the food supply is “generally recognized as safe,” 
or “gRas,” and they need not inform FDa or 
the public of this determination.  moreover, this 
analysis found that in order to encourage food 
companies to voluntarily ask FDa to examine the 
safety of chemicals they want to add to food, FDa 
has moved almost exclusively to a system in which 
it evaluates chemicals without notifying the public 
or providing an opportunity for the public to com-
ment on the chemical’s safety.  
In sum, under the current system, FDa is unaware 
of a large number of chemical uses in food and, 
therefore, cannot ensure that safety decisions re-
garding these uses were properly made.
additionally, food manufacturers are not required 
to notify FDa of relevant health and safety stud-
ies, thereby placing the agency in the difficult 
position of tracking safety information for more 
than 10,000 chemicals with limited resources and 
information. moreover, the agency’s expedited 
approach to reviewing safety decisions in the past 
decade and a half occurs with little public engage-
ment. Finally, pew’s research concluded FDa lacks 
the resources and information needed to identify 
and prevent potential health problems or to set 
priorities for systematic reevaluation of safety 
decisions made during the past half-century. this 
is a troublesome set of findings, and pew expects 
to look at carefully at potential policy solutions to 
these and other concerns identified in its ongoing 
scrutiny of the FDa food additives program, and to 
recommend changes as needed in 2012.
The need for Additional reforms
the FDa Food safety modernization act of 2011 
and the pesticide residue provisions in the Food 
quality protection act of 1996 have addressed 
some of the more serious risks posed by contami-
nants in food. 
New Law Takes a Big Bite Out of the Problem
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the newly enacted food safety law will not ful-
fill its promise, however, if the FDa lacks the 
resources to carry out its new responsibilities. 
the house of Representatives’ originally-passed 
version of the food safety legislation included a 
measure, which did not make it into the final act, 
that would have established a registration fee for 
food facilities to help fund the FDa’s food-safety 
activities.301 congress should consider establishing 
a similar fee through another appropriate act, to 
ensure that the FDa has a stable source of funding 
for its food safety program. 
It also is important to note that the new food-
safety law does not address the shortcomings in 
the u.s. Department of agriculture’s powers to 
prevent or address meat and poultry contami-
nation. For example, a court decision handed 
down under the decades-old meat safety law 
has blocked the department from closing down 
meat processing plants where repeated tests have 
found salmonella contamination.302 additionally, 
there is continued discussion about consolidat-
ing all federal food safety activities into a single 
agency: a government accountability office re-
port issued in 2011 has reiterated its previous rec-
ommendation that serious consideration be given 
to consolidating or restructuring the fragmented 
food safety system, which they found is splintered 
among 15 federal agencies, including usDa and 
FDa, implementing 30 laws.303 
moreover, the FDa’s science and risk analysis are 
in need of modernization and additional resources; 
FDa’s science board found that the “agency suf-
fers from serious scientific deficiencies and is not 
positioned to meet current or emerging regula-
tory responsibilities” because the demands on 
the FDa have soared in recent years, and the 
resources have not increased in proportion to the 
demands.304  the agency’s oversight of food ad-
ditives—especially the procedures for substances 
that are generally recognized as safe—in par-
ticular needs closer scrutiny, as the government 
accountability office recommended.305  Issues 
that have been proposed for evaluation include 
whether there is a need for regular reevaluations 
of current research on the risks posed by all sub-
stances added to food, and for establishing a an 
open and publicly transparent system to evaluate 
all risks in assessing the safety of these compounds.
legislative or administrative actions should be con-
sidered to prevent problematic nontherapeutic uses 
of antibiotics in animal agriculture, to reduce the 
risk of creating and spreading antibiotic-resistant 
“superbugs.” bills to mandate such reform were 
introduced in congress in 2009 and reintroduced in 
2011, but they have not moved beyond the hearing 
stage.306, 307, 308  FDa has proposed a voluntary guid-
ance document intended to encourage the judicious 
use of antibiotics in food-producing animals, but has 
not yet finalized it.309 completion of a strong guid-
ance could be a helpful first step, but ultimately, 
mandatory requirements are needed.
Finally, measures that prevent the tainting of 
food by environmental contaminants, such as un-
treated sewage or manure that enter waters and 
pollute crops downstream, and requirements to 
strengthen controls on air and water discharges 
of mercury and other common pollutants that are 
widely found in the food supply would help to re-
duce the health risks to the american public.
In the end, while the new 2011 food safety law 
will update and strengthen portions of the nation’s 
food- safety net, there remain significant gaps. 
america’s food safety infrastructure must take 
advantage of rapidly-developing scientific knowl-
edge, meet the ever-growing needs for scientific 
capacity and other resources at FDa, address 
emerging pathogens and other newly-recognized 
health risks, and keep up with the constantly-
morphing global food industry. We must review 
and, as necessary, update our mid-20th century 
food laws and programs, to ensure that they are 
preventing 21st century threats to public health. 
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ALL-HAZArDS PrePAreDneSS FUnDinG bY SoUrce AnD YeAr
FY 2010 FY 2011 % change  
FY 10 - FY 11
State cDc ASPr Total State cDc ASPr Total 
alabama $10,048,584 $5,959,171 $16,007,755 alabama $8,633,983 $5,386,508 $14,020,491 -12.4%
alaska $5,165,000 $1,295,371 $6,460,371 alaska $5,177,600 $1,211,937 $6,389,537 -1.1%
arizona $14,047,671 $7,819,583 $21,867,254 arizona $11,894,861 $7,051,765 $18,946,626 -13.4%
arkansas $7,393,805 $3,836,580 $11,230,385 arkansas $6,469,981 $3,486,575 $9,956,556 -11.3%
california $49,301,738 $31,967,442 $81,269,180 california $41,661,534 $28,666,533 $70,328,067 -13.5%
colorado $10,875,195 $6,142,385 $17,017,580 colorado $9,397,930 $5,550,503 $14,948,433 -12.2%
connecticut $8,719,806 $4,660,301 $13,380,107 connecticut $7,553,479 $4,223,889 $11,777,368 -12.0%
Delaware $5,150,000 $1,513,099 $6,663,099 Delaware $5,422,932 $1,406,825 $6,829,757 2.5%
D.c. $6,616,482 $1,682,835 $8,299,317 D.c. $6,730,903 $1,558,756 $8,289,659 -0.1%
Florida $33,481,834 $21,973,177 $55,455,011 Florida $27,687,829 $19,720,658 $47,408,487 -14.5%
georgia $18,481,819 $11,615,246 $30,097,065 georgia $15,653,814 $10,449,266 $26,103,080 -13.3%
hawaii $5,249,782 $2,025,920 $7,275,702 hawaii $5,260,290 $1,865,852 $7,126,142 -2.1%
Idaho $5,495,096 $2,240,733 $7,735,829 Idaho $5,181,907 $2,058,131 $7,240,038 -6.4%
Illinois $19,496,622 $12,357,745 $31,854,367 Illinois $16,845,953 $11,113,877 $27,959,830 -12.2%
Indiana $12,995,857 $7,994,316 $20,990,173 Indiana $11,146,909 $7,208,168 $18,355,077 -12.6%
Iowa $7,565,448 $4,039,814 $11,605,262 Iowa $6,595,869 $3,668,490 $10,264,359 -11.6%
Kansas $7,530,021 $3,781,030 $11,311,051 Kansas $6,595,020 $3,436,853 $10,031,873 -11.3%
Kentucky $9,455,848 $5,492,721 $14,948,569 Kentucky $8,275,695 $4,968,989 $13,244,684 -11.4%
louisiana $9,999,458 $5,589,694 $15,589,152 louisiana $8,632,297 $5,055,790 $13,688,087 -12.2%
maine $5,259,067 $2,068,743 $7,327,810 maine $5,206,160 $1,904,184 $7,110,344 -3.0%
maryland $12,720,551 $7,166,017 $19,886,568 maryland $11,057,196 $6,466,757 $17,523,953 -11.9%
massachusetts $15,229,770 $8,141,119 $23,370,889 massachusetts $13,459,602 $7,339,572 $20,799,174 -11.0%
michigan $20,143,034 $12,483,796 $32,626,830 michigan $16,543,509 $11,226,706 $27,770,215 -14.9%
minnesota $12,911,644 $6,633,486 $19,545,130 minnesota $10,842,711 $5,990,088 $16,832,799 -13.9%
mississippi $7,527,286 $3,954,888 $11,482,174 mississippi $6,565,242 $3,592,473 $10,157,715 -11.5%
missouri $12,572,343 $7,435,455 $20,007,798 missouri $10,717,722 $6,707,932 $17,425,654 -12.9%
montana $5,166,198 $1,621,303 $6,787,501 montana $5,178,911 $1,503,679 $6,682,590 -1.5%
nebraska $5,876,388 $2,599,056 $8,475,444 nebraska $5,234,954 $2,378,867 $7,613,821 -10.2%
nevada $7,511,623 $3,462,259 $10,973,882 nevada $6,585,802 $3,151,521 $9,737,323 -11.3%
new hampshire $5,349,356 $2,060,815 $7,410,171 new hampshire $5,398,877 $1,897,087 $7,295,964 -1.5%
new Jersey $18,015,661 $10,856,284 $28,871,945 new Jersey $16,184,853 $9,769,919 $25,954,772 -10.1%
new mexico $7,643,606 $2,820,161 $10,463,767 new mexico $6,526,120 $2,576,778 $9,102,898 -13.0%
new York $22,932,149 $13,666,210 $36,598,359 new York $19,284,669 $12,285,085 $31,569,754 -13.7%
north carolina $16,552,440 $11,012,906 $27,565,346 north carolina $14,020,450 $9,910,111 $23,930,561 -13.2%
north Dakota $5,021,860 $1,254,791 $6,276,651 north Dakota $5,180,405 $1,175,614 $6,356,019 1.3%
ohio $20,947,527 $14,124,698 $35,072,225 ohio $17,618,925 $12,695,478 $30,314,403 -13.6%
oklahoma $8,487,239 $4,748,620 $13,235,859 oklahoma $7,509,542 $4,302,943 $11,812,485 -10.8%
oregon $8,871,324 $4,892,898 $13,764,222 oregon $7,829,790 $4,432,087 $12,261,877 -10.9%
pennsylvania $22,808,671 $15,267,347 $38,076,018 pennsylvania $19,774,638 $13,718,265 $33,492,903 -12.0%
Rhode Island $5,150,000 $1,767,281 $6,917,281 Rhode Island $5,302,058 $1,634,345 $6,936,403 0.3%
south carolina $11,034,653 $5,629,437 $16,664,090 south carolina $9,308,851 $5,091,363 $14,400,214 -13.6%
south Dakota $5,150,000 $1,428,159 $6,578,159 south Dakota $5,169,600 $1,330,796 $6,500,396 -1.2%
tennessee $12,711,428 $7,668,219 $20,379,647 tennessee $10,845,628 $6,916,279 $17,761,907 -12.8%
texas $43,194,539 $28,404,362 $71,598,901 texas $37,545,665 $25,477,218 $63,022,883 -12.0%
utah $7,328,511 $3,526,992 $10,855,503 utah $6,464,082 $3,209,463 $9,673,545 -10.9%
Vermont $5,193,078 $1,240,595 $6,433,673 Vermont $5,192,031 $1,162,908 $6,354,939 -1.2%
Virginia $17,063,098 $9,572,306 $26,635,404 Virginia $14,483,987 $8,620,629 $23,104,616 -13.3%
Washington $13,731,541 $8,091,982 $21,823,523 Washington $11,711,066 $7,295,589 $19,006,655 -12.9%
West Virginia $5,898,188 $2,658,572 $8,556,760 West Virginia $5,336,731 $2,432,140 $7,768,871 -9.2%
Wisconsin $13,276,438 $7,095,720 $20,372,158 Wisconsin $11,235,615 $6,403,834 $17,639,449 -13.4%
Wyoming $5,000,000 $1,111,323 $6,111,323 Wyoming $5,169,600 $1,047,196 $6,216,796 1.7%
CDC Total         
FY 10**
ASPR* Total      
FY 10**
Grand Total      
FY 10**
CDC Total         
FY 11**
ASPR* Total      
FY 11**
Grand Total      
FY 11**
Grand Total 
Percent Change  
FY 10 - FY 11
$633,349,277 $356,452,963 $989,802,240 $553,303,778 $321,736,271 $875,040,049 -11.6%
* note that state cDc total funding include funding for cities Readiness Initiative funding, level 1 chemical laboratory funding, eWIDs funding and Risk funding although not 
every state receives funding in all of these supplemental categories.**note that totals do not include funds for three major u.s. metropolitan areas, chicago, l.a. county, 
and new York city, u.s. territories, such as puerto Rico and guam, and Freely associated states of the pacific, such as the marshall Islands. 
source: FY2011 Funding 1) cDc.  public health emergency preparedness cooperative agreement budget period 11 (FY 2011) Funding.  <http://www.cdc.gov/phpr/
documents/Fundingtable_FY_2011.pdf>  (accessed september 8, 2011).  2) hhs.gov.  hhs grants boost Disaster preparedness in hospitals, health care systems.  
news Release, July 1, 2011. <http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2011pres/07/20110701a.html>  FY2010 Funding 1) cDc. public health emergency preparedness coop-
erative agreement budget period 10 extension (FY 2010) Funding.   <http://www.bt.cdc.gov/cdcpreparedness/coopagreement/10/Revised_phep_bp10_extension_Fund-
ing_table_aug2010.pdf> (accessed october 14, 2010).  2)  hhs.gov.  hhs provides $390.5 million to Improve hospital preparedness and emergency Response.  news 
Release, July 7, 2010.  <http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2010pres/07/20100707h.html> (accessed July 8, 2010.)    
appenDIX a:  cDc anD aspR pRepaReDness gRants bY state
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appenDIX b:  Data anD methoDologY FoR state publIc 
health buDgets
TFAH conducted an analysis of state spending 
on public health for the last budget cycle, fiscal 
year 2010-2011.  For those states that only report 
their budgets in biennium cycles, the 2009-2011 
period (or the 2010-2012 and 2010-2011 for Vir-
ginia and Wyoming respectively) was used, and 
the percent change was calculated from the last 
biennium, 2007-2009 (or 2008-2010 and 2009-
2010 for Virginia and Wyoming respectively).
This analysis was conducted from August to 
October of 2011 using publicly available bud-
get documents through state government web 
sites.  Based on what was made publicly avail-
able, budget documents used included either 
executive budget document that listed actual 
expenditures, estimated expenditures, or final 
appropriations; appropriations bills enacted by 
the state’s legislature; or documents from legis-
lative analysis offices.
“Public health” is defined to broadly include all 
health spending with the exception of Medic-
aid, CHIP, or comparable health coverage pro-
grams for low-income residents.  Federal funds, 
mental health funds, addiction or substance 
abuse-related funds, WIC funds, services related 
to developmental disabilities or severely dis-
abled persons, and state-sponsored pharmaceu-
tical programs also were not included in order 
to make the state-by-state comparison more ac-
curate since many states receive federal money 
for these particular programs.  In a few cases, 
state budget documents did not allow these pro-
grams, or other similar human services, to be 
disaggregated; these exceptions are noted.  For 
most states, all state funding, regardless of gen-
eral revenue or other state funds (e.g. dedicated 
revenue, fee revenue, etc.), was used.  In some 
cases, only general revenue funds were used in 
order to separate out federal funds; these ex-
ceptions are also noted.
Because each state allocates and reports its bud-
get in a unique way, comparisons across states 
are difficult.  This methodology may exclude 
programs that, in come cases, the state may con-
sider a public health function, but the method-
ology used was selected to maximize the ability 
to be consistent across states.  As a result, there 
may be programs or items states may wish to 
be considered “public health” that may not be 
included in order to maintain the comparative 
value of the data.
Finally, to improve the comparability of the 
budget data between FY 2009-2010 and FY 
2010-2011 (or between biennium), TFAH ad-
justed the FY 2010-2011 numbers for inflation 
(using a 0.9652 conversion factor based on the 
U.S. Dept. of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics; 
Consumer Price Index Inflation Calculator at 
http://www.bls.gov/cpi/).   
After compiling the results from this online 
review of state budget documents, TFAH coor-
dinated with the Association of State and Terri-
torial Health Officials (ASTHO) to confirm the 
findings with each state health official.  ASTHO 
sent out emails on October 26, 2011 and state 
health officials were asked to confirm or correct 
the data with TFAH staff by November 11, 2011. 
ASTHO followed up via email with those state 
health officials who did not respond by the No-
vember 11, 2011 deadline and were given until 
November 18, 2011 to respond.  The states that 
did not reply by that date were assumed to be in 
accordance with the findings.   
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